Vitarich Corporation vs Femina Dagmil [ G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020 ] Case Digest

 

Vitarich Corporation vs Femina Dagmil

[ G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020 ]

Facts:

            Vitarich Corporation filed an action for sum of money against Femina Dagmil before the RTC Branch 11 of Malolos City.  Upon receipt of summons, Femina's counsel, Atty. Nepthali Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case on ground of improper venue. On August 17, 2010, the RTC denied the motion and directed Femina to answer the complaint.4 Atty. Solilapsi received the Order on November 3, 2010 but Femina did not submit any responsive pleading. On January 5,2011, Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default.6 Meantime, Femina's new counsel, Atty. Emilio Quianzon, Jr, entered his appearance and filed on January 31, 2011 a motion to admit answer.

            RTC declared Femina in default and allowed Vitarich to present its evidence ex-parte. Meanwhile, on March 1, 2011, the RTC denied Atty. Quianzon, Jr.'s entry of appearance and Femina's motion to admit answer. On April 1, 2011, the RTC granted the complaint and ordered Femina to pay Vitarich.

            Aggrieved, Femina filed a petition for relief from judgment based on her former counsel's excusable negligence. Allegedly, Atty. Solilapsi failed to timely read the order directing her to file an answer because his secretary placed it on a wrong case folder. Moreover, Atty. Solilapsi was saddled with health issues and seldom reported to his office that made it difficult for her to correspond with him. Femina also filed a motion for new trial claiming mistake and/or excusable negligence and that she has a meritorious defense. On June 7, 2012, the RTC denied the motion for new trial emphasizing that Femina is bound by the action of her counsel. Dissatisfied, Femina filed motions for reconsideration and to resolve the petition for relief from judgment. On May 20, 2013, the RTC denied the motions. CA reversed the April 1, 2011 judgment of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also ordered the RTC to admit Femina's answer.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not Femina be declared in default.

 

Held:

            NO. Given these precepts, we find that the CA correctly reversed the judgment of default. Foremost, Femina moved to admit her answer before she was declared in default. Femina filed her motion through registered mail on January 31, 2011 while the order of default was issued on February 8, 2011. The fact of mailing on the said date is undisputed. It was mentioned in the RTC and CA's findings and admitted in the parties' pleadings. Notably, Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.27 Thus, this circumstance must be fully appreciated in favor of Femina. Applying the Sablas ruling, the RTC should have considered Femina's answer since it was filed before the declaration of default.

            Moreover, persuasive reasons justified the belated filing of the motion to admit answer.28 The records reveal that Atty. Solilapsi had been confined in the hospital twice in January 2011. He was treated for Pulmonary Tuberculosis Class 3 (Intensive Phase) and was advised to take a rest for two months.29 This caused Atty. Solilapsi to be absent from office most of the time and to ask for his discharge as counsel. The delay was compounded by the mistake of Atty. Solilapsi's secretary who placed the order to file answer in the wrong case folder. These predicaments forced Femina to hire a new counsel to defend her case. Further, Femina's answer shows that she has a prima facie meritorious defense. The allegations that Femina did not receive several deliveries and that Vitarich money claims of P15,829,840.00 were bloated must be determined in a full-blown trial. The outcome of the case, after all, will still depend on the strength of the parties' respective evidence. Applying the Hernandez ruling, the RTC should have liberally exercised its discretion and permitted the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period.

            To be sure, there is no showing that Femina intended to delay the proceedings. As the CA aptly held, Femina availed several post-judgment remedies which evinced her desire to file an answer and to establish her defenses. More importantly, Vitarich did not suffer any damage. It appears that Femina's counsel received on November 3, 2010 the notice to file answer and had 15 days or until November 18, 2010 to comply. Yet, Vitarich moved to declare Femina in default only on January 5, 2011 or 48 days from the expiration of the reglementary period. The only conclusion is that Vitarich has not been prejudiced by the delay. Otherwise, Vitarich would not have been lenient and opted to wait that long before invoking its right.

Cruz vs CA [G.R. No. L-58671] Case Digest

 

Cruz vs CA

G.R. No.  L-58671

 

Facts:

Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private respondents herein, in a deed of donation. The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.

Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that he property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother. the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance. Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the CFI Rizal.

Trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

 

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation.

 

Held:

No.

 

Ratio:

In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor.

 

 

Heirs of Placido Miranda v. CA [G.R. No. 109312] Case Digest

 

Heirs of Placido Miranda v. CA

G.R. No. 109312

 

Facts:

Placido Miranda and his wife were owners of a parcel of land, in Pawa-Talon and Guintoan, Palauig, Zambales. Upon their death, the land was administered by their son Maximo Miranda.  Maximo sold the land to Agerico Miranda.  OCT was issued to Agerico Miranda's daughter, Charito. Agerico Miranda has been in possession and cultivation of the land in behalf of his daughter, now a resident of New Jersey, U.S.A.

The heirs of Placido Miranda entered the land and prevented private respondents (Agerico Miranda) from cultivating it, claiming that they were the rightful owners and possessors because Maximo Miranda was merely the administrator of Placido's estate.

Agerico Miranda brought an action for forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The complaint was dismissed by the court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case, but on appeal the RTC at Iba, Zambales reversed and remanded the case to the MCTC.

MCTC rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the land. RTC affirmed in toto the decision MTCC. CA reversed the decision of RTC. Petitioners herein filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity, Annulment of Title and Deed of Sale and Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages and Partition against private respondents.

Respondents alleged that since 1957, they had been in possession and cultivation of the land, planting it to mango and coconut trees. After Charito Miranda had gone to the U.S.A., the land was administered by her father, Agerico Miranda. Upon motion of private respondents, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Agerico Miranda (Respondent) acquired the land by prescription.

 

Held:

Yes.

 

Ratio:

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years if the adverse possession is by virtue of a title and it is in good faith.  Without need of title or of good faith, ownership and other real rights over immovable also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.  For possession to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, it must be under a claim of title or it must be adverse or in the concept of owner.  In this case, therefore, on the basis alone of possession for more than 30 years, private respondents' ownership, acquired through extraordinary prescription, is beyond question.

Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA 316 SCRA 502 (Case Digest)

 

Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA

316 SCRA 502

 

 

Facts:

Private respondents (Crisanta de Castro and others) filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs.

They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches.

 

 

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case

 

 

Held:

Yes.

 

 

Ratio:

As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.