Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina, G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022 [Case Digest]

 

Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina,

G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022

Lazaro- Javier J.

Case Digest

 

Subjects:

            Remedial Law – Jurisdiction and Evidence

            Civil Law - LTD

 

Facts:

            On June 22, 1993, respondents, heirs of Juan Caletina filed before the RTC, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, a complaint for ownership and recovery of possession against petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely: Angel Yadao and companions.

            Respondents averred that they are the grandchildren and surviving heirs of Juan, the registered owner of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 1087 of Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-479 (S). Sometime in 1991, petitioners occupied the subject land and refused to leave despite their opposition and vigorous prohibition. Thus, they brought the matter to the Barangay Captain of Taggat Norte. They failed to reach an agreement.

            Petitioners countered that on September 28, 1962, their parents Josefina Yadao (Josefina) and Domingo Yadao (Domingo) bought Lot 1087 for value and in good faith from Juan's surviving heirs, i.e., his second wife Casiana Dalo, and their sons Hospicio, Jose, and William. The sale was covered by a Contrata written in Ilocano.

            The contract provides the following: We, Jose Calitina, Hospicio Calitina, William Calitina and our mother Marciana Calitina, all of legal age, married and residents of this place, confirm the truth of our agreement concerning our sale of the lot that we inherited from our father who had died, which lot is located at Barrio Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan.
The Contrata was not notarized. But Josefina and Casiana executed another Deed of Absolute Sale on October 15, 1962 on the same Lot 1087 for the same price though this time had it notarized.

            As alleged by petitioners, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 479 (S) was delivered to them. They also averred, without any dispute, that from the time their parents bought Lot 1087, they had been in public and continuous possession thereof. The other defendants in the case below were their tenants in Lot 1087. Petitioners maintained that even assuming that no sale was made on Lot 1087, the fact remained that they had been in possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. On the other hand, as petitioners stressed, respondents brought the matter to court only on June 22, 1993 or more than thirty (30) years after they have taken possession thereof on September 28, 1962. By petitioners' conclusion, acquisitive prescription has ripened their de facto possession of Lot 1087 into legal possession and ownership.

            To prove the allegations in the complaint, Hospicio, Jr. and his mother Dolores Corpuz-Caletina (Dolores) took the witness stand. Dolores, testified that Juan was her father-in-law, being the father of her husband Hospicio, Sr. She admitted that Jose and William were also heirs of Juan as his children. She knew Jose to be Juan's child with another woman before he (Juan) got married to Nicetas. William was also Juan's son from another woman during his marriage to Nicetas. They were the half-brothers of Hospicio, Sr.  Interestingly, Dolores admitted against respondents' interest that after Juan had died, they sold, at least going by her admission, a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest Domingo and Josefina.

            Notably, the owner's duplicate of OCT No. P-479 (S) was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. Although it is not clear who gave the OCT to them, records bear that petitioners were the ones who offered this document in evidence. The delivery and voluntary cession of the OCT to their predecessors-in-interest and petitioners' eventual possession thereof were not contested by respondents. Respondents were able to offer in evidence only a certified copy of OCT No. P-479 (S) from the Register of Deeds in Cagayan.

            Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed Lot 1087 after its sale on September 28, 1962 and thereafter until the present time. Dolores did not deny and has never denied this fact. She has known of their occupation and possession since September 28, 1962.

            Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the assessed value of Lot 1087 was only P5,390.00.

            Trial court at first granted the motion to dismiss; but upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents; trial court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the complaint. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed at the tail end of the hearing when only one witness of petitioner had not testified. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction at that late time of the day.

            RTC decided in favor of respondent. The RTC held that there was no evidence to prove the alleged sale of Lot 1087 to the Yadaos. The Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr., Jose, William, and Casiana was not notarized, hence, it was only a private document which was unenforceable. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, on the other hand, was signed by Casiana who had no authority to do so as she was not a legal heir of Juan Caletina, being his non-marital partner. The RTC also opined that Lot 1087 was acquired during the marriage of Juan to Nicetas.  CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the present case?

 

Held:

            Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the present case. The general rule is that the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time in the proceedings, even on appeal. By way of an exception, however, Tijam v. Sibonghanoy has ruled that estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised later in the proceedings of the case and only after the party raising the argument has actively participated during trial and lost.

