Yao vs. CA and People, G.R. No. 132428; October 24, 2000 [Case Digest]

 

Yao vs. CA and People,

G.R. No. 132428             October 24, 2000

Facts:

            YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.

            Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCC's President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors.

            Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original.

            The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC's suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.

            MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.

            RTC affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated that "after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court."

            YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.

            Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that "[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, has long become final and executory" and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment.

            YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant's brief on 2 March 1995.

            Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit.

            In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.

 

Issue:

            Whether decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

 

Held:

            The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.

            That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal, for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, with the end result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.

            In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial.

            In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

            Let us quote in full the RTC judgment: This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional. After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court. WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.SO ORDERED.

            That is all there is to it.

            In Francisco v. Permskul, however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus: The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

            It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

            The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

            Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.

            We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco vs. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.

            Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

            Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

            In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question. In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities.