Trillanes IV vs. Judge Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 [Case Digest]

 

Trillanes IV vs. Judge Pimentel,

G.R. No. 179817,    June 27, 2008

En Banc [CARPIO MORALES, J.]

Facts:

            At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

            Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

            In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

            Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.

            Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests."

            Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

 

Issue:

            Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to attend senate session.

 

Held:

            No; it cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

            The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

            That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

            The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda: As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

            The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.