Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD, G.R. No. 196425, [July 24, 2012] Case Digest

 Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD,

G.R. No. 196425, [July 24, 2012]. 

Facts:

            On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.

            On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

            On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

            Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, “Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.”, and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

                        Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:

    I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.

    II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.

    III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

    IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

    V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.

    VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

            In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional.

 

Held:

            No; the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:

    (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

    (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

    (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.

            Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

            Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora he Court noted:   "However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa."

            The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of the President.” On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

            There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds: In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government, which implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to “direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency.” The aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, “even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.”

            Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation.  After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

            The IAD-ODESLA is a fact- finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi- judicial powers.

            The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.

            Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.

            While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

            Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

            Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.