            The delay in raising the argument and the moving party's participation in the proceedings has led the court and the opposing party of the waiver of this issue, and as a result, the belated claim if considered and more so if granted would be inefficient and iniquitous as it is opportunistic. The trial was on going for years. In fact, petitioners, as defendants, was about to present their last witness.

 

Issue 2:

            Did petitioners acquire ownership of the subject lot through acquisitive prescription?

 

Held:

            No; Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) declares that "no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. ruled that the ownership and possession of registered land cannot be obtained or acquired by prescription no matter the length of time of one's physical occupation and exercise of juridical rights of possession over the land.

            Hence, since ownership cannot be gained through this means, it follows that the registered owner is not automatically dispossessed of the registered land and foreclosed from getting it back through the passage of time as the registered owner may resort to appropriate remedies to recover the property. Appropriateness, however, requires that the rule on extinctive prescription as explained below has not set in.

 

Issue 3:

            Is respondents' action already barred by prescription?

 

Held:

            Yes; extinctive prescription refers to the rule that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their right over the subject lot. It is a shield rather than a sword – the mere fact that the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own. The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.

            There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.

            In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

            To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

            Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144. The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten­-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

            In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

            Hence, the result of the successful invocation of this rule is that while the registered owner keeps their substantive right over the lot, since acquisitive prescription is not a mode of acquiring ownership of a registered land, they are nonetheless prevented by law from invoking the legal remedies otherwise available to them. When extinctive prescription sets in, the damage done to the registered owner is not recognized as a legal injury – a legal case of damnum absque injuria – and they do not stand to enjoy any legal relief so far as their property (in both senses of title or right and the tangible lot) is concerned.

            The rule is that extinctive prescription does not lie against the heirs of the registered owner seeking recovery of the disputed lot in two instances: first, if the heirs are in actual possession of the lot; and second, if the conveyance to the party in possession of the lot is unlawful, void, or non-existent. In either of these instances, the action to recover the lot is imprescriptible.

            As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

            Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. The rule of imprescriptibility protects not only the registered owner but also the latter's heirs because they step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.

            These truths, however, do not affect the validity and enforceability of the presumably unregistered and factually unnotarized sale. An unregistered and unnotarized sale is valid and enforceable against the parties to the sale. Hospicio, Sr., respondents' predecessor-in-interest, is bound by the sale.

            As a result, we cannot accept Justice Caguioa's claim that there was no valid or even enforceable sale of Lot 1087 to petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, or that the sale was only for a portion thereof. As stated, the unnotarized Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr. and his half­-brothers sold to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest the whole of Lot 1087 for P850, and not only for 400 square meters as subsequently intercalated in the notarized Deed of Sale that Hospicio, Sr. witnessed. But whether for the whole of Lot 1087 or 400 square meters thereof, Hospicio, Sr. more likely than not agreed to these series of sales since the certificate of title for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest as they too at once occupied the entire lot, and collected rentals from the lessees of the portions they did not occupy – without objection from Hospicio, Sr. and Dolores.

            Given these factual circumstances, petitioners' present occupation and possession of Lot 1087 is not unlawful, void, or based on non-existent claim. They have long planted themselves on Lot 1087 under the series of sales by the heirs of the registered owner – without any objection from any of them until 1993 when the relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. For this reason, respondent's action to recover the lot is definitely not imprescriptible. It will be both inefficient and unfair to the truth­-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the courts to insist that prescription has not set in.

            To stress, respondents are now barred from assailing the sale of Lot 1087 and petitioners' possession of this lot by reason of extinctive prescription. The reckoning point for extinctive prescription to set in was when the right of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, i.e., Hospicio, Sr. as Dolores' spouse and respondents' father, who was the heir of Juan, accrued and was violated. This was when Juan died and Hospicio, Sr. acquired property (in the sense of rights) by succession to Lot 1087 and when this lot was sold to and possessed and openly occupied by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, whichever came later.

