Halog vs. Halog, G.R. No. 231695. October 06, 2021 LAZARO-JAVIER, J. [Case Digest]

 

Halog vs. Halog,

G.R. No. 231695. October 06, 2021

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

[Case Digest]

Facts:

            Ma. Virginia testified that she and Wilbur met through a mutual friend. They started as phone pals until they eventually became sweethearts. The first few years of their relationship went smoothly. She was happy that she found someone who provided her with special attention. But later on, the intimacy died down. Frequent misunderstandings ensued between them and Wilbur became temperamental whenever she could not meet his demands.

            They got married on June 12, 1993. While preparing for their wedding, she discovered that Wilbur was having an affair with another woman. But she decided to push through with the wedding to spare her family from the shame and scandal. She stuck to their relationship as she was blinded by her eagerness to maintain what they had, holding onto the hope that Wilbur would change and mend his ways.

            The early stage of their marriage was full of arguments and quarrels. Wilbur would always tell her that he regretted marrying her and that he was not ready for marriage. Being the eldest son, he still had to provide for his family.

            With so much resentment from Wilbur, the love and intimacy between them diminished further. Wilbur became cold and inactive in their sex life, albeit he would engage in extra-marital affairs. Whenever she confronted him about his infidelity, he would ask for forgiveness. And she would forgive him each time. But Wilbur did not change his ways. He continued having an illicit affair with his secretary.

            When they encountered financial difficulties, Wilbur became habitually irritable and more abusive, to the point that once he aimed his gun at her in the midst of their heated argument. He would abuse her even in the presence of their three (3) children.

            In 2005, Wilbur went to Qatar for work so he entrusted to her his network business. Their relationship improved at first and they were again in constant communication. But this period of tranquility did not last. Since she was not knowledgeable of Wilbur's business, he would call her an idiot or stupid whenever she would make a mistake.

            Eventually, Wilbur stopped showing concern for his family. When she told Wilbur that their daughter got diagnosed with dyslexia, he did not care. He even blamed her for their daughter's condition and avoided any responsibility towards their children. He also stopped providing financial support for their subsistence. Considering the many abuses she already suffered in his hands, she, too, had stopped expecting any form of love and concern from him.

            In 2006, she learned that he had been cohabiting with another woman, one Wiley Adolfo Sibulo whom he married in Doha, Qatar on December 14, 2006. The Philippine Embassy in Doha, Qatar issued a report of their marriage and the birth of their child. She and Wilbur had since gotten separated.

            Petitioner's eldest brother Joseph C. Del Rosario testified that his sister had inferiority complex and low self-esteem. She preferred to be alone and isolated because she felt she was the least smart and least favored child of her parents. As a brother, he reached out to her so she eventually became comfortable with him. Their parents tolerated Virginia's attitude and followed her wishes most of the time.

            Jessica Curry Josef testified that she is Ma. Virginia's close friend and confidant. She knew Virginia and Wilbur even before they got married. Virginia would confide her relationship problems to her, including Wilbur's philandering and physical abuses. She corroborated Ma. Virginia's testimony on material points.

            Dr. Melchor C. Gomintong issued his Psychiatric Evaluation Report on Ma. Virginia and Wilbur. He personally examined Virginia and found her to be suffering from Avoidant Personality Disorder. He tried to contact Wilbur for an examination but his efforts proved futile. He nonetheless did a collateral interview with Joseph and Jessica on separate occasions. Finding the information he gathered from them adequate, he diagnosed Wilbur with Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Both Ma. Virginia and Wilbur, therefore, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.

            RTC granted the petition on ground of Wilbur's alleged psychological incapacity. It found that contrary to the assessment of Dr. Gomintong, Ma. Virginia was not suffering from any psychological incapacity. There is nothing wrong with her behavior as her actions only manifested her genuine commitment to Wilbur and her love for their family.  Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Dr. Gomintong's report was insufficient to establish Wilbur's psychological incapacity. For his conclusions were solely based on information fed to him by only one of the parties. He did not use independent evidence to show Wilbur's incapacity; only the allegations of Ma. Virginia, her brother, and her friend were used, albeit the same were merely collateral and hardly objective.

           

 

Issue:

            Did the evidence on record sufficiently support the petition of Ma. Virginia D.R. Halog for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Wilbur Francis G. Halog on ground of psychological incapacity?

 

Held:

            Yes; psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, an expert opinion is not required.

As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been in existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.

