Feati Bank & Trust Co. VS CA
G.R. No. 94209
Facts:
Bernardo E. Villaluz
agreed to sell to the then defendant Axel Christiansen 2,000 cubic meters of
lauan logs at $27.00 per cubic meter FOB.
After inspecting the logs, Christiansen issued purchase order No.
76171.
On the arrangements made and
upon the instructions of the consignee, Hanmi Trade Development, Ltd., de Santa
Ana, California, the Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles, California
issued Irrevocable Letter of Credit available at sight in favor of Villaluz for
the sum of $54,000.00, the total purchase price of the lauan logs. The letter of credit was mailed to the Feati
Bank and Trust Company (now Citytrust) with the instruction to the latter that
it "forward the enclosed letter of credit to the beneficiary."
The letter of credit further
provided that the draft to be drawn is on Security Pacific National Bank and
that it be accompanied by the following documents:
§
Signed Commercial Invoice in four copies showing
the number of the purchase order and certifying that —
o
a. All terms and conditions of the purchase
order have been complied with and that all logs are fresh cut and quality equal
to or better than that described in H.A. Christiansen's telex #201 of May 1,
1970, and that all logs have been marked "BEV-EX."
o
b. One complete set of documents, including 1/3
original bills of lading was airmailed to Consignee and Parties to be advised
by Hans-Axel Christiansen, Ship and Merchandise Broker.
o
c. One set of non-negotiable documents was
airmailed to Han Mi Trade Development Company and one set to Consignee and
Parties to be advised by Hans-Axel Christiansen, Ship and Merchandise Broker.
§
Tally sheets in quadruplicate.
§
2/3
Original Clean on Board Ocean Bills of Lading with Consignee and Parties to be
advised by Hans Axel Christiansen, showing Freight Prepaid and marked Notify:
o
Han Mi Trade Development Company, Ltd., Santa
Ana, California.
§
Certification from Han-Axel Christiansen, Ship
and Merchandise Broker, stating that logs have been approved prior to shipment
in accordance with terms and conditions of corresponding purchase Order.
The logs were thereafter loaded on the vessel
"Zenlin Glory" which was chartered by Christiansen. Before its
loading, the logs were inspected by custom inspectors Nelo Laurente, Alejandro
Cabiao, Estanislao Edera from the Bureau of Customs and representatives Rogelio
Cantuba and Jesus Tadena of the Bureau of Forestry all of whom certified to the
good condition and exportability of the logs.
After
the loading of the logs was completed, the Chief Mate, Shao Shu Wang issued a
mate receipt of the cargo which stated the same are in good condition. However,
Christiansen refused to issue the certification as required in paragraph 4 of
the letter of credit, despite several requests made by the private respondent. Because
of the absence of the certification by Christiansen, the Feati Bank and Trust
Company refused to advance the payment on the letter of credit.
The persistent refusal of
Christiansen to issue the certification prompted the private respondent to
bring the matter before the Central Bank. Central Bank ruled that all log
exports, the certification of the lumber inspectors of the Bureau of Forestry
shall be considered final for purposes of negotiating documents.
Meanwhile, the logs arrived at Inchon, Korea and
were received by the consignee, Hanmi Trade Development Company, to whom
Christiansen sold the logs for the amount of $37.50 per cubic meter. anmi Trade Development Company, on the other
hand sold the logs to Taisung Lumber Company at Inchon, Korea.
Since
the demands by the private respondent for Christiansen to execute the
certification proved futile, Villaluz, instituted an action for mandamus and
specific performance against Christiansen and the Feati Bank and Trust Company
(now Citytrust) before CFI Rizal.
Issue:
Whether or not a
correspondent bank is to be held liable under the letter of credit despite
non-compliance by the beneficiary with the terms thereof.
Held:
No because Petitioner is only a notifying bank. In
case of a notifying bank, the correspondent bank assumes no liability except to
notify and/or transmit to the beneficiary the existence of the letter of
credit.
