Banat vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009 [Case Digest]

 

Banat vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 179271,    April 21, 2009

EN BANC [CARPIO, J.]

Facts:

            The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

            On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.

            The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic. The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."

            BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

            In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.

            The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

            The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

                        (b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

            (c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

            Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

 

Issue:

            Whether the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

 

Held:

            [The petitions have partial merit]. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

            However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

            After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

            All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative.

            Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.

Rank	Party	Votes Garnered	Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in %	Guaranteed Seat
1	BUHAY	1,169,234	7.33%	1
2	BAYAN MUNA	979,039	6.14%	1
3	CIBAC	755,686	4.74%	1
4	GABRIELA	621,171	3.89%	1
5	APEC	619,657	3.88%	1
6	A TEACHER	490,379	3.07%	1
7	AKBAYAN	466,112	2.92%	1
8	ALAGAD	423,149	2.65%	1
9	COOP-NATCCO	409,883	2.57%	1
10	BUTIL	409,160	2.57%	1

            The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

            We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

            To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

            We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."

            In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

            Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank	Party	Votes Garnered	Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % (A)	Guaranteed Seat (First Round) (B)	Additional Seats (Second Round) (C)	(B) plus (C), in whole integers (D)	Applying the three seat cap (E)
1	BUHAY	1,169,234	7.33%	1	2.79	3	N.A.
2	BAYAN MUNA	979,039	6.14%	1	2.33	3	N.A.
3	CIBAC	755,686	4.74%	1	1.80	2	N.A.
4	GABRIELA	621,171	3.89%	1	1.48	2	N.A.
5	APEC	619,657	3.88%	1	1.48	2	N.A.
6	A Teacher	490,379	3.07%	1	1.17	2	N.A.
7	AKBAYAN	466,112	2.92%	1	1.11	2	N.A.
8	ALAGAD	423,149	2.65%	1	1.01	2	N.A.
9	COOP-NATCCO	409,883	2.57%	1	1	2	N.A.
10	BUTIL	409,160	2.57%	1	1	2	N.A.
11	BATAS	385,810	2.42%	1	1	2	N.A.
12	ARC	374,288	2.35%	1	1	2	N.A.
13	ANAKPAWIS	370,261	2.32%	1	1	2	N.A.
14	ABONO	339,990	2.13%	1	1	2	N.A.
15	AMIN	338,185	2.12%	1	1	2	N.A.
16	AGAP	328,724	2.06%	1	1	2	N.A.
17	AN WARAY	321,503	2.02%	1	1	2	N.A.
18	YACAP	310,889	1.95%	0	1	1	N.A.
19	FPJPM	300,923	1.89%	0	1	1	N.A.
20	UNI-MAD	245,382	1.54%	0	1	1	N.A.
21	ABS	235,086	1.47%	0	1	1	N.A.
22	KAKUSA	228,999	1.44%	0	1	1	N.A.
23	KABATAAN	228,637	1.43%	0	1	1	N.A.
24	ABA-AKO	218,818	1.37%	0	1	1	N.A.
25	ALIF	217,822	1.37%	0	1	1	N.A.

           

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

As whether the major political parties can participate in party-list system:

            Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.

            Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

            Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

            However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.