Vaporoso vs. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Vaporoso vs. People,

G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

Second Division [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

Facts:

            At around 7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D. Torculas (PO2 Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo City, he noticed two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road. When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped away. At this point, the owner of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark, secluded area in Bangoy Street, prompting him to call for back-up. Shortly after, Police Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1 Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area.

            About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them. Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to apprehend them. After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from petitioners, the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought them to the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inventory in the presence of Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban.

            RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC that the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the second search conducted to herein appellant which yielded an illegal drug valid.

 

Held:

            No; in warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

            The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

            In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he. did not waver in his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.

            On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."

            Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.

            In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

 

Saluday vs. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018 [Case Digest]

 

Saluday vs. People,

G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018

En Banc [Carpio, Acting C.J.]

Facts:

            On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

            Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

            Petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866 by the RTC. Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification.

            Saluday argues that seized items are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

 

Issue:

            Whether the seized items are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

 

Held:

            No; the elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. As regards the second and third elements, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority.

            Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, reads: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction, may shed light on the matter.

            In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus: Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this cast. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

            Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

            The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

            A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable.

            Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy.

            Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security .measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is. diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.

            In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggage. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

            Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

            While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on board. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

            In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be continued to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

            The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminal, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

            Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

            To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

People vs. Mentoy, G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019, [Case Digest]

 

People vs. Mentoy,

G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019,

First Division [Bersamin, C.J.]

Facts:

            On May 31, 2008, at about 8 a.m., PSI Socrates briefed the operation team (team). At about 4:30 p.m., the informant relayed to the team that accused-appellant will be boarding a Charing 19 shuttle van (van) with plate number VRA 698. Thus, the team proceeded to the National Highway, Barangay Malatgao, Nan-a, Palawan. At a distance of one (1) to two (2) meters, PO1 Rosales, while on board his motorcycle, saw accused-appellant board the van. PO1 Rosales flagged down the van as it approached them. The team introduced themselves as police officers. They declared that they were conducting a checkpoint because of information about persons transporting illegal drugs. PO1 Rosales told the driver that they will check the van passengers. The driver then opened the van's side door. PO1 Rosales asked the van passengers who among them was Rose. Accused-appellant replied, "Aka po" (I am). PO1 Rosales asked accused-appellant where her baggage was. Accused-appellant apprehensively requested the driver to hand her the pink bag placed at the rear portion of the van. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales, however, noticed that accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, from the pink bag to a black one. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales suspected this bundle to contain marijuana leaves. Accused-appellant then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. SPO2 Felizarte also noticed that accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, but he and PO1 Rosales restrained her. Afterwards, PO1 Rosales called Barangay Captain Ernesto Maiguez (Brgy. Captain Maiguez) to proceed to the area.

            When Brgy. Captain Maiguez arrived, SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales asked him if he knew accused-appellant. Brgy. Captain Maiguez said he knew accused-appellant as a rice seller who resided in Barangay Malatgao where he was chairman. The police officers asked Brgy. Captain Maiguez to pick up the black bag, which accused-appellant held beside her. Brgy. Captain Maiguez got (the) said bag and placed it by the road. SPO2 Felizarte requested him to open it. Brgy. Captain Maiguez opened said bag in the presence of accused-appellant and the other van passengers. PO1 Rosales took photographs while said bag was being opened. The black bag contained, inter alia: (a) one (1) L-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape; (b) one (1) block-shaped bundle wrapped in newspaper; and (c) one (1) sachet (covered with tissue paper), all suspected to contain marijuana leaves. The police officers smelled the bundles and sachet and confirmed that these contained marijuana leaves. The police officers returned the items inside the black bag. They arrested and informed accused-appellant that she violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and apprised the latter of her constitutional rights. Since accused-appellant lived near the crime scene, the police officers brought her and the seized items immediately to the police station to avoid any untoward incident.