It is a settled
rule in commercial transactions involving letters of credit that the documents
tendered must strictly conform to the terms of the letter of credit. The tender
of documents by the beneficiary (seller) must include all documents required by
the letter. A correspondent bank which departs from what has been stipulated under
the letter of credit, as when it accepts a faulty tender, acts on its own risks
and it may not thereafter be able to recover from the buyer or the issuing
bank, as the case may be, the money thus paid to the beneficiary Thus the rule
of strict compliance.
The case of Anglo-South
America Trust Co. v. Uhe et al. (184 N.E. 741 [1933]) expounded clearly on
the rule of strict compliance.
We have heretofore held that these letters of
credit are to be strictly complied with which documents, and shipping documents
must be followed as stated in the letter. There is no discretion in the bank or
trust company to waive any requirements. The terms of the letter constitutes an
agreement between the purchaser and the bank.
Under the foregoing provisions of the U.C.P., the bank may only negotiate,
accept or pay, if the documents tendered to it are on their face in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the documentary credit. And since a
correspondent bank, like the petitioner, principally deals only with documents,
the absence of any document required in the documentary credit justifies the
refusal by the correspondent bank to negotiate, accept or pay the beneficiary,
as it is not its obligation to look beyond the documents. It merely has to rely
on the completeness of the documents tendered by the beneficiary.
In regard to the ruling of the lower court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals that the petitioner is not a notifying bank but a confirming bank, we
find the same erroneous.
he trial court appears to have overlooked the fact that an irrevocable
credit is not synonymous with a confirmed credit. These types of letters have
different meanings and the legal relations arising from there varies. A credit
may be an irrevocable credit and at the same time a confirmed
credit or vice-versa.
An irrevocable credit refers to the duration of the letter of credit. What
is simply means is that the issuing bank may not without the consent of the
beneficiary (seller) and the applicant (buyer) revoke his undertaking under the
letter. The issuing bank does not reserve the right to revoke the credit. On
the other hand, a confirmed letter of credit pertains to the kind of obligation
assumed by the correspondent bank. In this case, the correspondent bank gives
an absolute assurance to the beneficiary that it will undertake the issuing
bank's obligation as its own according to the terms and conditions of the
credit.
Hence, the mere fact that a letter of credit is irrevocable does not
necessarily imply that the correspondent bank in accepting the instructions of
the issuing bank has also confirmed the letter of credit. Another error which
the lower court and the Court of Appeals made was to confuse the obligation
assumed by the petitioner.
In commercial transactions involving letters of credit, the functions
assumed by a correspondent bank are classified according to the obligations
taken up by it. The correspondent bank may be called a notifying bank, a
negotiating bank, or a confirming bank.
Doctrine by gpai èCorrespondent Bank is general
term
In case of a notifying bank, the correspondent bank assumes no liability
except to notify and/or transmit to the beneficiary the existence of the letter
of credit. A negotiating bank, on the
other hand, is a correspondent bank which buys or discounts a draft under the
letter of credit. Its liability is dependent upon the stage of the negotiation.
If before negotiation, it has no liability with respect to the seller but after
negotiation, a contractual relationship will then prevail between the
negotiating bank and the seller. In the
case of a confirming bank, the correspondent bank assumes a direct obligation
to the seller and its liability is a primary one as if the correspondent bank
itself had issued the letter of credit.
In this case, the letter merely provided that the
petitioner "forward
the enclosed original credit to the beneficiary." Considering the aforesaid instruction to the
petitioner by the issuing bank, the Security Pacific National Bank, it is
indubitable that the petitioner is only a notifying bank and not a confirming
bank as ruled by the courts below.
If the petitioner was a confirming bank, then a
categorical declaration should have been stated in the letter of credit that
the petitioner is to honor all drafts drawn in conformity with the letter of
credit. What was simply stated therein was the instruction that the petitioner
forward the original letter of credit to the beneficiary.