To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

            As for the three (3) main criteria for psychological incapacity – gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence, Tan-Andal set new parameters in appreciating these elements. As stated, "gravity" still has to be established, if only to preclude spouses from invoking mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts as ground for nullity. Meanwhile, "incurability," too, should be understood in the legal sense. So long as couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable breakdown of the marriage, the psychological incapacity of a spouse or both spouses is deemed "incurable." Finally, "juridical antecedence" or the existence of the condition prior to the celebration of marriage, is a statutory requirement which must be proven by the spouse alleging psychological incapacity.

           

            Ma. Virginia sufficiently established that her marriage with Wilbur should be nullified on ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.

            Here, there is clear and convincing evidence that Wilbur is psychologically incapacitated from discharging his duties as husband to Ma. Virginia and father to their three (3) children. His condition was present even before he celebrated his marriage to Virginia, rendering their marital union void ab initio.

            a. Manifestations of Wilbur's psychological incapacity - Ma. Virginia's brother Joseph corroborated her testimony. He testified that he meets up with Ma. Virginia about twice a month and they also see each other in their parents' house during special occasions. Whenever they meet, Ma. Virginia would tell him about her marital problems with Wilbur. She would confide in him regarding the physical abuse she had been suffering in the hands of her husband. She also narrated how she got traumatized when Wilbur poked a gun at her during a heated altercation. Joseph also saw bruises and dark marks on different parts of Ma. Virginia's face and body. When asked where she got those from, Ma. Virginia answered that they were caused by her husband Wilbur.

            b. Wilbur is psychologically incapacitated in the legal sense

            First - Juridical Antecedence (i.e. the condition existed prior to the celebration of marriage):            Wilbur's condition has juridical antecedence since his philandering ways were manifest even before the celebration of his marriage with Ma. Virginia. While he and Ma. Virginia were already in a boyfriend – girlfriend relationship, he too had a similar affairs with other women. In fact, just before they, got married, he engaged in a last minute amorous affair. But what he did while working in Qatar beginning 2005 was the worst form of infidelity. He married another woman in December 2006.

            Second – Gravity (i.e. the condition cannot be categorized as mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts): Wilbur resented Ma. Virginia and it showed. He never accorded her the love and respect that was due to her as his wife and partner. He was even vocal about it. Thus, at the early stage of their marriage, Wilbur would always tell Ma. Virginia how he regretted marrying her. He too would repeatedly get caught cheating on his wife with another woman. By poking a gun at Ma. Virginia, Wilbur, too, showed utter disregard to the life of his wife and mother of their children. Finally, the fact that he was willing to marry another woman and have a child with her only about a year after he left for Qatar speaks volumes of his eagerness to sever his relationship with Ma. Virginia and their children, leaving them in the past. Surely, we cannot, by any means, consider Wilbur's condition a mild characterological peculiarity.

            Finally – Incurability (i.e., the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable breakdown of the marriage): Wilbur's condition is also "incurable" in the legal sense since he consistently failed to commit to his relationship with Ma. Virginia. Though Ma. Virginia was aware of Wilbur's affairs and confronted him each time, he always succeeded in making her believe that he would change his ways, but never did. He continued having extramarital relations with women, including his secretary. In the end, he abandoned his wife and children for another woman.

 

Forolan vs. Forolan, G. R. No. 250287, July 20, 2022 LAZARO-JAVIER, J. [Case Digest]

 

Forolan vs. Forolan,

G. R. No. 250287, July 20, 2022

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

[Case Digest]

Facts:

            Petitioner Zeth D. Fopalan filed the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Neil F. Fopalan. She alleged that she met respondent in college as they were both taking up Political Science at Arellano University. One day, respondent just grabbed her hand while she was walking and told her he was infatuated with her. Thereafter, he started sending her love letters and roses. It took a couple ofmonths before she and respondent became a couple but they soon broke up when she learned that respondent had another girlfriend.  Respondent later explained that he was actually dating five different women simultaneously because he was "keeping his options open."

            After they broke up, she focused on her studies and entertained other suitors. After some time, she and respondent started talking again and overtime, they developed a mutual understanding. Even then, she knew that respondent was also seeing another girl, a certain Shirley, and their relationship had been going on for the past seven years.  Respondent confessed to her that he cannot break up with Shirley because the latter had threatened to commit suicide if he did. She (petitioner) also learned that respondent's mother disliked Shirley who worked as a helper to support her studies. Respondent's mother threatened to disinherit him if he married Shirley.

            Despite respondent's other relationship, she (petitioner) continued to see him. She and respondent eventually became sexually intimate but she never thought of demanding from respondent to break up with Shirley.  She just accepted the reality that sooner or later, respondent would have to choose between her and Shirley.

