Palgan vs. Holy Name University, G.R. No. 219916, Feb. 10, 2021 [Case Digest]

 

Palgan vs. Holy Name University,

G.R. No. 219916, Feb. 10, 2021

Third Division [Hernando, J]

 

Facts:

            Petitioner started working as a Casual or Assistant Clinical Instructor for two semesters for school year (S.Y.) 1992-1993 in HNU's College of Nursing while awaiting the results of her Nursing Board Examination. She alleged that upon her hiring, HNU did not inform her of the standards for the evaluation of her satisfactory completion of her probationary period.

            In the second semester of S.Y. 1994-1995, she was hired as a full-time Clinical Instructor until S.Y. 1998-1999, and was assigned at the Medical Ward. During the second semester of S.Y. 1998-1999, she was transferred to the Guidance Center as a Nursing Guidance Instructor handling guidance, education, and graduate school courses. At this time, she was elected as Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Bohol. Upon her reelection as Municipal Councilor for the 2001-2004 term, she took a leave of absence from HNU.

            Sometime in the year 2004, petitioner rejoined HNU and was given a full-time load for the S.Y. 2004-2005. For S.Y. 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, petitioner signed contracts for term/semestral employment. However, in a notice dated February 28, 2007, HNU informed Arlene that her contract of employment, which would have expired on March 31, 2007, will no longer be renewed.

            Arlene argued that since she taught at HNU for more than six consecutive regular semesters, she already attained the status of a regular employee pursuant to the Manual of Regulations for Private School Teachers. There having been no valid or justifiable cause for her dismissal as she was not guilty of any infractions under the Labor Code or the Manual of Regulations for Private School Teachers, petitioner claimed that her employment was illegally terminated.

            On the other hand, respondents contended that in S.Y. 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, Arlene remained a probationary employee. The completion of her probationary period did not automatically make her a permanent employee since she failed to comply with all the conditions of her probationary employment satisfactorily. Respondents insisted that petitioner was not dismissed; rather, her contract of employment merely expired on March 31, 2007.

            The Arbiter dismissed Arlene's complaint for lack of merit. Since her employment was probationary in nature, she has no vested right yet to a permanent appointment until after the completion of the pre-requisite three-year period for the acquisition of a permanent status.

            The NLRC denied Arlene's appeal and affirmed the ruling of the Arbiter. Palgan filed Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC granted. NLRC held that Palgan was illegally dismissed. CA reversed the decision of NLRC and held that Palgan was not illegally dismissed.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether CA erred in reversing the decision of NLRC.

 

Held:

            No; the governing law for the employment status of teachers/professors/instructors are the manuals of regulations for private schools.

            In Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University (Lacuesta), We held that the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code determines whether or not a faculty member in a private educational institution has attained a permanent or regular status.

            Petitioner did not meet all the criteria required to be considered as a permanent employee. We have laid down in Lacuesta the following requisites before a private school teacher acquires permanent status, namely: 1) The teacher serves full-time; 2) he/she must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and 3) such service must have been satisfactory.

            These requisites find basis in Sections 92 and 93 of the 1992 Manual, which provide: Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on the trimester basis.

            While petitioner has rendered three consecutive years of satisfactory service, she was, however, not a full-time teacher at the College of Nursing of HNU. It must be stressed that only a full-time teaching personnel can acquire regular or permanent status. This rule has been reiterated in a long line of cases, one of which is Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College, where We held: "In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic requirements for the position, she may only be considered as a part-time instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual. In turn, as we have enunciated in a line of cases, a part-time member of the academic personnel cannot acquire permanence of employment and security of tenure under the Manual of Regulations in relation to the Labor Code. We thus quote the ruling of this Court in Lacuesta."

            Petitioner was never qualified to be a full-time faculty due to the apparent lack of the required clinical experience under the governing law and its relevant regulations. Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:

                        a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department under this Manual for all academic personnel;

                        b. Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as provided for in the policies, rules and standards of the Department and the school;

                        c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to the school;

                        d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work that will conflict with the working hours in the school; and

                        e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.

            All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-time.

 

            Petitioner's experience as clinical instructor cannot be considered as "clinical practice experience" as there

is no substantial evidence on record that would prove that petitioner actually engaged in activities that may be considered as clinical practice within the ambit of the law.

