Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC,
324 SCRA 244; October 6, 2000
EN BANC [PANGANIBAN, J.]
Facts:
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Comelec en banc held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
Issue:
Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling.
Held:
It is merely a ceiling; clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
The Constitution simply states that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
Issue 2:
Whether the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.
Held:
Yes; the two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
Issue 3:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment:
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
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