            Shirley, however, got married to another man. This prompted respondent to follow her (petitioner) to her hometown in Dumaguete City where her mother had opened a school. Respondent decided to stay with her in Dumaguete and they lived with the school janitor and the latter's family.

            Much later, they moved to the petitioner's hometown in Romblon. When her entire savings got depleted, she went back to Manila to look for a job. Respondent stayed in Romblon though.  When she found a job in Manila, she rented a small space where she lived alone.  Later on, she got lucky to land a job as a school teacher. She then rented a place in Sta. Mesa where she and respondent lived for two years. She was the only one working and earning while respondent took charge of the household.  Respondent, however, soon got tired of this arrangement so they decided to move back to Dumaguete City.  They went back to work in her family-owned school.

            On October 16, 1999, she gave birth to their son, Matthew Joseph D. Fopalan (Matthew). But she got disappointed with how respondent hostiletreated their new born child. One time, he shook the infant to stop him from crying. The child was later diagnosed with autism.

            As soon as he learned of his son's autism, respondent's attitude toward the latter turned from bad to worse. He never played with his son though he always found time playing basketball with his co-workers every Saturday afternoon. He would not even allow the child to switch channels whenever they happen to watch television together. Over the years, respondent would distance himself farther from the child. He never bonded with his son. He even did bad things to the child, leaving an imprint in the latter's young and vulnerable mind. She could only cry in frustration and pray for respondent to change for the better. Due to his neglect and indifference, she assumed the role of both mother and father to their child Matthew.

            Aside from his manifest inability to love and support his own son, respondent was also unfaithful to her. Sometime in 2011, she read a message on his phone: "Ingat ka. I miss you. I love you." She suspected that the message came from a working student in their school.  She also found a photo of a naked teen girl in his phone. But her desire to preserve their marriage prevailed so she just ignored these things and focused instead on taking care of Matthew.  She also adopted another child so Matthew will have a brother and a playmate.

            Then, she read yet another message from respondent's phone: "Alam rno naman mahal kita 18 years na."  Right off, it dawned upon her that respondent was a hopeless case. He would never change. She confronted him about his attitude and his illicit affairs. But he quickly turned the tables on her, blaming her for causing him to get jealous of her adopted child. She knew he was just making it up since his extramarital affairs long preceded the birth of their son and the adoption of their second child.

            Realizing once more that respondent would never change, she left their home and billeted in a hotel with her two sons. She was, nonetheless, forced to return due to her mother's prodding to work things out with respondent He also threatened to kill himself if she did not return.

            She consulted psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag for a psychiatric evaluation of herself and respondent. When Dr. Tayag talked to respondent's brother to ascertain respondent's whereabouts and invite him to come to her clinic for psychological evaluation, the brother informed Dr. Tayag that he did not know how to contact respondent since he kept changing his phone number. Hence, Dr. Tayag never got the chance to interview respondent himself.

            As for respondent, Dr. Tayag found him to be suffering from narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder and his psychological condition had caused the deterioration of his marriage to petitioner.  This condition is primarily characterized by respondent's "patterns of pervasive grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy along with a complete disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others." Respondent, on the other hand, did not take any part in the proceedings.

            Trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on ground of the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. CA ruled that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently establish respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. For there was nothing to illustrate the gravity, incurability, or root cause of respondent's alleged narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder.

 

Issue:

            Whether CA erred in ruling that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently establish respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.

 

Held:

            Yes; to put things in perspective, Tan-Andal defines psychological incapacity as a "personal condition that prevents a spouse from complying with fundamental marital obligations toward a specific partner and that may have existed at the time of marriage but became evident only through behavior subsequent to the marriage ceremony.''

            In its present interpretation, psychological incapacity is no longer understood as a mental or personality disorder. Viewed in its legal conceptualization, psychological incapacity is now understood as a condition deeply embedded in one's "personality structure" that prevents them from fulfilling the fundamental marital obligations. Whether a person may or may not be aware of it, the condition already exists at the time or even before the solemnization of their marriage but has become manifest only thereafter.

            Characterizations of psychological incapacity have now been modified in Tan-Andal, as follows:

1. As to gravity, the requirement is retained, albeit not in the sense that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be serious or dangerous. Now, one need only to show that the incapacity is caused by a "genuinely serious psychic cause" rendering one "ill-equipped" to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

2. Proof of the juridical antecedence of the psychological incapacity subsists. For one, this is an indispensable requisite under Article 36, which states that the incapacity must be existing "at the time of the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." For another, "it is an accepted principle of all major and recognized theoretical schools within psychology that a person's behavior is determined by the interaction of certain genetic predispositions and by their environment, working in iterative loops of influence."  Verily, it must be shown that the incapacitated spouse has had prior experiences, antedating the marriage, that could be associated to their psychological malady that makes them incapable of complying with their marital obligations.