            Here, this means that the starting date for extinctive prescription was September 28, 1962 and has since been interrupted only on June 22, 1993 when the complaint was filed with the RTC. Hospicio, Sr. could not have but known of his right to Lot 1087 and the violation of his right because –

    (i) he himself sold this lot to petitioners' predecessor-in-interests on September 28, 1962, and

    (ii) they at once openly possessed Lot 1087 by physical occupation for their own use and by leasing portions thereof to other individuals.

 

Issue 4:

            Is there a valid and binding contract selling Lot 1087 to the Yadaos?

 

Held:

           

            In sum, the fact that the Contrata was not notarized does not mean that there was no sale of Lot 1087 between the Caletina's (or Calitina) and the Yadaos. As discussed, even an oral sale of a real property is valid and binding between the parties, their heirs, and assigns.

            More important, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the other pieces of evidence proving that: (i) respondents' privies themselves in fact sold supposedly a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; (ii) the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered contemporaneously to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; and (iii) on September 28, 1962, contemporaneously with the execution of the Contrata, petitioners started their occupation and possession of the entirety of Lot 1087 with respondents' privies' knowledge and without complaints from them and their successors-in-­interest until well into June 22, 1993.

            All in all, what is clear from the evidence is that the heirs of Juan sold Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and petitioners and their successors occupied and possessed the entire lot. There were admissions to this effect from respondents themselves and respondents did not complain for thirty-one (31) years until June 22, 1993. By then, respondents have compromised the truth-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the RTC as a result of the fact that relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. It is thus now too late for respondents to assail and for the courts to upend the validity and enforceability of the Contrata. As we have concluded above, since there is nothing in and about the Contrata that makes it invalid and unenforceable, and in view of the presence of all the elements of a valid and enforceable sale, the Contrata must be upheld in toto to affirm the validity of petitioners' ownership including of course possession of the whole of Lot 1087.

Vaporoso vs. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Vaporoso vs. People,

G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

Second Division [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

Facts:

            At around 7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D. Torculas (PO2 Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo City, he noticed two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road. When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped away. At this point, the owner of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark, secluded area in Bangoy Street, prompting him to call for back-up. Shortly after, Police Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1 Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area.

            About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them. Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to apprehend them. After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from petitioners, the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought them to the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inventory in the presence of Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban.

            RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC that the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the second search conducted to herein appellant which yielded an illegal drug valid.

 

Held:

            No; in warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

            The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

            In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he. did not waver in his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.

            On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."

            Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.

            In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

 

People vs. Olarte, G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019 [Case Digest]

 People vs. Olarte,

G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019

First Division [Germundo, J.]

Facts:

PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were members of Task Force "Boy Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to be responsible for several robbery incidents at Pabayo and Chavez Streets in Cagayan de Oro City. On July 19, 2014, at around 1:30 P.M., PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were conducting discreet monitoring operations in the area. During their watch, they noticed a man walking towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. His features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image was shown in closed circuit television (CCTV) footages of past robberies in the area. As "Boy Solo" was about to enter the establishment, he pulled out a firearm. This prompted PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar to immediately run towards the suspect.  "Boy Solo," however, noticed the police officers running towards him so he ran away. "Boy Solo's" companions – Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and Rodel B. Rubilla, acting as his lookouts, also fled from their posts. They all boarded a Cugman Liner, a public utility jeepney heading towards the Cogon Market. Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested near Ororama Superstore in Cogon after a chase by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.

During the arrest, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar searched accused-appellant's person and recovered a .25 caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly, a flathead screwdriver, and a transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. PO2 Intud then wrapped the grenade with masking tape and marked it with his initials RMI2. Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant to Police Station 1-Divisoria where the incident was recorded in the police blotter.  PO2 Intud then turned over the grenade to the prosecutor but the latter refused to take custody of It. He handed it to Chief Investigator Senior Police Officer 2 Allan Radaza (SPO2 Radaza) who, in turn, entrusted it to the PNP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.  The police officers found out that accused-appellant had no license or permit to possess the M61 hand grenade as well as the .25 caliber pistol, though a replica.

In the course of reconstituting the records, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-830 (illegal possession of hand grenade) seeking to change the reflected fuse assembly marking from "M204X2" to "M204A2." This was eventually granted by the RTC.

RTC rendered a joint judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand grenade, for the following reason: an accused may be arrested and searched without warrant when he/she is attempting to commit an offense. However, it dismissed the case of illegal possession of a .25 caliber pistol replica against accused-appellant because the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-831 was defective. It only alleged that the pistol replica was merely possessed and not used in the commission of a crime as contemplated in Section 35, Article V of R.A. No. 10591.

CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling in Crim. Case No. 2014-830 of the RTC, ratiocinating that: (a) accused-appellant never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal; (b) accused-appellant was validly arrested and searched without a warrant as he was caught attempting to commit a robbery, making the hand grenade admissible in evidence as it was validly obtained; (e) it does not matter if the fuse assembly marking on the grenade, as stated in the information (Criminal Case No. 2014-830), differs from that stated in the arresting officers' judicial affidavits; the alleged discrepancy being "clearly a clerical error" as supported by other documentary evidence (July 28, 2014 Certification, Seizure Receipt, and Extract Blotter), thereby justifying the amendment of the information; and others. 

Accused insists that: (a) his arrest was illegal because PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar merely assumed that he was "Boy Solo" based on CCTV footages and that "one cannot, without a warrant, arrest anyone based on similarities of physical attributes;" (b) "[a] waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest;"  (c) the corpus delicti is doubtful because, when the subject hand grenade was presented in court, the marking "RJVII2" was not found on it and the fuse assembly marking stated in the original information did not match the grenade's serial number and others.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest is valid and the hand grenade seized from the accused-appellant is admissible in evidence.

Held:

Yes. The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless arrests based on probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been committed." Here, the offense had already been consummated but not in the presence of the peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More importantly, there is durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace officer or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or immediate vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases where the peace officer or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act of committing an offense.

"Probable cause" (in the context of warrantless arrests) has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.  While probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest is required only in instances where the peace officer or private person who was present only at the time when the offense was committed believes (based on his/her immediate perception) that an offense had just been committed, some of its yardsticks for determination may be of help in ascertaining whether an accused is attempting to commit an offense. This is because the probable cause needed to justify a warrantless arrest ordinarily involves a certain degree of suspicion, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense based on actual facts.  And such determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior."

Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a reasonable suspicion to arrest accused-appellant who was seen to have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common sense dictates that police officers need not wait for a serious crime, such as robbery, to be consummated before they move in and make the arrest because it will definitely endanger the lives and safety of the public, as well as their own. This is consistent with the jurisprudential dictum that the obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose, as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.  Moreover, even if the firearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the police officers were not expected to know on sight whether the firearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second to act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient ground to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it.  As a result of the validity of the accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the incidental search and seizure of the items in his possession is also valid "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."

Additionally, accused-appellant's argument that the CCTV footage cannot be considered as a valid basis for his arrest fails to persuade. While it is a long-standing rule that reliable information alone (such as footage from a CCTV recording) is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, the rule only requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.  Therefore, it does not matter that accused-appellant was previously identified only from a CCTV footage supposedly covering his previous criminal conduct because he was seen by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar performing an overt act of drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC.

In this case, accused-appellant failed to timely question the illegality of his arrest and to present evidence (or at least some reasonable explanation) to substantiate his alleged wrongful detention. This renders the warrantless arrest and the accompanying search valid; thus, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over his person and making all the items, confiscated from accused-appellant, admissible in evidence. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's validation of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and incidental search.

Object evidence is classified into: (a) actual, physical or "autoptic evidence: those which have a direct relation or part in the fact or incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal examination by the presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual or physical object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or to aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness. Further, actual evidence is subdivided into three categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects); (b) those that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those with no identifying marks (non-unique objects).

The Court promulgated the Judicial Affidavit Rule which mandates parties to file, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference, judicial affidavits executed by their witnesses which shall take the place of their direct testimonies.  Here, parties seeking to offer documentary and/or object evidence are now required to describe, authenticate, and make the same evidence form part of the witness' judicial affidavit under the said Rule. Therefore, as a rule, object evidence now requires authentication or testimonial sponsorship before it may be admitted or considered by the court.

In the case at hand, the chain of custody rule does not apply to an undetonated grenade (an object made unique), for it is not amorphous and its form is relatively resistant to change. A witness of the prosecution need only identify the hand grenade, a structured object, based on personal knowledge that the same contraband or article is what it purports to be—that it came from the person of accused-appellant. Even assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary value of the explosive had been sufficiently established by the prosecution. As aptly observed by the CA:  As previously stated, PO2 Intud, SPO2 Radaza and SPO2 Tingson positively testified as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the grenade presented in court, marked as Exhibit "B-1." PO2 Intud testified that it is the same grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant at the time of his arrest. SPO2 Radaza testified that it is the same grenade turned over [to] him by PO2 Intud. SPO2 Tiongson testified that it is the same grenade turned over to him by SPO2 Radaza. Thus, there is no break in the chain of custody of the grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant.

Porteria vs. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Porteria vs. People,

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

Third Division [Reyes, A., Jr.]

Facts:

            Wilfredo Christian P. Mien is the registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle, 2004 model, with Plate No. EL5401.

            After finishing his shift at about 2:00 p.m., Christian discovered that his motorcycle was no longer in its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian went to the PNP Naga to report that his motorcycle was stolen. The following day, Christian and his brother, Wilfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5-Camarines Sur to report the incident again.

            On February 1, 2011, the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. The Chief of Police of the Ocampo Police Station, Police Inspector Samuel De Asis Villamer (P/Insp. Villamer), dispatched a team to verify the report.

            The report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along me highway of Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, for the illegal possession of firearm. He was, thereafter, subjected to a search of his body and of the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the bag, the arresting officer found an assortment of documents, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian's stolen motorcycle.

            At the Ocampo Police Station, Marvin was asked regarding the documents discovered in his bag. P/Insp. Villamer stated that Marvin responded voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas (Felix) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Later on, P/Insp. Villamer sent a text message to Christian's brother, notifying Him that Marvin was arrested, and that they found the registration of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Christian and his brother then went to the Ocampo Police Station, where they were advised thait Marvin has been transferred to the Naga City District Jail (NCDJ).

            On February 5, 2011, the mother of Christian, Virgie P. Mien (Virgie), went to the NCDJ, intending to talk to Marvin. She asked Marvin about the registration of the subject motorcycle found in his possession, to which Marvin apparently replied by confessing his guilt. Virgie testified that Marvin admitted taking Christian's motorcycle and going on a road trip to Quezon. Marvin also allegedly told Virgie that he left the motorcycle with a certain "Insan Joy," whose address is Phase 5, Southville Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

            That night, Virgie called her friend, who was a police officer, to relay the information she obtained from Marvin. This friend of hers, Police Superintendent Teodorico Bolitic, called her a week later to inform her that the motorcycle was not at the address Marvin provided.

            On March 11, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., a checkpoint was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime A. Cariaso (SPO3 Cariaso) and several other police officers were manning the checkpoint-at that time. By 3:20 p.m., a blue motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Seeing that the driver was not wearing a helmet, the police flagged down the motorcycle, who refused to stop and continued to pass the checkpoint. The police officers chased the motorcycle using their police car, and finally caught up with the driver at around 3:30 p.m.

            The police officers asked the driver of the motorcycle for his license, and for the registration documents of the motorcycle. The driver, later identified as Albert Orino (Albert), was unable to present any document. The police officers, thus, brought Albert to the barangay hall to record the incident in the barangay blotter. He was thereafter taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, together with the motorcycle.

            At the police station, Albert supposedly told the police officers that he does not own the motorcycle. According to SPO3 Cariaso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left him the motorcycle. The police then charged Albert with a traffic violation for driving without a license. After verifying the ownership of the motorcycle, the police notified Christian regarding its recovery.

            Marvin, for his part, denied the accusations of the prosecution. According to him, he met a friend at Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur on February 1, 2011. His friend, a certain Francis Aguilar, was driving a motorcycle and carrying a bag. His friend left the area, leaving behind the motorcycle, with the bag on top of it. Several moments later, police officers approached Marvin and invited him to go to the police station. The invitation was purportedly pursuant to a report of a suspicious person in the area. Marvin refused, but the police officers forced him to go with them.

