People vs. Gabiosa, G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020 [Case Digest]

 

People vs. Gabiosa,

G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020

First Division [Caguioa, J]

 

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Facts:

            Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner before the Executive Judge Balagot.  In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero attached the Affidavit of his witness, PO1 Geverola. On the basis of the Affidavit, Judge Balagot conducted a preliminary examination to PO1 Geverola.

            Judge Balagot, then, issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 after finding a probable cause for such issuance. Thereafter, the aforementioned search warrant was served against petitioner.

            Petitioner, however, questioned the validity of the search warrant issued against him. Thus, on March 13, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence claiming that the issuance of the search warrant is grossly violative of his fundamental constitutional and human right.

            RTC denied the Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence (Motion to Quash) filed by Gabiosa. The RTC ruled against Gabiosa's contention that the search warrant was invalid as the judge did not examine the complainant but only his witness. The RTC explained that the judge was not mandatorily required to examine both the complainant and his witness.

            CA granted Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari and set aside the decision of RTC. CA held that the Search Warrant No. 149-2017 is null and void, and the search conducted on its authority is also rendered void. Consequent thereto, any evidence gathered by virtue of the aforementioned search warrant are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

 

Issue:

            Whether the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa.

 

Held:

            Yes. The Petition is granted. The Court rules that the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari, considering that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the validity of the search warrant.

            Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — one of two provisions in the Bill of Rights preserving the citizens' right to privacy  — protects every citizen's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It preserves, in essence, the right of the people "to be let alone" vis-à-vis the far-reaching and encompassing powers of the State, with respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects. It thus ensures protection of the individual from arbitrary searches and arrests initiated and perpetrated by the State. The rationale for the right, particularly of the right to be secure in one's home, was explained in the early case of US. v. Arceo, where the Court elucidated: The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.

            In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause;" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

                The CA's construction of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was inaccurate.  Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the CA, in invalidating the search warrant subject of this case, focused on a word used by the Constitution — "and" — and then ruled that it was the intent of the Constitution that both the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined by the judge before any warrant may be issued.  As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither supported by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the right.

                As early as 1937, in the case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the Court explained that ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause.

                The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary.

                If, despite the use of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as probable cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse — the judge examined the witness only and not the applicant — would not be valid as well. Again, the purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant only, or the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual's privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing undue importance on the Constitution's use of the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or."

In addition, it would be a fruitless exercise to insist that the judge should have examined the complainant as well when, as here, he admittedly did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that constitute the probable cause. Based on the affidavit submitted, it was Police Officer 1 Rodolfo M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola) and his "Action Agent" who had personal knowledge of the circumstances as they were the ones who conducted the surveillance and test buy. Even if, for instance, Judge Balagot examined the complainant, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero (P/Supt Ajero), he would have obtained nothing from the latter because of his lack of personal knowledge. P/Supt Ajero was the complainant only because he was the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City Police Station, but it was never alleged that he participated in any of the prior surveillance conducted.

Porteria vs. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Porteria vs. People,

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

Third Division [Reyes, A., Jr.]

Facts:

            Wilfredo Christian P. Mien is the registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle, 2004 model, with Plate No. EL5401.

            After finishing his shift at about 2:00 p.m., Christian discovered that his motorcycle was no longer in its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian went to the PNP Naga to report that his motorcycle was stolen. The following day, Christian and his brother, Wilfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5-Camarines Sur to report the incident again.

            On February 1, 2011, the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. The Chief of Police of the Ocampo Police Station, Police Inspector Samuel De Asis Villamer (P/Insp. Villamer), dispatched a team to verify the report.

            The report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along me highway of Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, for the illegal possession of firearm. He was, thereafter, subjected to a search of his body and of the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the bag, the arresting officer found an assortment of documents, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian's stolen motorcycle.