            The juridical antecedence of the psychological incapacity may be proved by testimonies describing the incapacitated spouse's childhood or environment which may have influenced a particular behavior. An example cited in Tan-Andal is violence against one's spouse and children - it can be a manifestation of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that the violent spouse grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic relationships before the marriage.

            3. Incurability must now be understood not in its medical sense but in its legal sense. Tan-Anda! explains that the psychological incapacity must be proved to be "so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage".

            The totality of petitioner's evidence must, thus, clearly and convincingly establish that respondent is suffering from a psychological incapacity, manifested through acts of dysfunctionality, showing that they are not capable of recognizing, let alone, complying with the basic obligations of marriage.

            Applying these modified guidelines as enunciated in Tan-Andal, the Court finds that petitioner sufficiently established, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The totality of the evidence adequately proved that respondent's personality structure rendered him incapable of recognizing and fulfilling his duties as husband to petitioner and as father to his son Matthew and their adopted child.

            Manifestations of respondent's disordered personality - Petitioner's friend and co-worker Nobleza corroborated the former's testimony. Nobleza had known petitioner and respondent since 1995 and she had witnessed respondent's arrogance and controlling nature. She had also

observed how respondent disrespected petitioner and maltreated his own child. Petitioner and her witness testified that respondent had invariably manifested his psychological incapacity in various ways: first, by failing to provide financial and emotional support to his family; second, by failing to help provide a nurturing environment to his son; and finally, by committing repeated acts of infidelity to his wife.

 

            Gravity:

            Tan-Andal explains that the condition of the psychologically incapacitated spouse cannot be categorized merely as mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts.

            Here, respondent demonstrated an utter failure and unwillingness to fulfill the fundamental obligations as spouse to petitioner and parent to his son

Matthew and their adopted child, which basic duties are defined under Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 221 of the Family Code, respectively.

           

            Juridical Antecedence:

            Juridical antecedence simply means that the condition existed prior to the celebration of marriage.

            Respondent's psychological incapacity is rooted in his childhood. He was adopted by Antonio Sr. and Nazaria together with his other brothers Antonio Jr. and Charton. Their adoptive parents had five biological children, four daughters and one son. The family's living arrangement was that respondent's two brothers continued to reside with their biological parents who lived only next door from their adoptive parents. It was only respondent who lived with their adoptive parents. Growing up, respondent harbored a grudge against the biological son, Antonio Jr. and his adoptive mother as she loved her own son more.  Based on the psychological evaluation of respondent, this unhealthy socio emotional extensions attributed to the formation of respondent's egocentric and irresponsible attitudes, as clearly shown during his cohabitation with petitioner. He came from a confusing situation and this directed the formation of his identity as he was growing up. Having two sets of parents, two sets of values governing him, caused internal chaos for respondent and his caregivers failed to see and correct it.  As for his relationship with his siblings, the same was far from caring and this provoked feelings of insecurity.  Due to these factors in his development, respondent grew up to be insensitive and inconsiderate toward the needs and feelings of those around him.

            Respondent's philandering ways also antedate his marriage. While he and petitioner were dating, he was simultaneously dating other women and he was not even discreet about his situation. He was not ashamed to admit that he was dating five (5) women all at the same time, justifying his action that he was still choosing from among them the best fit. Respondent, thus, demonstrated his egocentricity and his propensity to be unfaithful. His selfishness also manifested in all the other aspects of his married life.

 

            Incurability:

            Tan-Andal teaches that the psychological disorder may also be said to be incurable if "the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage."

            The enduring and persistent quality of respondent's psychological incapacity was adequately shown. Petitioner and respondent had lived together as husband and wife for seventeen (17) years and for this length of time, respondent was relentlessly immature, irresponsible, and indifferent He had never, at any point in the marriage, showed that he would change or improve his ways. Sadly, for petitioner, it took her 17 long years to finally realize that a change of heart for respondent was never coming.

            Further, the personality structures of petitioner and respondent are so adverse to each other, making the breakdown of their marriage inevitable. Respondent, on one hand, is irresponsible, uncaring, and undependable while petitioner, on the other hand, is devoted, trusting, and always too willing to assume the sole responsibility for all obligations in the marriage. By doing so, petitioner had been so consumed such that nothing was left of her, or perhaps, a little amount of self-respect was left, enough to strengthen petitioner to end her relationship with respondent. At any rate, the differences in their personality structures prevented petitioner and respondent from having a loving and peaceful married life.