            The trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of Marvin's co-accused, including Albert, the person in whose possession he motorcycle was found. Nonetheless, in its Judgment promulgated on December 5, 2014, the trial court found Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping, punishable under R.A. No. 6539 [Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972].  C A affirmed Marvin’s conviction.  The CA held that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sufficiently supported the conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of events, which eventually resulted in the recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

 

Issue:

            Whether the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid.

 

Held:

            Yes; the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid. Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose. Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances.

            Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For the case at bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot apply.

            An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it.

            Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in flagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense.

            According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to send a team to verify the report. One of the police officers, SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of Marvin. However, he did not specify the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious person.

            [Direct examination of SPO4 Pequiras by Prosecutor Alan Fernando]:

Q: What is your purpose in conducting the search on his body and his bag that he was carrying?

A: On February 1, 2011[,] we received information that a certain person was seen with a suspicious thing tucked on his waist.

            From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to believe that Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing how Marvin committed a crime, was committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.

            In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot pursuit arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers about the commission of an offense. In Veridiano v. People, the Court ruled on the validity of the warrantless arrest made pursuant to a report of illicit or suspicious activity: Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

            A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

            The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Here, Marvin may no longer raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest.

            As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession of firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized from Marvin's possession as part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

            Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search. A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct.

            In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion or a hunch. Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.

            In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. This is determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the police officers approaching him, or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. For this particular case, however, the Court cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk Marvin.

            Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

            The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity. As the Court explained in People v. Satorre: At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.

            Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to: (a) cause the immediate release of the petitioner, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause; and (b) inform this Court of the date of his release, or the reason for his continued confinement as the case may be, within five (5) days from notice.

Pryde Henry Teves vs. COMELEC and Roel R. Degamo G.R. Nos. 262622 / 262682 [February 14, 2023] CASE DIGEST

 

Pryde Henry Teves vs. COMELEC and Roel R. Degamo

G.R. Nos. 262622 / 262682 [February 14, 2023]

EN BANC [LOPEZ, J. J.]

Facts:

            On October 7, 2021, Roel R. Degamo (Roel) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Negros Oriental under the Nacionalista Party. The following day, Ruel filed his Certi4cate of Candidacy as an independent candidate for the same position. Teves filed his own Certificate of Candidacy to be part of the gubernatorial race.

            Roel filed a Petition before the COMELEC seeking to declare Ruel as a nuisance candidate. Roel claimed that Ruel filed his Certificate of Candidacy for governor to confuse the choice and mind of the voters in Negros Oriental. Roel further claimed that Ruel is a Gaudia and not a Degamo and that he has no birth certificate as he was merely raised by his surrogate guardians, the spouses Jaime Degamo and Ima Gaudia Degamo (spouses Degamo). To prove his claim, Roel submitted the sworn affidavit of Ima Gaudia Degamo.

            Roel also alleged that Ruel is devoid of means, influence, and machinery to launch a campaign for a position as high as governor since his income as an air conditioner mechanic will not be sufficient, and he has not held any elective or appointive position, not even as a barangay tanod. Roel asserted that Ruel was never called as a "Ruel" and it was only in his Certificate of Candidacy that he used such nickname.

            Lastly, Roel claimed that his political rival kidnapped, pressured and bribed a relative of Ruel for the latter to file a Certificate of Candidacy. The affidavit of Rifeniel Degamo (Rifeniel) was submitted to prove the narration of his abduction and the attempt to entice him and his two brothers. Roel further claimed that Rifeniel's wife, Nanchie Degamo (Nanchie) was pressured and bribed to run for a congressional seat but later on withdrew her candidacy. Roel also offered the affidavit of Nanchie to this effect.

            Ruel countered that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to run for a local elective office such as for the position of governor. Thus, there is no valid reason to cancel or deny due course his Certificate of Candidacy. Ruel claimed that to require him or anyone aspiring to run for a public office to have the "means, influence, and machinery" to wage a campaign is tantamount to imposing a property qualification that is not allowed by the Constitution or any law.

            Ruel denied the allegation of Roel that he is not a degamo and that his nickname "Ruel" is merely a pretense. He asserted that his registered name is Ruel G. Degamo and has always bee11 known as Ruel.

            COMELEC Second Division grant the petition and declared that Ruel Degamo a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC Second Division noted that Ruel is known as Ruel Gaudia and it is only recently that he bpted to use Ruel Gaudia Degamo. The presence of two "Degamos", one with a name "Roel" and another with the nickname "Ruel" will necessarily confuse the voters and render worthless a vote for a "Degamo" during the appreciation of votes.  It also declared that Ruel failed to demonstrate his bona fide intention to run for public office in good faith and that no evidence was presented to show that Ruel is aware of the rigors of a campaign, and has abted or is acting in response to these rigors.

            On May 9, 2022, the electorate of Negros Oriental voted for local and national positions without the final resolution on the issue of whether Ruel is a nuisance candidate. As a result, the riiame "Ruel Gaudia Degamo" remained on the official ballot as candidate for governor. The results of the election tally resulted in Teves receiving the highest number of votes. Roel and Ruel came in second and third respectively. The tally of the votes are as follows:

Candidate’s Name	Votes Received
Pryde Henry A. Teves	301,319
Roel Ragay Degamo	281,773
Ruel Gaudia Degamo	49,953

 

            Roel filed manifestation and motion asking the COMELEC En Banc to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration. Roel asserted this Court's ruling in the 2018 case of Santos v. Commission on Elections En Banc, et al., wherein the votes obtained by a nuisance candidate should be credited to a legitimate candidate with similar name, which crediting can be done even after the elections.

            On June 20, 2022, Roel filed before this Court a Petition for Mandamus. He imputed that the COMELEC has the clear legal duty to resolve with dispatch the case for declaration of a nuisance candidate and the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy. Roel asserted that by its nature, a case for declaration of nuisance candidates was purposely designed to be summary and expeditious. He also highlighted that as per the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and pertinent COMELEC Resolutions, the nuisance proceedings may be resolved with finality within a period of 30-60 days.

            On August 16, 2022, this Court granted the Petition for Mandamus filed by Roel. The Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 21-085 (DC) within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.

            On October 3, 2022, the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers convened and proclaimed Roel as the duly elected Governor of the Province of Negros Oriental. The following day, he took his oath of office before President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.

            Teves claimed in G.R. No. 262622 that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that Ruel is a nuisance candidate and the votes cast in his favor should be counted in favor of Roel instead. Teves also stated that because of the active and very specific campaign launched against Ruel, the votes cannot be deemed to have been confused about the identity of the two individuals especially since Roel is a well-known public figure in the province. He stressed that the number of voters in the present case are substantially more than the largest number of voters in favor of any nuisance candidate in jurisprudence.

            Roel countered in his consolidated comment that the COMELEC En Banc did not violate Teves' right to due process. He explained that the exclusion of Teves as party respondent in the nuisance proceedings against Ruel is consistent with the rules and does not violate the principle of due process as the rules require that only those sought to be disqualified should be impleaded.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring Ruel as a nuisance bandidate.

 

Held:

            No; the Omnibus Election Code provides for grounds to seek the disqualification of candidates on varying grounds provided under Sections 68 and 261.  Another means to seek the disqualification of a candidate is provided in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, which states: "Section. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission on Elections may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."

            As can be gleaned from the provision of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code there are two modes of assailing a nuisance candidacy. The first mode authorizes the COMELEC, on its own initiative, to declare a nuisance candidate provided it complies with the due process requirement.  This Court in De Alban v. Commission on Elections, et al., discussed the power of the COMELEC to deny the candidacy of a nuisance candidate even without the intervention of a petitioner.

            A careful reading of the above:-quoted provision would show that the COMELEC En Banc has already made a determination that "Ruel" Degamo was in bad faith in using such name because he was actually known to be "Grego" but suddenly wants to use '"Ruel" in the 2022 National and Local Elections. Moreso, he knows that he is a Gaudia but suddenly used Degamo for purposes of the 2022 National and Local Elections.

