Porteria vs. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Porteria vs. People,

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

Third Division [Reyes, A., Jr.]

Facts:

            Wilfredo Christian P. Mien is the registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle, 2004 model, with Plate No. EL5401.

            After finishing his shift at about 2:00 p.m., Christian discovered that his motorcycle was no longer in its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian went to the PNP Naga to report that his motorcycle was stolen. The following day, Christian and his brother, Wilfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5-Camarines Sur to report the incident again.

            On February 1, 2011, the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. The Chief of Police of the Ocampo Police Station, Police Inspector Samuel De Asis Villamer (P/Insp. Villamer), dispatched a team to verify the report.

            The report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along me highway of Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, for the illegal possession of firearm. He was, thereafter, subjected to a search of his body and of the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the bag, the arresting officer found an assortment of documents, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian's stolen motorcycle.

            At the Ocampo Police Station, Marvin was asked regarding the documents discovered in his bag. P/Insp. Villamer stated that Marvin responded voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas (Felix) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Later on, P/Insp. Villamer sent a text message to Christian's brother, notifying Him that Marvin was arrested, and that they found the registration of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Christian and his brother then went to the Ocampo Police Station, where they were advised thait Marvin has been transferred to the Naga City District Jail (NCDJ).

            On February 5, 2011, the mother of Christian, Virgie P. Mien (Virgie), went to the NCDJ, intending to talk to Marvin. She asked Marvin about the registration of the subject motorcycle found in his possession, to which Marvin apparently replied by confessing his guilt. Virgie testified that Marvin admitted taking Christian's motorcycle and going on a road trip to Quezon. Marvin also allegedly told Virgie that he left the motorcycle with a certain "Insan Joy," whose address is Phase 5, Southville Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

            That night, Virgie called her friend, who was a police officer, to relay the information she obtained from Marvin. This friend of hers, Police Superintendent Teodorico Bolitic, called her a week later to inform her that the motorcycle was not at the address Marvin provided.

            On March 11, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., a checkpoint was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime A. Cariaso (SPO3 Cariaso) and several other police officers were manning the checkpoint-at that time. By 3:20 p.m., a blue motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Seeing that the driver was not wearing a helmet, the police flagged down the motorcycle, who refused to stop and continued to pass the checkpoint. The police officers chased the motorcycle using their police car, and finally caught up with the driver at around 3:30 p.m.

            The police officers asked the driver of the motorcycle for his license, and for the registration documents of the motorcycle. The driver, later identified as Albert Orino (Albert), was unable to present any document. The police officers, thus, brought Albert to the barangay hall to record the incident in the barangay blotter. He was thereafter taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, together with the motorcycle.

            At the police station, Albert supposedly told the police officers that he does not own the motorcycle. According to SPO3 Cariaso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left him the motorcycle. The police then charged Albert with a traffic violation for driving without a license. After verifying the ownership of the motorcycle, the police notified Christian regarding its recovery.

            Marvin, for his part, denied the accusations of the prosecution. According to him, he met a friend at Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur on February 1, 2011. His friend, a certain Francis Aguilar, was driving a motorcycle and carrying a bag. His friend left the area, leaving behind the motorcycle, with the bag on top of it. Several moments later, police officers approached Marvin and invited him to go to the police station. The invitation was purportedly pursuant to a report of a suspicious person in the area. Marvin refused, but the police officers forced him to go with them.

            The trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of Marvin's co-accused, including Albert, the person in whose possession he motorcycle was found. Nonetheless, in its Judgment promulgated on December 5, 2014, the trial court found Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping, punishable under R.A. No. 6539 [Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972].  C A affirmed Marvin’s conviction.  The CA held that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sufficiently supported the conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of events, which eventually resulted in the recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

 

Issue:

            Whether the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid.

 

Held:

            Yes; the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid. Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose. Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances.

            Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For the case at bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot apply.

            An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it.

            Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in flagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense.

            According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to send a team to verify the report. One of the police officers, SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of Marvin. However, he did not specify the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious person.

            [Direct examination of SPO4 Pequiras by Prosecutor Alan Fernando]:

Q: What is your purpose in conducting the search on his body and his bag that he was carrying?

A: On February 1, 2011[,] we received information that a certain person was seen with a suspicious thing tucked on his waist.

            From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to believe that Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing how Marvin committed a crime, was committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.

            In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot pursuit arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers about the commission of an offense. In Veridiano v. People, the Court ruled on the validity of the warrantless arrest made pursuant to a report of illicit or suspicious activity: Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

            A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

            The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Here, Marvin may no longer raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest.

            As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession of firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized from Marvin's possession as part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

            Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search. A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct.

            In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion or a hunch. Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.

            In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. This is determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the police officers approaching him, or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. For this particular case, however, the Court cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk Marvin.

            Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

            The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity. As the Court explained in People v. Satorre: At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.

            Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to: (a) cause the immediate release of the petitioner, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause; and (b) inform this Court of the date of his release, or the reason for his continued confinement as the case may be, within five (5) days from notice.