Espiritu vs. Boac-Espiritu,
GR No. 247583; October 06, 2021
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Facts:
In
August 1998, a common friend introduced them to each other. He courted
respondent for a month and eventually became lovers. On July 18, 2000, they got
married in Municipal Hall, Talavera, Nueva Ecija officiated by then Mayor
Manolito Fausto. They were blessed with three (3) children. They resided in the
house owned by respondent's parents in Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
After
a while, he noticed that respondent started showing signs of alleged
"psychological incapacity" in performing her marital obligations. She
refused to have sex with him for no reason. She told him to look for another
woman to satisfy his sexual urges. Also, she did not want to sleep on the same
bed with him and demanded to be alone.
As a
police officer, he got assigned to different places so he could only go home
once a week. Whenever he was home, however, respondent had the habit of picking
fights with him on trivial matters instead of being happy with his company. She
was hot-tempered and a constant nagger. When they quarreled, she cursed at him
and harshly called him a worthless husband. Since the house where they lived
were owned by her parents, she would easily order him to leave. Despite this,
he chose to understand her for the sake of their family.
Respondent,
too, did not trust him. Each time he arrived from work, she smelled his clothes
for a woman's scent. She regularly checked his cellphone to verify if he had
extramarital affairs. She also looked into his wallet and ATM card to verify
his withdrawals as she suspected he was spending money for different women. She
believed that he resembled her father, a soldier, who abandoned them for
another family. She also thought that just like her father, he (petitioner),
too, was a womanizer supporting another family. Further, she got jealous
whenever he talked to other women, among them, his co-workers' wives. Whenever
she got furious, she would drive him away, telling him to meet up with his
so-called mistresses. He tried his best to disprove her accusations but it was
all in vain. She never believed him. She had no room for compromise and never
admitted her mistakes.
On
numerous occasions, she prioritized her friends more than their family. She
would go out with them for days leaving their minor children starving. There
were times when he was out for work, respondent's aunt would be the one looking
after their kids while she spent hours or days with friends. She eventually
banished him from their home, blurting "lumayas ka na dito hindi na kita
kailangan, doon ka na lang sa mga babae mo!" That forced him to move out
and live in his friend's house. They separated in 2008.
Meantime,
he consulted a clinical psychologist, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) who opined
that their marriage should be nullified on ground of respondent's psychological
incapacity. Dr. Tudla interviewed him, their driver Rolando David (David), and
their neighbor Ricardo Maligaya (Maligaya). Both David and Maligaya confirmed
the chaotic relationship between him and his wife especially her curses and
expletives directed against her husband, mostly spewed within their neighbors'
hearing distance, her outbursts on his unworthiness as a husband and several
times she drove him away from their home.
Based
on her assessment, Dr. Tudla diagnosed respondent with "Histrionic
Personality Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder".
Trial
court denied the petition. The trial court held that the totality of evidence
failed to prove respondent's psychological incapacity. Dr. Tudla based her
conclusions only from the information offered by petitioner and his collateral
witnesses who knew nothing about her childhood or what she was going through as
they were simply the family's neighbor and petitioner's driver. Their
testimonies were unreliable and even self-serving, hence, devoid of any
evidentiary weight.
Court
of Appeals affirmed. It did not give credence to the findings of the clinical
psychologist, Dr. Tudla, pertaining to the alleged dysfunctional personality
traits of respondent. It noted that since Dr. Tudla relied solely on the
information gathered from petitioner, their driver, and neighbor, her findings
were actually one-sided and incompetent, therefore, on both grounds unreliable.
Issue:
Whether
petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Held:
Yes; in
Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court En Banc revisited the concept of psychological
incapacity and how through the years, it was invariably interpreted and applied
as a mere medical condition which hinged on mental incapacity or personality
disorder. The Court, voting as one, ultimately agreed on a reconfigured concept
of psychological incapacity: "Psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert
opinion. There may now be proof of the durable aspects of a person's
personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's
personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and,
more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital
obligations."
Notably,
Tan-Andal correctly stated the threshold of evidence in psychological
incapacity cases i.e, the spouse alleging psychological incapacity is required
to prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. Clear and
convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance
of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In
the case of marriage, the presumption strongly upholds its validity. Trial
courts hearing psychological incapacity cases that are uncontested must
invariably bear in mind this legal requirement – a petitioner bears the heavy
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the legal requisites of
psychological incapacity in order to rebut the presumptive validity of marriage
and obtain the relief that they seek, even if neither the State nor the
respondent presents any evidence in chief and depends only on the
cross-examination of petitioner's witnesses and objections to the latter's
other evidence. To stress – Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption
is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
To
repeat, every case to nullify a marriage positions the petitioner as invariably
standing against this presumption. Thus, the petitioner must successfully
discharge their burden of proving the contrary by clear and convincing evidence
the essence of psychological incapacity in order to overcome the presumed
validity of one's marriage.
In
the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, the Court already decreed that there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by an expert, be it a psychiatrist or a clinical
psychologist. What is important is the presence of totality of evidence that
adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity. Tan-Andal, too,
cited Marcos. albeit it clarified that Marcos failed to categorically mention
that expect opinion is no longer required in proving psychological incapacity.
Indeed, lay persons can testify about dysfunctional
acts that undermine the family. The types of
evidence that a lay person may adduce for this
purpose are: (i) the reputation of
the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated – that is the
viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses' relevant communities, (ii)
the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative
of such incapacity, (iii) the everyday behavior, acts or conduct of
the incapacitated spouse, and (iv) the offended spouse's own experience of
neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among
others.
These types of evidence may establish
circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the
family. The relevant circumstances to be proven would include (i) instances of violence against
women and their children as defined in Republic Act. 9262, (ii) zero
probability of reconciliation between the spouses and (iii) failure
of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or marital
duties and obligations in a manner clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Notably, the third category circumstances refers to the
characterization, i.e., clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, that was once used
to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological
incapacity.
Since Tan-Andal has abandoned
the focus on personality disorders and expert opinions, this
characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the
problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological
incapacity. Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such
facts as: (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of
such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one
spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of actual loss of trust, love,
and respect for each other. This is notwithstanding the reality of
meaningless marriages which force either or both spouses into chronically
unproductive and detached lives, thus, physically and psychologically
endangering themselves in the process.
Applying Tan-Andal here, we
find that petitioner was NOT ABLE to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that, indeed, respondent is afflicted with
psychological incapacity which hinders her from performing her marital duties
to petitioner.
Meanwhile, their driver, David,
and their neighbor Maligaya confirmed the chaotic relationship
between him and his wife especially her outbursts on his husband and the
several times she drove him away from their home. Even if we believe these testimonies as
gospel truth, however, petitioner still failed to provide a complete picture of
respondent's supposed psychological incapacity. The Court is faced with more
questions than answers on why respondent was acting the way she did: 1) what
are those "trivial matters" that made her furious?; 2) why would she
regularly sniff his clothes, check his cellphone and ATM card?; 3) what made
her believe that he had extramarital affairs?; 4) why would she get jealous
over his co-worker's wive?; 5) why did she ask him to move out from their
home?; 6) did their driver and neighbor actually understand the root cause of
their so called "chaotic relationship"? Clearly petitioner only
offered general statements of respondent's supposed manifestations of
psychological incapacity. This assumed knowledge pertaining to respondent's
acts, even if true, is incomplete to establish petitioner's
cause.
Third. For the same reason given above assailing the
probative value of petitioner's evidence, there is as well no clear and
convincing evidence for the requisite juridical antecedence, gravity, and
incurability of respondent's personality structure.
As
to juridical antecedence, neither petitioner nor his driver and neighbor grew
up with respondent. Admittedly, petitioner met respondent only in August
1998. They are therefore incompetent to prove this requisite.
Hence, to prove gravity, it must be asked whether there
is evidence of conduct, on respondents part, clearly and convincingly that the
non-performance is not due to mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to
perform marital obligations, but due to her personality structure.
Here, there is no clear
and convincing evidence of the requisite
gravity. For one, the more likely inference is that respondent was already fed
up with her distrust of petitioner. More, there is no clear and convincing
evidence of the nature and make-up of respondent's personality structure and
its causative effect upon her non-performance of the obligations of her part of
the marriage. Petitioner's declarations that respondents "never believed
him," "had no room for compromise" and "never admitted her
mistakes" are insufficient to establish a true and serious incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
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