           

Espiritu vs. Boac-Espiritu, GR No. 247583; October 06, 2021 LAZARO-JAVIER, J. [Case Digest]

 

Espiritu vs. Boac-Espiritu,

GR No. 247583; October 06, 2021

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Facts:

            In August 1998, a common friend introduced them to each other. He courted respondent for a month and eventually became lovers. On July 18, 2000, they got married in Municipal Hall, Talavera, Nueva Ecija officiated by then Mayor Manolito Fausto. They were blessed with three (3) children. They resided in the house owned by respondent's parents in Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

            After a while, he noticed that respondent started showing signs of alleged "psychological incapacity" in performing her marital obligations. She refused to have sex with him for no reason. She told him to look for another woman to satisfy his sexual urges. Also, she did not want to sleep on the same bed with him and demanded to be alone.

            As a police officer, he got assigned to different places so he could only go home once a week. Whenever he was home, however, respondent had the habit of picking fights with him on trivial matters instead of being happy with his company. She was hot-tempered and a constant nagger. When they quarreled, she cursed at him and harshly called him a worthless husband. Since the house where they lived were owned by her parents, she would easily order him to leave. Despite this, he chose to understand her for the sake of their family.

            Respondent, too, did not trust him. Each time he arrived from work, she smelled his clothes for a woman's scent. She regularly checked his cellphone to verify if he had extramarital affairs. She also looked into his wallet and ATM card to verify his withdrawals as she suspected he was spending money for different women. She believed that he resembled her father, a soldier, who abandoned them for another family. She also thought that just like her father, he (petitioner), too, was a womanizer supporting another family. Further, she got jealous whenever he talked to other women, among them, his co-workers' wives. Whenever she got furious, she would drive him away, telling him to meet up with his so-called mistresses. He tried his best to disprove her accusations but it was all in vain. She never believed him. She had no room for compromise and never admitted her mistakes.

            On numerous occasions, she prioritized her friends more than their family. She would go out with them for days leaving their minor children starving. There were times when he was out for work, respondent's aunt would be the one looking after their kids while she spent hours or days with friends. She eventually banished him from their home, blurting "lumayas ka na dito hindi na kita kailangan, doon ka na lang sa mga babae mo!" That forced him to move out and live in his friend's house. They separated in 2008.

            Meantime, he consulted a clinical psychologist, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) who opined that their marriage should be nullified on ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. Dr. Tudla interviewed him, their driver Rolando David (David), and their neighbor Ricardo Maligaya (Maligaya). Both David and Maligaya confirmed the chaotic relationship between him and his wife especially her curses and expletives directed against her husband, mostly spewed within their neighbors' hearing distance, her outbursts on his unworthiness as a husband and several times she drove him away from their home.

            Based on her assessment, Dr. Tudla diagnosed respondent with "Histrionic Personality Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder".

            Trial court denied the petition. The trial court held that the totality of evidence failed to prove respondent's psychological incapacity. Dr. Tudla based her conclusions only from the information offered by petitioner and his collateral witnesses who knew nothing about her childhood or what she was going through as they were simply the family's neighbor and petitioner's driver. Their testimonies were unreliable and even self-serving, hence, devoid of any evidentiary weight.

            Court of Appeals affirmed. It did not give credence to the findings of the clinical psychologist, Dr. Tudla, pertaining to the alleged dysfunctional personality traits of respondent. It noted that since Dr. Tudla relied solely on the information gathered from petitioner, their driver, and neighbor, her findings were actually one-sided and incompetent, therefore, on both grounds unreliable.

 

Issue:

            Whether petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

 

Held:

            Yes; in Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court En Banc revisited the concept of psychological incapacity and how through the years, it was invariably interpreted and applied as a mere medical condition which hinged on mental incapacity or personality disorder. The Court, voting as one, ultimately agreed on a reconfigured concept of psychological incapacity: "Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There may now be proof of the durable aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations."

