Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina, G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022 [Case Digest]

 

Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina,

G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022

Lazaro- Javier J.

Case Digest

 

Subjects:

            Remedial Law – Jurisdiction and Evidence

            Civil Law - LTD

 

Facts:

            On June 22, 1993, respondents, heirs of Juan Caletina filed before the RTC, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, a complaint for ownership and recovery of possession against petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely: Angel Yadao and companions.

            Respondents averred that they are the grandchildren and surviving heirs of Juan, the registered owner of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 1087 of Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-479 (S). Sometime in 1991, petitioners occupied the subject land and refused to leave despite their opposition and vigorous prohibition. Thus, they brought the matter to the Barangay Captain of Taggat Norte. They failed to reach an agreement.

            Petitioners countered that on September 28, 1962, their parents Josefina Yadao (Josefina) and Domingo Yadao (Domingo) bought Lot 1087 for value and in good faith from Juan's surviving heirs, i.e., his second wife Casiana Dalo, and their sons Hospicio, Jose, and William. The sale was covered by a Contrata written in Ilocano.

            The contract provides the following: We, Jose Calitina, Hospicio Calitina, William Calitina and our mother Marciana Calitina, all of legal age, married and residents of this place, confirm the truth of our agreement concerning our sale of the lot that we inherited from our father who had died, which lot is located at Barrio Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan.
The Contrata was not notarized. But Josefina and Casiana executed another Deed of Absolute Sale on October 15, 1962 on the same Lot 1087 for the same price though this time had it notarized.

            As alleged by petitioners, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 479 (S) was delivered to them. They also averred, without any dispute, that from the time their parents bought Lot 1087, they had been in public and continuous possession thereof. The other defendants in the case below were their tenants in Lot 1087. Petitioners maintained that even assuming that no sale was made on Lot 1087, the fact remained that they had been in possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. On the other hand, as petitioners stressed, respondents brought the matter to court only on June 22, 1993 or more than thirty (30) years after they have taken possession thereof on September 28, 1962. By petitioners' conclusion, acquisitive prescription has ripened their de facto possession of Lot 1087 into legal possession and ownership.

            To prove the allegations in the complaint, Hospicio, Jr. and his mother Dolores Corpuz-Caletina (Dolores) took the witness stand. Dolores, testified that Juan was her father-in-law, being the father of her husband Hospicio, Sr. She admitted that Jose and William were also heirs of Juan as his children. She knew Jose to be Juan's child with another woman before he (Juan) got married to Nicetas. William was also Juan's son from another woman during his marriage to Nicetas. They were the half-brothers of Hospicio, Sr.  Interestingly, Dolores admitted against respondents' interest that after Juan had died, they sold, at least going by her admission, a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest Domingo and Josefina.

            Notably, the owner's duplicate of OCT No. P-479 (S) was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. Although it is not clear who gave the OCT to them, records bear that petitioners were the ones who offered this document in evidence. The delivery and voluntary cession of the OCT to their predecessors-in-interest and petitioners' eventual possession thereof were not contested by respondents. Respondents were able to offer in evidence only a certified copy of OCT No. P-479 (S) from the Register of Deeds in Cagayan.

            Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed Lot 1087 after its sale on September 28, 1962 and thereafter until the present time. Dolores did not deny and has never denied this fact. She has known of their occupation and possession since September 28, 1962.

            Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the assessed value of Lot 1087 was only P5,390.00.

            Trial court at first granted the motion to dismiss; but upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents; trial court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the complaint. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed at the tail end of the hearing when only one witness of petitioner had not testified. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction at that late time of the day.

            RTC decided in favor of respondent. The RTC held that there was no evidence to prove the alleged sale of Lot 1087 to the Yadaos. The Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr., Jose, William, and Casiana was not notarized, hence, it was only a private document which was unenforceable. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, on the other hand, was signed by Casiana who had no authority to do so as she was not a legal heir of Juan Caletina, being his non-marital partner. The RTC also opined that Lot 1087 was acquired during the marriage of Juan to Nicetas.  CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the present case?

 

Held:

            Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the present case. The general rule is that the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time in the proceedings, even on appeal. By way of an exception, however, Tijam v. Sibonghanoy has ruled that estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised later in the proceedings of the case and only after the party raising the argument has actively participated during trial and lost.