            At the Ocampo Police Station, Marvin was asked regarding the documents discovered in his bag. P/Insp. Villamer stated that Marvin responded voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas (Felix) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Later on, P/Insp. Villamer sent a text message to Christian's brother, notifying Him that Marvin was arrested, and that they found the registration of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Christian and his brother then went to the Ocampo Police Station, where they were advised thait Marvin has been transferred to the Naga City District Jail (NCDJ).

            On February 5, 2011, the mother of Christian, Virgie P. Mien (Virgie), went to the NCDJ, intending to talk to Marvin. She asked Marvin about the registration of the subject motorcycle found in his possession, to which Marvin apparently replied by confessing his guilt. Virgie testified that Marvin admitted taking Christian's motorcycle and going on a road trip to Quezon. Marvin also allegedly told Virgie that he left the motorcycle with a certain "Insan Joy," whose address is Phase 5, Southville Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

            That night, Virgie called her friend, who was a police officer, to relay the information she obtained from Marvin. This friend of hers, Police Superintendent Teodorico Bolitic, called her a week later to inform her that the motorcycle was not at the address Marvin provided.

            On March 11, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., a checkpoint was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime A. Cariaso (SPO3 Cariaso) and several other police officers were manning the checkpoint-at that time. By 3:20 p.m., a blue motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Seeing that the driver was not wearing a helmet, the police flagged down the motorcycle, who refused to stop and continued to pass the checkpoint. The police officers chased the motorcycle using their police car, and finally caught up with the driver at around 3:30 p.m.

            The police officers asked the driver of the motorcycle for his license, and for the registration documents of the motorcycle. The driver, later identified as Albert Orino (Albert), was unable to present any document. The police officers, thus, brought Albert to the barangay hall to record the incident in the barangay blotter. He was thereafter taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, together with the motorcycle.

            At the police station, Albert supposedly told the police officers that he does not own the motorcycle. According to SPO3 Cariaso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left him the motorcycle. The police then charged Albert with a traffic violation for driving without a license. After verifying the ownership of the motorcycle, the police notified Christian regarding its recovery.

            Marvin, for his part, denied the accusations of the prosecution. According to him, he met a friend at Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur on February 1, 2011. His friend, a certain Francis Aguilar, was driving a motorcycle and carrying a bag. His friend left the area, leaving behind the motorcycle, with the bag on top of it. Several moments later, police officers approached Marvin and invited him to go to the police station. The invitation was purportedly pursuant to a report of a suspicious person in the area. Marvin refused, but the police officers forced him to go with them.

            The trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of Marvin's co-accused, including Albert, the person in whose possession he motorcycle was found. Nonetheless, in its Judgment promulgated on December 5, 2014, the trial court found Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping, punishable under R.A. No. 6539 [Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972].  C A affirmed Marvin’s conviction.  The CA held that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sufficiently supported the conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of events, which eventually resulted in the recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

 

Issue:

            Whether the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid.

 

Held:

            Yes; the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid. Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose. Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances.

            Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For the case at bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot apply.

            An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it.

            Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in flagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense.

            According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to send a team to verify the report. One of the police officers, SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of Marvin. However, he did not specify the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious person.

            [Direct examination of SPO4 Pequiras by Prosecutor Alan Fernando]:

Q: What is your purpose in conducting the search on his body and his bag that he was carrying?

A: On February 1, 2011[,] we received information that a certain person was seen with a suspicious thing tucked on his waist.

            From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to believe that Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing how Marvin committed a crime, was committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.

            In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot pursuit arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers about the commission of an offense. In Veridiano v. People, the Court ruled on the validity of the warrantless arrest made pursuant to a report of illicit or suspicious activity: Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

            A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

            The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Here, Marvin may no longer raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest.

            As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession of firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized from Marvin's possession as part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

            Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search. A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct.

            In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion or a hunch. Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.

            In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. This is determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the police officers approaching him, or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. For this particular case, however, the Court cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk Marvin.

            Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

            The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity. As the Court explained in People v. Satorre: At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.

            Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to: (a) cause the immediate release of the petitioner, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause; and (b) inform this Court of the date of his release, or the reason for his continued confinement as the case may be, within five (5) days from notice.

Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 263590, [2023] Case Digest

 

Macalintal vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 263590, [2023]

En Banc [Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr.]

Facts:

            Incumbent barangay officials were elected in the May 2018 barangay elections pursuant to R. A. No. 10952. While this law provides for the holding of subsequent barangay elections u on the second Monday of May 2020, the May 2020 barangay election was postponed to December 5, 2022 pursuant to R. A. 11462.

On October 10, 2022, President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., signed R. A. No. 11935. Section 2 of said law provides that it shall take effect immediately following the completion of its publication either in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The said law was published in the Official Gazette on October 12, 2022. Hence, it became effective on October 12, 2022.

            Petitioner is, instituting this case in his capacity as a registered voter of Precinct No. 389A, Barangay Pamplona Dos, Las Pinas City. He has material and legal interest in this case since the assailed R.A. No. 11935 deprives him of an opportunity to elect barangay officials of his choice, in view of the postponement of the December 5, 2022 Barangay Elections, and, instead, appointed/holdover officials are forced upon him

and others similarly situated.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether Congress has no power to postpone the December 5, 2022 Barangay Elections because this power exclusively belongs to the Comelec.

 

Held:

            Yes; the Constitution gives Congress the power to determine or fix the term of office of barangay officials. Clearly, the Constitution does not give Congress the power to "postpone" the barangay elections nor to extend the term of office of the barangay officials. This is so because the power to postpone elections is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) after it has determined that serious causes, as provided under Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code ("OE”C), warrant such postponement. Thus, by enacting a law postponing a scheduled barangay elections, Congress is in effect executing said provision of the OEC or has overstepped its constitutional boundaries and assumed a function that is reserved to Comelec.

            At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Comelec, as an independent Constitutional body, is vested by no less than the 1987 Constitution with broad and exclusive powers to resolve all questions relating to, or affecting, elections.

            Particularly, paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 2, Article IX-C, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, provides: SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions: (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

            (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

            The aforesaid plenary power granted by the Constitution to Comelec, includes the power to postpone elections, when circumstances so warrant. Recognizing this constitutional grant to Comelec, Congress, through Section 5, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, codified into statute this power of Comelec to postpone elections. Thus: Sec. 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

            As stated in this Petition, Congress has absolutely no power to postpone a scheduled election. What the Constitution vested on Congress is the authority to fix the term of office of barangay officials, and not to postpone elections, which is an office reserved to Comelec, being the Constitutional body imbued with the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections.

            The reason for this is because the propriety of postponing elections is part of the administrative and/or quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, after it has determined that the causes provided for under Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code, indeed, exist.

            Being the independent constitutional body specializing in all matters pertaining and relating to elections, Comelec is in the best position to determine whether there exist legal grounds to postpone an upcoming election.

            On the other hand, Congress, being a law-making body, is not authorized by our Constitution to meddle with matters pertaining to the propriety of postponing elections and setting of the date for special elections.

            While due respect is given to legislative ratio or reason, for the enactment of laws, allowing Congress to postpone elections based only on its speculation that the country is suffering from election fatigue, opens the floodgates to abuse. As a matter of fact, even before the passage of R. A. No. 11935, the Comelec said that "it is close to completing preparations for the upcoming December 5 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections even as it remains uncertain if the polls will be held as scheduled."

            By enacting R.A. No. 11935, the legislature is, in effect, executing or implementing Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code, which, it certainly has no power to do so, and which function, is given both by Constitution and statute to Comelec, as only Comelec can decide whether an election should be postponed, after evaluation of prevailing circumstances.

            In this case, Congress, overstepped its constitutional boundaries, and assumed a function that is reserved to Comelec.