            Notably, Tan-Andal correctly stated the threshold of evidence in psychological incapacity cases i.e, the spouse alleging psychological incapacity is required to prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

            In the case of marriage, the presumption strongly upholds its validity. Trial courts hearing psychological incapacity cases that are uncontested must invariably bear in mind this legal requirement – a petitioner bears the heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the legal requisites of psychological incapacity in order to rebut the presumptive validity of marriage and obtain the relief that they seek, even if neither the State nor the respondent presents any evidence in chief and depends only on the cross-examination of petitioner's witnesses and objections to the latter's other evidence. To stress – Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

            To repeat, every case to nullify a marriage positions the petitioner as invariably standing against this presumption. Thus, the petitioner must successfully discharge their burden of proving the contrary by clear and convincing evidence the essence of psychological incapacity in order to overcome the presumed validity of one's marriage.

            In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, the Court already decreed that there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by an expert, be it a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist. What is important is the presence of totality of evidence that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity. Tan-Andal, too, cited Marcos. albeit it clarified that Marcos failed to categorically mention that expect opinion is no longer required in proving psychological incapacity.

            Indeed, lay persons can testify about dysfunctional acts that undermine the family. The types of evidence that a lay person may adduce for this purpose are: (i) the reputation of the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated – that is the viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses' relevant communities, (ii) the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative of such incapacity, (iii) the everyday behavior, acts or conduct of the incapacitated spouse, and (iv) the offended spouse's own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.

            These types of evidence may establish circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the family. The relevant circumstances to be proven would include (i) instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act. 9262, (ii) zero probability of reconciliation between the spouses and (iii) failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or marital duties and obligations in a manner clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

            Notably, the third category circumstances refers to the characterization, i.e., clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, that was once used to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological incapacity.

            Since Tan-Andal has abandoned the focus on personality disorders and expert opinions, this characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological incapacity. Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such facts as: (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of actual loss of trust, love, and respect for each other. This is notwithstanding the reality of meaningless marriages which force either or both spouses into chronically unproductive and detached lives, thus, physically and psychologically endangering themselves in the process.

            Applying Tan-Andal here, we find that petitioner was NOT ABLE to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, indeed, respondent is afflicted with psychological incapacity which hinders her from performing her marital duties to petitioner.

            Meanwhile, their driver, David, and their neighbor Maligaya confirmed the chaotic relationship between him and his wife especially her outbursts on his husband and the several times she drove him away from their home.  Even if we believe these testimonies as gospel truth, however, petitioner still failed to provide a complete picture of respondent's supposed psychological incapacity. The Court is faced with more questions than answers on why respondent was acting the way she did: 1) what are those "trivial matters" that made her furious?; 2) why would she regularly sniff his clothes, check his cellphone and ATM card?; 3) what made her believe that he had extramarital affairs?; 4) why would she get jealous over his co-worker's wive?; 5) why did she ask him to move out from their home?; 6) did their driver and neighbor actually understand the root cause of their so called "chaotic relationship"? Clearly petitioner only offered general statements of respondent's supposed manifestations of psychological incapacity. This assumed knowledge pertaining to respondent's acts, even if true, is incomplete to establish petitioner's cause.

            Third. For the same reason given above assailing the probative value of petitioner's evidence, there is as well no clear and convincing evidence for the requisite juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of respondent's personality structure.

            As to juridical antecedence, neither petitioner nor his driver and neighbor grew up with respondent. Admittedly, petitioner met respondent only in August 1998. They are therefore incompetent to prove this requisite.

            Hence, to prove gravity, it must be asked whether there is evidence of conduct, on respondents part, clearly and convincingly that the non-performance is not due to mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to perform marital obligations, but due to her personality structure.

            Here, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the requisite gravity. For one, the more likely inference is that respondent was already fed up with her distrust of petitioner. More, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the nature and make-up of respondent's personality structure and its causative effect upon her non-performance of the obligations of her part of the marriage. Petitioner's declarations that respondents "never believed him," "had no room for compromise" and "never admitted her mistakes" are insufficient to establish a true and serious incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ventura vs. Heirs of Sps. Endaya, G.R. No. 190016 [Case Digest]

 

Ventura vs. Heirs of Sps. Endaya,

G.R. No. 190016,    October 2, 2013

Perlas-Bernabe, J.  Second Division

Case Digest

Facts:

            On June 29, 1981, Dolores Ventura (Dolores) entered into a Contract to Sell with spouses Eustacio and Trinidad Endaya for the purchase of two parcels of land, situated in Marian Road II, Marian Park (now Barangay San Martin de Porres), Parañaque City, Metro Manila.