            The delay in raising the argument and the moving party's participation in the proceedings has led the court and the opposing party of the waiver of this issue, and as a result, the belated claim if considered and more so if granted would be inefficient and iniquitous as it is opportunistic. The trial was on going for years. In fact, petitioners, as defendants, was about to present their last witness.

 

Issue 2:

            Did petitioners acquire ownership of the subject lot through acquisitive prescription?

 

Held:

            No; Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) declares that "no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. ruled that the ownership and possession of registered land cannot be obtained or acquired by prescription no matter the length of time of one's physical occupation and exercise of juridical rights of possession over the land.

            Hence, since ownership cannot be gained through this means, it follows that the registered owner is not automatically dispossessed of the registered land and foreclosed from getting it back through the passage of time as the registered owner may resort to appropriate remedies to recover the property. Appropriateness, however, requires that the rule on extinctive prescription as explained below has not set in.

 

Issue 3:

            Is respondents' action already barred by prescription?

 

Held:

            Yes; extinctive prescription refers to the rule that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their right over the subject lot. It is a shield rather than a sword – the mere fact that the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own. The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.

            There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.

            In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

            To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

            Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144. The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten­-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

            In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

            Hence, the result of the successful invocation of this rule is that while the registered owner keeps their substantive right over the lot, since acquisitive prescription is not a mode of acquiring ownership of a registered land, they are nonetheless prevented by law from invoking the legal remedies otherwise available to them. When extinctive prescription sets in, the damage done to the registered owner is not recognized as a legal injury – a legal case of damnum absque injuria – and they do not stand to enjoy any legal relief so far as their property (in both senses of title or right and the tangible lot) is concerned.

            The rule is that extinctive prescription does not lie against the heirs of the registered owner seeking recovery of the disputed lot in two instances: first, if the heirs are in actual possession of the lot; and second, if the conveyance to the party in possession of the lot is unlawful, void, or non-existent. In either of these instances, the action to recover the lot is imprescriptible.

            As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

            Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. The rule of imprescriptibility protects not only the registered owner but also the latter's heirs because they step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.

            These truths, however, do not affect the validity and enforceability of the presumably unregistered and factually unnotarized sale. An unregistered and unnotarized sale is valid and enforceable against the parties to the sale. Hospicio, Sr., respondents' predecessor-in-interest, is bound by the sale.

            As a result, we cannot accept Justice Caguioa's claim that there was no valid or even enforceable sale of Lot 1087 to petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, or that the sale was only for a portion thereof. As stated, the unnotarized Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr. and his half­-brothers sold to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest the whole of Lot 1087 for P850, and not only for 400 square meters as subsequently intercalated in the notarized Deed of Sale that Hospicio, Sr. witnessed. But whether for the whole of Lot 1087 or 400 square meters thereof, Hospicio, Sr. more likely than not agreed to these series of sales since the certificate of title for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest as they too at once occupied the entire lot, and collected rentals from the lessees of the portions they did not occupy – without objection from Hospicio, Sr. and Dolores.

            Given these factual circumstances, petitioners' present occupation and possession of Lot 1087 is not unlawful, void, or based on non-existent claim. They have long planted themselves on Lot 1087 under the series of sales by the heirs of the registered owner – without any objection from any of them until 1993 when the relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. For this reason, respondent's action to recover the lot is definitely not imprescriptible. It will be both inefficient and unfair to the truth­-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the courts to insist that prescription has not set in.

            To stress, respondents are now barred from assailing the sale of Lot 1087 and petitioners' possession of this lot by reason of extinctive prescription. The reckoning point for extinctive prescription to set in was when the right of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, i.e., Hospicio, Sr. as Dolores' spouse and respondents' father, who was the heir of Juan, accrued and was violated. This was when Juan died and Hospicio, Sr. acquired property (in the sense of rights) by succession to Lot 1087 and when this lot was sold to and possessed and openly occupied by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, whichever came later.

            Here, this means that the starting date for extinctive prescription was September 28, 1962 and has since been interrupted only on June 22, 1993 when the complaint was filed with the RTC. Hospicio, Sr. could not have but known of his right to Lot 1087 and the violation of his right because –

    (i) he himself sold this lot to petitioners' predecessor-in-interests on September 28, 1962, and

    (ii) they at once openly possessed Lot 1087 by physical occupation for their own use and by leasing portions thereof to other individuals.

 

Issue 4:

            Is there a valid and binding contract selling Lot 1087 to the Yadaos?