            These are factual findings of a specialized agency, which this Court accords respect, and will not be reversed in the absence of any exceptional circumstance. To recapitulate, when Roel filed his Petition to declare Ruel as a nuisance candidate, he presented affidavits supporting his claim that Ruel is not a Degamo, and that he was merely forced to use the said name. The COMELEC gave more weight to the pieces of evidence submitted by Roel. Ultimately, the burden of evidence shifted to Ruel to prove otherwise. As the name of Roel and Ruel can only be separated by a vowel and in fact, pronounced in the same way, which causes confusion, this led the COMELEC En Banc to pronounce that "he has not persuaded us that using "Ruel Degamo" was not intended to confuse voters."

            Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC En Banc, Ruel failed to controvert the fact that he is1legally a Gaudia. There is no showing that he submitted for scrutiny, his birth certificate, to prove his identity as a Degamo. To this Court's mind, this raises doubts as to why, of all pieces of evidence to prove his filiation, Ruel did not bother to present his own birth certificate. This document could easily be secured from the Local Civil Registry or the Philippine Statistics Authority. This would have been the best evidence to controvert the allegation of Roel that Ruel is not a Degamo. We find this omission on the part of Ruel as falling under Section (e) of Rule 131, which provides: "Section 3. Disputable presumptions - The following presentations are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (e) that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."

            In Blue Cross Health Care, Inc; v. Spouses Olivares, We discussed that the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and, (d) the suppression is an exercise of a previ1lege.

            We find that none of the exceptions is present. As to the first exception, it is obvious that Roel could not get hold of a copy of Ruel's birth certificate, as this is not allowed due to the innate privacy limitations in securing such personal document. Second, the suppression appears to be willful as there was no reason to withhold a readily available document for scrutiny. As discussed earlier, Ruel could have easily secured a copy of his birth certificate before the Local Civil Registry or the Philippine Statistics Authority. Third, the birth certificate is not merely corroborative or cumulative as it is the primary document to prove the identity of an individual. In the present case, such document would unequivocally prove that Ruel is a Degamo. Lastly, the evidence is clearly not a document covered by any obligation for it to remain privileged.

            In a Petition for declaration of nuisance candidate, one factor that takes primary consideration is the seriousness to run for public office and not put the electoral process in disrepute. Here, as found by the COMELEC, Roel was able to establish that Ruel was in bad faith in suddenly using Ruel Degamo in the 2022 National and Local Elections. The burden of evidence was eventually shifted to Ruel to prove otherwise. He could have presented the best evidence to show that he was indeed serious in running for the position of governor, if this was the truth. However, he failed to do so.

            In Bautista v. Commission on Elections, this Court disqualified Edwin "Efren" Bautista as a nuisance candidate for the mayoralty race in Navotas because his name was confusingly similar to Cipriano "Efren" Bautista. We similarly found that there was a confusion caused in the case involving candidates Edilito C. Martinez and Celestino A. Martinez III in Martinez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

            Even with the automation of election system, this Court has held that such development will not eliminate confusion on the part of the voters. This was made apparent in the case of Santos, wherein we found that "Roxas Jenn-Rose," was strikingly similar with "Roxas Jenny."

            In reversing the COMELEC, the Court ruled that even in the automated elections, the votes for the nuisance candidate should still be credited to the legitimate candidate. It held that the previous COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 - declaring that the vote cast for a nuisance candidate who had the same surname as the legitimate candidate, should be counted in favor of the latter - remains good law.

            From the Certified List of Voters and the Official Ballot, it can be observed that there is as noticeable likeness to the name of candidates "Roel Degamo" and "Ruel Degamo". First, their names are only distinguishable by one vowel as the incumbent uses the letter "o" while the independent candidate uses the letter "u". Second the name "Roel" and the nickname "Ruel" have similar pronunciation. Likewise, the two candidates used Degamo as their surnames. Similar to the circumstances in Zapanta, the only way to distinguish "Roel" and "Ruel" is their number on the ballot and their political affiliations.

            Anent the allegation of Teves las to the violation of his right to due process, it has already been discussed in Santos, that the status of a winning candidate in a petition for declaration of a nuisance candidate is merely that of an observer. This was reiterated in zapanta.

            Ultimately, this Court upholds the counting of the votes of nuisance candidate Ruel G. Degamo in favor of Roel R. Degamo as it is in accord with our Jurisprudential pronouncements.