            Hence, on these points alone, R.A. No. 11935 must be struck-down for being unconstitutional and null and void.

 

Issue 2:

            Whether Congress has no power to statutorily appoint barangay officials - the Holdover" provision of R. A. No. 11935 is, in effect, an act of Congress appointing them to said position until their successors are duly elected.

 

Held:

            Yes. Congress has no power to statutorily appoint barangay officials-the "holdover" provision of R. A. No. 11935 is in effect, an act of Congress appointing them to said position until their successors are duly elected.

            "Legislative appointment covers 'holdover offices' since a legislative extension of the term of an incumbent is virtually an appointment of the office for the extended time."

            No less than the 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits the appointment of these barangay officials.

            However, in this case, what Congress cannot do directly, it is doing indirectly because in clear circumvention of the law, Congress appointed these barangay officials by postponing the scheduled December 5, 2022 elections, thereby extending their term of office by allowing them to "holdover" to their positions until December 31, 2022.

            In a word, what the Constitution prohibits, the questioned law permits. For sure, Congress is not allowed by the Constitution to appoint any official who, under the Constitution, are supposed to be elected by their respective constituents -the Constitution is very clear that barangay officials are to be elected and not appointed.

            Thus, we learned in Osmena vs. Comelec that: It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term, (citing State v. Clark 89 A. 172, 87 Conn537) and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify with the time.

 

Issue 3:

            Whether R.A. No. 11935 deprives the electorate of their right of suffrage to choose their barangay officials.

 

Held:

            Yes. R.A. No. 11935 deprives the electorate of their right of suffrage to choose their barangay officials. Our Constitution provides that our country is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

            In this case, the barangay officials were precisely elected by the voters to serve only for a term of three years; nothing more, and nothing less.

            However, under this questioned law, Congress imposes upon or compels the electorate to accept their barangay leaders, whether the latter like it or not for an extended period, beyond the three-year term for which they were elected.

            This runs counter to the very essence of the right of suffrage of the people, which is to choose the candidate of their own choice. Otherwise, barangay officials or any elected official for that matter can just hold on to their office indefinitely.

            Thus, in Socrates v. Comelec, this Honorable Court correctly ruled that, "term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders".

            Certainly, to postpone the December 5, 2022 barangay elections is to extend the term of these barangay officials which violates the democratic and republican nature of our government that elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate.

            By providing that incumbent barangay officials shall hold over to their respective posts, the questioned law deprives the electorate of their right to choose their barangay officials through popular elections after the expiration of the term of office of the barangay officials they had elected in the past election.

            By extending the term of office of barangay officials who were elected under a law fixing their term for only three (3) years, Congress has violated the constitutional provision that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service."

            By extending the term of office of barangay officials, R.A. No. 11935 violates the principle that the term of said officials should not be longer than their superiors.

            In David vs. Comelec, this Honorable Court agreed with the position of former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who appeared in said case as amicus curiae, that "the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors." To allow the extension of term of incumbent barangay officials through holdover, is to violate this rule and principle.

           

Yao vs. CA and People, G.R. No. 132428; October 24, 2000 [Case Digest]

 

Yao vs. CA and People,

G.R. No. 132428             October 24, 2000

Facts:

            YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.

            Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCC's President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors.

            Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original.

            The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC's suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.

            MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.

            RTC affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated that "after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court."

            YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.

            Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that "[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, has long become final and executory" and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment.

            YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant's brief on 2 March 1995.

            Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit.

            In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.

 

Issue:

            Whether decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

 

Held:

            The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.

            That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal, for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, with the end result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.

            In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial.

            In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

            Let us quote in full the RTC judgment: This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional. After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court. WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.SO ORDERED.

            That is all there is to it.

            In Francisco v. Permskul, however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus: The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

            It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

            The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

            Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.

            We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco vs. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.

            Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

            Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

            In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question. In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities.