 

Held:

           

            In sum, the fact that the Contrata was not notarized does not mean that there was no sale of Lot 1087 between the Caletina's (or Calitina) and the Yadaos. As discussed, even an oral sale of a real property is valid and binding between the parties, their heirs, and assigns.

            More important, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the other pieces of evidence proving that: (i) respondents' privies themselves in fact sold supposedly a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; (ii) the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered contemporaneously to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; and (iii) on September 28, 1962, contemporaneously with the execution of the Contrata, petitioners started their occupation and possession of the entirety of Lot 1087 with respondents' privies' knowledge and without complaints from them and their successors-in-­interest until well into June 22, 1993.

            All in all, what is clear from the evidence is that the heirs of Juan sold Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and petitioners and their successors occupied and possessed the entire lot. There were admissions to this effect from respondents themselves and respondents did not complain for thirty-one (31) years until June 22, 1993. By then, respondents have compromised the truth-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the RTC as a result of the fact that relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. It is thus now too late for respondents to assail and for the courts to upend the validity and enforceability of the Contrata. As we have concluded above, since there is nothing in and about the Contrata that makes it invalid and unenforceable, and in view of the presence of all the elements of a valid and enforceable sale, the Contrata must be upheld in toto to affirm the validity of petitioners' ownership including of course possession of the whole of Lot 1087.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT

GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., Second Division

 

Subjects:

Constitutional Law

Remedial Law

 

Facts:

                For the benefit of public-school teachers, DepEd devised and implemented a payroll deduction scheme for the loans they secured from DepEd's duly accredited private lenders. RTKBCI was among DepEd's accredited private lenders which availed of the latter's payroll deduction scheme. To facilitate DepEd's collections and remittances, RTKBCI was assigned Deduction Codes 209 and 219. DepEd was also paid two percent of the total monthly deductions as administrative fees.

                By Memorandum dated July 4, 2001, DepEd Undersecretary Ernesto S. Pangan directed Dr. Blanquita D. Bautista, Chief Accountant and Officer-in- Charge, Finance and Management Service to hold the remittance of the collections for February to June 2001; and suspend as well the salary deduction scheme for RTKBCI pending resolution of the teachers' numerous complaints against RTKBCI's alleged unauthorized excessive deductions and connivance with some DepEd's personnel in charge of effecting these deductions.

                Responding to Undersecretary Pangan's directive, RTKBCI wrote the former demanding the release of the collections. By letter dated September 12, 2001, Undersecretary Pangan denied the demand. He asserted that the suspension of the salary deduction scheme was necessary to protect the concerned public school teachers.

                RTKBCI filed with RTC-Manila the petition for mandamus to compel DepEd and then Secretary Raul Roco and Undersecretary Pangan to remit to RTKBCI the loan collections and continue with the salary deduction scheme until the loans of the public school teachers should have been fully paid. Trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for and ordered DepEd to release to RTKBCI the collections amounting to P111,989,006.98. DepEd was also ordered to pay actual damages of P5,000,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500,000.00.

                CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of actual damages.

 

Issue:

                Whether the Department of Education (DepEd) be compelled by writ of mandamus to collect, by salary deductions, the loan payments of public-school teachers and remit them to the Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc. (RTKBCI).

 

Held:

                No; the rules governing the writ of mandamus: One. For the writ of mandamus to prosper, the applicant must prove by preponderance of evidence that "there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act."

                Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station. A clear legal right is one that is founded or granted by law. Unless the right to relief is clear, mandamus will not issue. If there is any discretion as to the taking or non-taking of the action sought, there is no clear legal duty. [Pacheco v. Court of Appeals].

                Further, Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council distinguished a ministerial act from a discretionary act, viz: "A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive."

                Conversely, mandamus will not compel a public official to do anything which is not his or her duty or otherwise give the applicant anything to which he or she is not entitled to under the law. Here, RTKBCI must prove that a law or regulation compels DepEd to continue as RTKBCI's collecting and remitting agent for the loans the latter extended to public school teachers and that RTKBCI is, by such law or regulations, entitled to the collection and remittance of these payments.

                Section 7 of RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) sets forth the power, duties and functions of DepEd and the different levels of supervision and regulation of educational activities. Notably, DepEd's activities as collection and remittance agent for accredited private lending institutions are not among its core power, duties, and functions.

