Jacob vs Sandiganbayan [GR No. 162206] Case Digest

 

Jacob vs Sandiganbayan

GR No. 162206

 

Facts:

Petitioners Jacob and Legarda were officila of Petron Corporation. Ombudsman indicted several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron for perpetrating the so-called "tax credit scam." Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations against them for the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

 Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan 4^th Division, ordered the dismissal of all criminal cases because the accused had been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and disposition of the cases against them. The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division overruled Justice Nario's verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the accused in the alleged tax credit scam. The motion for reconsideration and motion to quash/dismiss filed the accused were denied by the respondent court.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' right to speedy trial.

 

Held:

No.

 

Ratio:

The test for determining whether an accused was indeed deprived of his right to a speedy trial and disposition of the case against him:

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

SC agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario's dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. 

 

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.  This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.  Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied."  This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.