Dumayas vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001 [Case Digest]

 

Dumayas vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

 

Facts:

            Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized elections.1âw During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law." Appellant Dumayas, Jr. submitted his evidence to the Board of Canvassers on 14 May 1998 which consist of (a) the joint affidavits executed by LAMMP watchers (b) affidavit of petitioner’s supporter Virgilisa Capao; (c) joint affidavit of precinct 63A – watcher Nona Dichosa and precinct 62A – watcher Daniel Carmona; (d) blotter report dated 12 May 1998 of Carles PNP, Iloilo; and (d) corroborating affidavit of LAMMP supporter Honorato Gallardo.

            All the supplemental affidavits of the different BEIs categorically declared that the elections in their respective precincts "starting from the start of the voting to its closing, to the counting of votes and to the preparation and submission of election returns" were peaceful, clean, orderly and no acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion and similar acts prohibited by law was (sic) exerted on anybody including the voters and members of the BEIs. They all attested that the incidents alleged by petitioner’s watchers did not happen.

            Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given due course by the COMELEC Second Division.

            Comelec 2^nd division held that Election Return No. 3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No. 3000977 from Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978 from Precinct Nos. 63-A/64-A (clustered).

            Petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-Chairman dissenting, justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an official copy of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.

            Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, said petition included respondent Bernal as one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.

            COMELEC en banc reversed and set aside order of the Second division and annulled the proclamation of Rodolfo Dumayas Jr. Respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the newly-constituted Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles, thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.

            Petitioner claims that March 2, 2000 Resolution of the COMELEC is void because Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and Japal Guiani have already retired on the date of its promulgation, even if they had participated earlier in the deliberations of the case and signed the resolution dated August 24, 1999. Petitioner submits that this defect invalidated the entire decision of the Commission and that accordingly, a new vote should be taken to settle the matter.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent Commission.

 

Held:

            No; as a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.

            Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.

            An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor an election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.

            The allegations contained in Betita’s petition before the regular court do not present any proper issue for either an election protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus Election Code. Spl. Civil Action NO. 98-141 appears to be in the nature of an action for usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on succession of local government officials contained in the Local Government Code. Although said petition is also denominated as a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, it is different in nature from the quo warranto provided for in the Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for determination is either disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent therein. Neither can it be considered as an election protest since what was put forth as an issue in said petition was petitioner’s alleged unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of his alleged illegal proclamation as the winning candidate in the election.

 

 

Issue 2

            Whether the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the contested election returns in the canvassing of ballots.

 

Held:

            No; Although petitioner’s proclamation was undertaken pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC’s Second Division, it appears plain to us that the latter grievously erred in ordering the exclusion of the contested returns from Precincts 61A, 62A and 63A/64A (clustered). On this score, the Comelec en banc correctly reversed the Second Division by holding that petitioner Dumayas failed to justify the exclusion of said returns on the ground of duress, intimidation, threat or coercion. We note that the only evidence submitted by petitioner to prove said irregularities were self-serving affidavits executed by his watchers and supporters. Aside from the fact that these allegations were countered by opposing affidavits made by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties16 and who categorically denied the allegations, the election returns were also observed to be genuine, clean, signed and/or thumb marked by the proper officials and watchers.

            Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC, or any other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on this Court. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.

            In the present case, petitioner barely alleged that the preparation of said returns was attended by threats, duress, intimidation or coercion without offering any proof, other than the affidavits mentioned above, that these had affected the regularity or genuineness of the contested returns. Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are indeed spurious, manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by petitioner would require the reception of evidence aliunde which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy such as the one initiated by petitioner. Returns can not be excluded on mere allegation that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear regular and without any physical signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy.

 

Issue 3:

            In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2, 2000, should said resolution be deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?

 

Held:

            No; in Jamil vs. Commission on Elections, we held that a decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolution’s promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.

            However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision a nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at the time of the resolution’s promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent. Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the defect cited by petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of respondent Commission’s disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the challenged resolution, in our view, would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.