                DepEd, nonetheless, has no legal duty to act as a collecting and remitting agent for RTKBCI. The latter has not shown that it remains an accredited private lending institution entitled to avail of the payroll deduction system. Assuming that RTKBCI is still DepEd accredited, DepEd is not precluded from suspending its activities under the payroll deduction scheme vis-a-vis a private lending agency such as RTKBCI. The payroll deduction scheme expressly describes the services it offers as a privilege. As such, DepEd may act as a collecting and remitting agent for a private lending agency, but doing so must always be in consonance with DepEd's power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155.

                RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its collecting and remitting agent. To reiterate, this is not one ofDepEd's power, duties, and functions. Rather, it is an accommodation that DepEd does - - - not for the benefit of any private lending agency but as a means to protect and promote the teachers' welfare. Hence, the only feasible characterization of this activity its being a mere privilege. To otherwise characterize this activity is to demean and degrade the stature of DepEd as the sovereign regulator and supervisor of basic education and to reduce it to being a mere collection and remittance agency for private lending institutions.

                Second. Neither estoppel nor practice engenders a clear legal duty for DepEd to act as RTKBCI's collection and remittance agent. As held in Pena v. Delos Santos, "[estoppel is a principle in equity and pursuant to Article 1432, Civil Code, it is adopted insofar as it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code and other laws." Estoppel, thus, cannot supplant and contravene the provision of law clearly applicable to a case, and conversely, it cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.

                Continued practice in domestic legal matters does not rise to the level of a legal obligation. The first sentence of Article 7 of the Civil Code states, "[laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary." There can be no clear legal duty and clear legal right where to do so would compel DepEd to violate its power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155, specifically toward the protection and promotion of the teachers' welfare. In the latter case, no practice, continued or otherwise, would establish and validate such clear legal duty and clear legal right.

 

Vaporoso vs. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Vaporoso vs. People,

G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

Second Division [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

Facts:

            At around 7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D. Torculas (PO2 Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo City, he noticed two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road. When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped away. At this point, the owner of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark, secluded area in Bangoy Street, prompting him to call for back-up. Shortly after, Police Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1 Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area.

            About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them. Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to apprehend them. After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from petitioners, the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought them to the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inventory in the presence of Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban.

            RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC that the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the second search conducted to herein appellant which yielded an illegal drug valid.

 

Held:

            No; in warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

            The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

            In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he. did not waver in his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.

            On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."

            Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.

            In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

 

Roel Degamo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212416. December 05, 2018 [Case Digest]

 

Roel Degamo vs. Office of the Ombudsman,

G.R. No. 212416. December 05, 2018

Third Division [Leonen, J]

 

Facts:

            The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (Council) requested the release of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental province (provincial government) to finance the rehabilitation of various infrastructures damaged by Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. he Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., approved the request, charging the amount against the Calamity Fund for Fiscal Year 2012, subject to availability.

                The Department, through its Regional Office No. VII, issued on June 5, 2012 Special Allotment Release Order which covered the approved amount. It also issued a Notice of Cash Allocation worth P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the approved sum.

                In a June 18, 2012 letter to Budget and Management Secretary Florencio Abad (Abad), Public Works and Highways Secretary Rogelio L. Singson requested the Department not to indicate the recipient local government unit in the Special Allotment Release Order yet, since the Department of Public Works and Highways needed to evaluate the local government units' capability to implement projects prior to the release of a fund. Thus, Abad ordered Relampagos to withdraw the previously issued Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation.

                Relampagos informed Degamo that the Department is withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order because its release did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund releases for infrastructure projects. He said this withdrawal was effective until the Department of Public Works and Highways could determine that the local government units are able to implement the projects.

                On June 29, 2012, the Department's Regional Office VII Director advised Degamo that the Special Allotment Release Order had been withdrawn, and ordered the provincial government to return and deposit P480,775,000.00, the previously released amount, to the National Treasury.

                On July 16, 2012, Degamo informed Relampagos that the provincial government would not be returning the funds, and claimed that he was illegally withdrawing funds unbeknownst to higher authorities.

                Degamo filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions against Relampagos. He alleged that when Relampagos wrote the June 19, 2012 letter-advice, Relampagos falsely posed himself to have been authorized by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III. Degamo added that Relampagos usurped the official functions of the Executive Secretary, who had the sole authority to write and speak for and on behalf of the President.

                Relampagos maintained that he wrote the letter as the Department's Undersecretary for Operations. He claimed that he acted upon Abad's instructions, and that the Office of the President was informed of the withdrawal.

                Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint. It found no probable cause to charge Relampagos with Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions since he signed the letter in his own name and under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." There was also no positive express, and explicit representation made. Neither did Relampagos act under pretense of official position, nor without legal authority.