Since the petitioner was only a notifying bank, its
responsibility was solely to notify and/or transmit the documentary of credit
to the private respondent and its obligation ends there.
The notifying bank may suggest to the seller its
willingness to negotiate, but this fact alone does not imply that the notifying
bank promises to accept the draft drawn under the documentary credit.
A notifying
bank is not a privy to the contract of sale between the buyer and the seller,
its relationship is only with that of the issuing bank and not with the
beneficiary to whom he assumes no liability. It follows therefore that when the petitioner
refused to negotiate with the private respondent, the latter has no cause of
action against the petitioner for the enforcement of his rights under the
letter.
At the most, when the petitioner extended the loan to
the private respondent, it assumed the character of a negotiating bank. Even
then, the petitioner will still not be liable, for a negotiating bank before
negotiation has no contractual relationship with the seller.
In regard to the finding that the petitioner became
a "trustee in relation to the plaintiff (private respondent) as the
beneficiary of the letter of credit," the same has no legal basis.
A trust has been defined as the "right,
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property the legal
title to which is vested to another." (89 C.J.S. 712)
The concept of a trust presupposes the existence of
a specific property which has been conferred upon the person for the benefit of
another. In order therefore for the trust theory of the private respondent to
be sustained, the petitioner should have had in its possession a sum of money
as specific fund advanced to it by the issuing bank and to be held in trust by
it in favor of the private respondent. This does not obtain in this case.
What actually transpires in an irrevocable credit is
that the correspondent bank does not receive in advance the sum of money from
the buyer or the issuing bank. On the contrary, when the correspondent bank
accepts the tender and pays the amount stated in the letter, the money that it
doles out comes not from any particular fund that has been advanced by the
issuing bank, rather it gets the money from its own funds and then later seeks
reimbursement from the issuing bank.
Granting that a trust has been created, still, the
petitioner may not be considered a trustee. As the petitioner is only a
notifying bank, its acceptance of the instructions of the issuing bank will not
create estoppel on its part resulting in the acceptance of the trust.
Precisely, as a notifying bank, its only obligation is to notify the private
respondent of the existence of the letter of credit. How then can such create
estoppel when that is its only duty under the law?
We also find erroneous the statement of the Court of
Appeals that the petitioner "acted as a guarantor of the issuing bank and
in effect also of the latter's principal or client, i.e., Hans Axel
Christiansen."
It is a fundamental rule that an irrevocable credit
is independent not only of the contract between the buyer and the seller but
also of the credit agreement between the issuing bank and the buyer. (See
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 96 N.Y.S. 2d 779 [1949]). The
relationship between the buyer (Christiansen) and the issuing bank (Security
Pacific National Bank) is entirely independent from the letter of credit issued
by the latter.
The concept
of guarantee vis-a-vis the concept of an irrevocable credit are inconsistent
with each other. In the first place, the guarantee theory destroys the
independence of the bank's responsibility from the contract upon which it was
opened. In the second place, the nature of both contracts is mutually in
conflict with each other. In contracts of guarantee, the guarantor's obligation
is merely collateral and it arises only upon the default of the person
primarily liable. On the other hand, in an irrevocable credit the bank
undertakes a primary obligation.
The failure by him to submit the certification was
fatal to his case.1âwphi1 The U.C.P. which is incorporated in the letter of
credit ordains that the bank may only pay the amount specified under the letter
if all the documents tendered are on their face in compliance with the credit.
It is not tasked with the duty of ascertaining the reason or reasons why
certain documents have not been submitted, as it is only concerned with the
documents. Thus, whether or not the buyer has performed his responsibility
towards the seller is not the bank's problem.
We are aware of the injustice committed by
Christiansen on the private respondent but we are deciding the controversy on
the basis of what the law is, for the law is
not meant to favor only those who have been oppressed, the law is to govern
future relations among people as well. Its commitment is to all and not to a
single individual. The faith of the people in our justice system may be eroded
if we are to decide not what the law states but what we believe it should
declare. Dura
lex sed lex.