            The contract to sell provides that the purchase price of ₱347,760.00shall be paid by Dolores in the following manner: (a) down payment of ₱103,284.00 upon execution of the contract; and (b) the balance of ₱244,476.00 within a 15-year period (payment period), plus 12% interest per annum (p.a.) on the outstanding balance and 12% interest p.a. on arrearages. It further provides that all payments made shall be applied in the following order: first, to the reimbursement of real estate taxes and other charges; second, to the interest accrued to the date of payment; third, to the amortization of the principal obligation; and fourth, to the payment of any other accessory obligation subsequently incurred by the owner in favor of the buyer. It likewise imposed upon Dolores the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties, or to reimburse Sps. Endaya for any tax payments made by them, plus 1% interest per month. Upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, Sps. Endaya undertook to execute a final deed of sale and transfer ownership over the same in favor of Dolores.

            Meanwhile, Dolores was placed in possession of the subject properties and allowed to erect a building thereon. However, on April 10, 1992, before the payment period expired, Dolores passed away.

            On November 28, 1996, Dolores’ children, Frederick Ventura, Marites Ventura-Roxas, and Philip Ventura (petitioners), filed before the RTC a Complaint and, thereafter, an Amended Complaint for specific performance, seeking to compel Sps. Endaya to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. In this regard, they averred that due to the close friendship between their parents and Sps. Endaya, the latter did not require the then widowed Dolores to pay the down payment stated in the contract to sell and, instead, allowed her to pay amounts as her means would permit. The payments were made in cash as well as in kind, and the same were recorded by respondent Trinidad herself in a passbook given to Dolores to evidence the receipt of said payments. As of June 15, 1996, the total payments made by Dolores and petitioners amounted to ₱952,152.00, which is more than the agreed purchase price of ₱347,760.00, including the 12% interest p.a. thereon computed on the outstanding balance.

            However, when petitioners demanded the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, Sps. Endaya refused. For their part, Sps. Endaya filed their Answer,19 admitting the execution and genuineness of the contract to sell and the passbook. However, they countered that Dolores did not pay the stipulated down payment and remitted only a total of 22 installments. After her death in1992, petitioners no longer remitted any installment. Sps. Endaya also averred that prior to Dolores' death, the parties agreed to a restructuring of the contract to sell whereby Dolores agreed to give a "bonus" of ₱265,673.93 and to pay interest at the increased rate of 24% p.a. on the outstanding balance. They further claimed that in April 1996, when the balance of the purchase price stood at ₱1,699,671.69, a final restructuring of the contract to sell was agreed with petitioners, fixing the obligation at ₱3,000,000.00. Thereafter, the latter paid a total of ₱380,000.00 on two separate occasions, leaving a balance of ₱2,620,000.00. In any event, Sps. Endaya pointed out that the automatic cancellation clause under the foregoing contract rendered the same cancelled as early as 1981 with Dolores’ failure to make a down payment and to faithfully pay the installments; hence, petitioners’ complaint for specific performance must fail. In addition, Sps. Endaya interposed a counterclaim for the alleged unpaid balance of ₱2,620,000.00, plus damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

            In their Reply with Answer to Counterclaim, petitioners denied the existence of any restructuring of the contract to sell, invoking the Dead Man's Statute and the Statute of Frauds. In turn, Sps. Endaya filed a Rejoinder, challenging the inapplicability of the foregoing principles since the case was not filed against an estate or an administrator of an estate, and in view of the partial performance of the contract to sell.

            RTC found that petitioners were able to prove by a preponderance of evidence the fact of full payment of the purchase price for the subject properties. CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. It found that petitioners were not able to show that they fully complied with their obligations under the contract to sell. It observed that aside from the payment of the purchase price and 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell imposed upon petitioners the obligations to pay 12% interest p.a. on the arrears and to reimburse Sps. Endaya the amount of the pertinent real estate taxes due on the subject properties, which the former, however, totally disregarded as shown in their summary of payments.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not respondents should execute a deed of sale over the subject properties in favor of petitioners.

 

Held:

            No; a thorough review of the records reveals no sufficient reason to warrant the reversal of the CA’s August 18, 2006 Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint for specific performance which sought to enforce the contract to sell and to compel respondents to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties.

            A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price and/or compliance with the other obligations stated in the contract to sell. Given its contingent nature, the failure of the prospective buyer to make full payment and/or abide by his commitments stated in the contract to sell prevents the obligation of the prospective seller to execute the corresponding deed of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from arising.

            To note, while the quality of contingency inheres in a contract to sell, the same should not be confused with a conditional contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale. On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically transferring the seller’s ownership or title to the property to the buyer.

            Keeping with these principles, the Court finds that respondents had no obligation to petitioners to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. As aptly pointed out by the CA, aside from the payment of the purchase price and 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell likewise imposed upon petitioners the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties as well as 12% interest p.a. on the arrears. However, the summary of payments as well as the statement of account submitted by petitioners clearly show that only the payments corresponding to the principal obligation and the 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance were considered in arriving at the amount of ₱952,152.00. The Court has examined the petition as well as petitioners' memorandum and found no justifiable reason for the said omission. Hence, the reasonable conclusion would therefore be that petitioners indeed failed to comply with all their obligations under the contract to sell and, as such, have no right to enforce the same.

Cabrera vs. Ysaac, G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014 Leonen, J. [Case Digest]

Cabrera vs. Ysaac,

G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

Leonen, J.

Case Digest

Facts:

            The heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506. One of the co-owners is respondent, Henry Ysaac.

            Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986. On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to Juan Cabrera. He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for his needs because there was no parking space for his vehicle.

            In order to address Juan Cabrera’s concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of land have a combined area of 439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the two families agree to it.

            Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and Juan Cabrera settled on the price of ₱250.00 per square meter, but Juan Cabrera stated that he could only pay in full after his retirement on June 15, 1992.8 Henry Ysaac agreed but demanded for an initial payment of ₱1,500.00, which Juan Cabrera paid.

            According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him that the Borbe family and the Espiritu family were no longer interested in purchasing the properties they were leasing. Since Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family initially considered purchasing the property and had made an initial deposit for it, Juan Cabrera agreed to reimbursethis earlier payment. On June 9, 1990, Juan Cabrera paid the amount of ₱6,100.00. Henry Ysaac issued a receipt for this amount. ₱3,100.00 of the amount paid was reimbursed to Mamerta Espiritu and, in turn, she gaveJuan Cabrera the receipts issued to her by Henry Ysaac.

            On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However,at that time, Henry Ysaac was in the United States. The only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife. The wife refused to accept Juan Cabrera’s payment.

            On September 21, 1994, Henry Ysaac’s counsel, Atty. Luis Ruben General, wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Leoncio Clemente, Juan Cabrera’s counsel.16 Atty. General informed Atty. Clemente that his client is formally rescinding the contract of sale because Juan Cabrera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the land between May 1990 and May 1992. The letter also stated that Juan Cabrera’s initial payment of ₱1,500.00 and the subsequent payment of ₱6,100.00 were going to be applied as payment for overdue rent of the parcel of land Juan Cabrera was leasing from Henry Ysaac. The letter also denied the allegation of Juan Cabrera that Henry Ysaac agreed to shoulder the costs of the resurveying of the property. Juan Cabrera, together with his uncle, Delfin Cabrera, went to Henry Ysaac’s house on September 16, 1995 to settle the matter.19 Henry Ysaac told Juan Cabrera that he could no longer sell the property because the new administrator of the property was his brother, Franklin Ysaac.

            Due to Juan Cabrera’s inability to enforce the contract of sale between him and Henry Ysaac, he decided to file a civil case for specific performance on September 20, 1995. Juan Cabrera prayed for the execution of a formal deed of sale and for the transfer of the title of the property in his name. He tendered the sum of ₱69,650.00 to the clerk of court as payment of the remaining balance of the original sale price.

            Regional Trial Court of Naga City ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded when the former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price in the period agreed upon. CA ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was not validly rescinded. For the rescission to be valid under Article 1592 of the Civil Code, it should have been done through a judicial or notarial act and not merely through a letter. However, due to the sale of the entire property of the Ysaac family in favor of the local government of Naga City, the Court of Appeals ruled that the verbal contract between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac cannot be subject to the remedy of specific performance. The local government of Naga City was an innocent purchaser for value, and following the rules on double sales, it had a preferential right since the sale it entered into was in a public instrument, while the one with Juan Cabrera was only made orally.

 

Issue:

            Whether there was no valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent.

 

Held:

            No; unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their property, none of them may sell a definite portion of the land. The co-owner may only sell his or her proportionate interest in the co-ownership. A contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio.

            The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. If the seller is not the owner, the seller must be authorized by the owner to sell the object.

            Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract. Sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-owners. However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership.

            These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.

If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property. As summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, "if he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."

Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.

The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This is evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was under the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.

We rule that petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount of money because he paid it as consideration for ownership of the land. Since the ownership of the land could not be transferred to him, the money he paid for that purpose must be returned to him. Otherwise, respondent will be unjustly enriched.

Respondent’s claim for rent in arrears is a separate cause of action from this case. For petitioner’s earnestmoney payment to be considered payment for his rent liabilities, the rules of compensation under Article 1279 of the Civil Code must be followed.