                Degamo filed this Petition for Certiorari, arguing that public respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman, gravely abused its discretion when it held that there was no probable cause to indict private respondent Relampagos of the crime charged.

                Petitioner does not dispute the Department's authority in approving or disapproving Special Allotment Release Orders; however, it must be under the law. According to him, the funding assistance was a calamity fund governed by Republic Act No. 10121, or the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, and the special provisions of Republic Act No. 10155 or the General Appropriations Act of 2012 (2012 GAA), as provided in the Department's Budget Circular No. 2012-2.37 Per these laws, releasing funds to the implementing agency requires the approval of the President with favorable recommendation of the Council. Hence, there was no need for the Department of Public Works and Highways' prior determination before the Special Allotment Release Order could be released.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Complaint for usurpation of authority or official functions, which petitioner filed against private respondent, for lack of probable cause.

 

Held:

            No; SC has adopted a policy of non-interference with public respondent's determination of probable cause. In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.: As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.

            The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

            Moreover, in a special civil action for certiorari, this Court cannot correct errors of fact or law not amounting to grave abuse of discretion. This Court may review public respondent's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, but only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner,"

                In his Complaint, petitioner charged private respondent with violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states: ARTICLE 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

                This law provision penalizes the crimes of usurpation of authority and usurpation of official functions. As worded, any person who commits the punishable acts enumerated can be held liable. This was upheld in People v. Hilvano, where the Court denied the appellant public official's attempt to restrict Article 177's application to private individuals only. The same case held that good faith is a defense against a charge under it.

                The crime of usurpation of authority punishes the act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the government.

                What petitioner posits is that by signing the letter, private respondent led the addressee to believe that he had the authority to do so when he did not, which constitutes usurpation of authority. He is incorrect. The punishable act in usurpation of authority is false and knowing representation, i.e. the malicious misrepresentation as an agent, officer, or representative of the government.

               

 

 

Private respondent did not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent, officer, or representative of the government. He is a public official himself, the Department's Undersecretary for Operations, whom public respondent had found to have signed the letter in his own name and under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary."

Clearly, the facts presented by petitioner do not constitute the crime of usurpation of authority. Public respondent was not in grave abuse of discretion when it found that there was no sufficient evidence to support an indictment for usurpation of authority against private respondent.

The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any person who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.

                Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the elements of the crime of usurpation of official functions are when a person: (1) performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof; (2) acts under pretense of official position; and (3) acts without being lawfully entitled to do so.

As discussed, the public respondent found that private respondent signed the letter in his own name as the Undersecretary for Operations, and under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." Petitioner did not dispute this finding. However, he argues that respondent acted without legal authority and usurped the Executive Secretary's function, as the latter is the only one who can write and speak for and on behalf of the President.

At the onset, private respondent did not claim to write for and on behalf of the President in the letter. This Court fails to see how he usurped the Executive Secretary's function when there was no attempt to represent the President in the letter. In any case, petitioner insists that only the President can withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order from his provincial government.

In Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, this Court acquitted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of Nakar, Quezon, who issued 221 permits for the transportation of salvaged products. The Sandiganbayan convicted him of usurpation of official functions of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, this Court found that the government agency did not have the sole authority to issue the questioned permits, and that local government units may likewise exercise such power under the general welfare clause. Moreover, the permit that Ruzol issued was not intended to replace the one required by the government agency. He was found to have acted in good faith and was acquitted.

Following Ruzol, an inquiry must be made on whether private respondent may exercise the power to withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order through a letter-advice, and whether he acted in good faith.

Private respondent argues that he acted under Abad's authority, under the August 18, 2011 Department Order No. 2011-11. A scrutiny of this document confirms that private respondent himself was designated to sign documents on Abad's behalf, which explicitly includes the Special Allotment Release Order, the Notice of Cash Allocation, and the letter-advice to agencies.

It appears that private respondent was acting on behalf of Abad, upon the instructions of the President. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments.

It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts, which render transaction unconscientious." Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.

The records fail to show that private respondent acted in bad faith in withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order. On the contrary, it appears it was petitioner who acted in bad faith. Private respondent claims that despite the notice of withdrawal and the directive to return the public fund to the National Treasury pending compliance with the rules, petitioner brazenly procured various infrastructure projects. Petitioner was the only one among the local chief executives who disregarded the order from the Executive Department.