            Evidence on record would reveal that petitioner was hired by HNU as a "full-time" clinical instructor assigned at the medical ward from 1994-1997. From 1998-2002, Arlene worked as a "part-time" faculty member until she was again hired in 2004.

            The evidence on record would show that petitioner was not illegally dismissed since no dismissal occurred in the first place. Her fixed-term contract merely expired.

Wilfredo Y. Antiquina v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Masterbulk Pte., Ltd., G.R. No. 168922 (Case Digest)

 

●     Wilfredo Y. Antiquina v.  Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Masterbulk Pte., Ltd., G.R. No. 168922. April 13, 2011

Facts:

                Wilfredo Y. Antiquina was hired, through respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the vessel, M/T Star Langanger, which was owned and operated by respondent Masterbulk Pte., Ltd. (Masterbulk). According to petitioner’s contract of employment. During a routine maintenance of the vessel’s H.F.O Purifier #1, petitioner suffered a fracture on his lower left arm after a part fell down on him. petitioner was diagnosed with "fractura 1/3 proximala cubitus stg." as shown by the medical certificate issued by the attending physician and his arm was put in a cast.

            Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines and mmediately reported to the office of MMC on October 4, 2000 and was referred to Dr. Robert Lim. Dr. Lim subsequently issued a medical report confirming that petitioner has an undisplaced fracture of the left ulna. Another company designated doctor, Dr. Tiong Sam Lim, evaluated petitioner’s condition and advised that petitioner undergo a bone grafting procedure whereby a piece of metal would be attached to the fractured bone. Upon learning from Dr. Tiong Sam Lim that the metal piece will only be removed from his arm after one and a half years, petitioner allegedly reacted with fear and decided not to have the operation. Petitioner filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against herein respondents.

            Respondents contended that petitioner’s monetary claims were premature by reason of the latter’s refusal to undergo the operation recommended by the company designated physician.

            Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded him the amount of US$3,614.00 as sickness allowance; US$80,000.00 "representing [his] permanent medical unfitness benefits under the pertinent provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement"; and attorney’s fees. The NLRC dismissed respondents’ appeal in a Decision and denied their (respondent) motion for reconsideration.

                Undeterred, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with CA. Court of Appeals held that: “Although said evidence were filed for the first time on appeal, it would have been prudent upon the NLRC to look into them since it was not bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity. In fact, labor officials are mandated by Article 221 of the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.”  CA hold that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision awarding [petitioner] US$80,000.00 as medical unfitness benefit, despite the fact that such claim was unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence.

            In his motion for reconsideration of the above Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner claimed that it was only by inadvertence that he previously failed to attach a copy of the CBA. Attached as annexes to his motion were: (a) a purported copy of the CBA (Masterbulk Vessels Maritime Officers Agreement 1999) which allegedly entitled him to US$110,000.00 in disability benefits (an amount even higher than the Labor Arbiter’s award of US$80,000.00); and (b) a copy of his monthly contributions as union member during the period that he was employed by respondents. Thus, he prayed that the Court of Appeals reconsider its May 31, 2005 Decision and award him the higher amount of US$110,000.00 in disability benefits in accordance with the Masterbulk Vessels Maritime Officers Agreement 1999.  Respondents objected to the annexes of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the grounds that his belated filing violated their right to due process and that the list of monthly contributions he presented did not prove he was a member of AMOSUP since the said list did not contain any validation/signature of an AMOSUP officer. Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

 

Issues:

                Whether or not CA committed grave error in NOT admitting and considering the evidence submitted by petitioner (as to his membership of the Union).

                Whether or not CA was clearly biased in favor of the respondents such that it showed liberality to the latter but strictly applied the rules against petitioner.

 

 

Held:

                YES. The Court finds merit in petitioner’s contention that it would be more in keeping with the interest of fairness and substantial justice for the Court of Appeals to likewise admit and review petitioner’s evidence despite being submitted only on appeal. There appears to be no justification for relaxing the rules of procedure in favor of the employer and not taking the same action in the case of the employee, particularly in light of the principle that technical rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class in accordance with the demands of substantial justice. “Rules of procedure and evidence should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases in order that technicalities would not stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties."

            In line with the objective of dispensing substantial justice, this Court has examined the evidence belatedly submitted by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, even with this procedural concession in favor of petitioner, we do not find any sufficient basis to overturn the Court of Appeals’ May 31, 2005 Decision on the merits.

            Although petitioner was able to submit to the Court of Appeals copies of his identification card as an AMOSUP member and a certification from AMOSUP’s Legal Department that he was a member of said union during the period of his employment on the M/T Star Langanger, he still failed to present any copy of respondents’ supposed CBA with AMOSUP. What petitioner belatedly presented on appeal appears to be a CBA between respondent Masterbulk and the Singapore Maritime Officers’ Union, not AMOSUP.

At the outset, it should be noted that the resolution of the foregoing issues entails a review of the facts of the case which ordinarily would not be allowed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

            However, this principle is subject to recognized exceptions. In the labor law setting, the Court will delve into factual issues when conflict of factual findings exists among the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals. Considering that in the present case there were differing factual findings on the part of the Court of Appeals, on one hand, and the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on the other, there is a need to make our own assiduous evaluation of the evidence on record.

 

San Miguel Corporation et.al., v. Layoc, et.al., [G.R. No. 149640] Case Digest

 

●     San Miguel Corporation et.al., v. Layoc, et.al., G.R. No. 149640, Oct 19, 2007

 

 

Facts:

                Respondents were among the "Supervisory Security Guards" of the Beer Division of the San Miguel Corporation.  They started working as guards with the petitioner San Miguel Corporation assigned to the Beer Division on different dates until such time that they were promoted as supervising security guards.

                From the commencement of their employment, the private respondents were required to punch their time cards for purposes of determining the time they would come in and out of the company’s work place. Corollary [sic], the private respondents were availing the benefits for overtime, holiday and night premium duty through time card punching.  In the early 1990’s, the San Miguel Corporation embarked on a Decentralization Program aimed at enabling the separate divisions of the San Miguel Corporation to pursue a more efficient and effective management of their respective operations.

                As a result of the Decentralization Program, the Beer Division of the San Miguel Corporation implemented a "no time card policy" whereby the Supervisory I and II composing of the supervising security guards of the Beer Division were no longer required to punch their time cards.   Consequently, on January 16, 1993, without prior consultation with the private respondents, the time cards were ordered confiscated and the latter were no longer allowed to render overtime work.

                However, in lieu of the overtime pay and the premium pay, the personnel of the Beer Division of the petitioner San Miguel Corporation affected by the "No Time Card Policy" were given a 10% across-the-board increase on their basic pay while the supervisors who were assigned in the night shift (6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) were given night shift allowance ranging from ₱2,000.00 to ₱2,500.00 a month.

                Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law.

                The Labor Arbiter held decision hereby ordering the petitioners to restore to the [respondents] their right to earn for overtime services rendered as enjoyed by the other employees and payment of indemnity.  NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling of Arbiter Canizares that respondents suffered a diminution of benefits as a result of the adoption of the "no time card policy." CA set aside the ruling of the NLRC and entered a new judgment in favor of respondents.

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the "no time card policy" affecting all of the supervisory employees of the Beer Division is a valid exercise of management prerogative

 

Held:

                Yes.

 

Ratio:

                Both petitioners and respondents agree that respondents are supervising security guards and, thus, managerial employees.

                Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. The other provisions in the Title include normal hours of work (Article 83), hours worked (Article 84), meal periods (Article 85), night shift differential (Article 86), overtime work (Article 87), undertime not offset by overtime (Article 88), emergency overtime work (Article 89), and computation of additional compensation (Article 90). It is thus clear that, generally, managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Respondents failed to show that the circumstances of the present case constitute an exception to this general rule.

SC agree with petitioners’ position that given the discretion granted to the various divisions of SMC in the management and operation of their respective businesses and in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting their operations and their personnel, the "no time card policy" affecting all of the supervisory employees of the Beer Division is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The "no time card policy" undoubtedly caused pecuniary loss to respondents. However, petitioners granted to respondents and other supervisory employees a 10% across-the-board increase in pay and night shift allowance, in addition to their yearly merit increase in basic salary, to cushion the impact of the loss. So long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, Court will uphold them.