            PO1 Rosales carried the black bag from the crime scene to the police station. Thereat, PO1 Rosales prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of a media representative and Brgy. Captain Maiguez. PO1 Rosales also marked the L-shaped bundle as "ADR-1", blocked-shaped bundle as "ADR-2", and sachet as "ADR-3", respectively, in the presence of accused-appellant. PO1 Rosales brought the bundles and sachet to the Palawan Crime Laboratory (crime laboratory) where Forensic Chemist and Police Chief Inspector Mary Jane Cordero (PCI Cordero) examined the seized items. She found the contents of the bundles and sachet positive for marijuana and prepared Chemistry Report No. D-005-08 stating her findings.

            RTC convicted the accused-appellant as charged.  CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant. It opined that a search could precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused­-appellant had been an incident of her lawful arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the crucial links in the chain of custody.

 

Issue:

            Whether the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from her bag were inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule.

 

Held:

            No; a lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal effects of an individual. The process cannot be reversed. Hence, the search must rest on probable cause existing independently of the arrest.

            Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause - the existence of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to do so; or the person whose property is to be searched has used the same to commit crime, and its issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or conjecture,,,, or hearsay. The right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures is so sacred that no less than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution declares the right to be inviolable, and for that reason expressly prohibits the issuance of any search warrant or warrant of arrest except upon probable cause to be personally determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

            To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the exclusionary rule by unqualifiedly declaring that "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusionary rule is intended to deter the violation of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.

            We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

            Warrantless search of the accused-appellant's personal belongings was not based on probable cause.  For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block­ shaped bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.

            The general rule is that an arrest or search and seizure should be effected upon a judicial warrant. A lawful warrantless arrest may be effected by a peace officer or private person but only when any of the exceptions listed in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest to be issued is applicable.

            On its part, the CA upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of the accused-appellant having been. caught in flagrante delicto, the situation covered by Section 5(a), supra. An arrest made in flagrante delicto means that the arrestee is caught in the very act of committing the crime, and the phrase necessarily implies that the positive identification of the culprit has already been done by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification constitutes direct evidence of culpability because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." But we find otherwise, because there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.

            Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused­ appellant once she had identified herself as Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really contained marijuana. As earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2 Felizarte's afterthought justification considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It is noteworthy in this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had opened the bag.

            The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.  As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.

            What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her.

People vs. Olarte, G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019 [Case Digest]

 People vs. Olarte,

G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019

First Division [Germundo, J.]

Facts:

PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were members of Task Force "Boy Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to be responsible for several robbery incidents at Pabayo and Chavez Streets in Cagayan de Oro City. On July 19, 2014, at around 1:30 P.M., PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were conducting discreet monitoring operations in the area. During their watch, they noticed a man walking towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. His features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image was shown in closed circuit television (CCTV) footages of past robberies in the area. As "Boy Solo" was about to enter the establishment, he pulled out a firearm. This prompted PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar to immediately run towards the suspect.  "Boy Solo," however, noticed the police officers running towards him so he ran away. "Boy Solo's" companions – Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and Rodel B. Rubilla, acting as his lookouts, also fled from their posts. They all boarded a Cugman Liner, a public utility jeepney heading towards the Cogon Market. Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested near Ororama Superstore in Cogon after a chase by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.

During the arrest, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar searched accused-appellant's person and recovered a .25 caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly, a flathead screwdriver, and a transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. PO2 Intud then wrapped the grenade with masking tape and marked it with his initials RMI2. Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant to Police Station 1-Divisoria where the incident was recorded in the police blotter.  PO2 Intud then turned over the grenade to the prosecutor but the latter refused to take custody of It. He handed it to Chief Investigator Senior Police Officer 2 Allan Radaza (SPO2 Radaza) who, in turn, entrusted it to the PNP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.  The police officers found out that accused-appellant had no license or permit to possess the M61 hand grenade as well as the .25 caliber pistol, though a replica.

In the course of reconstituting the records, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-830 (illegal possession of hand grenade) seeking to change the reflected fuse assembly marking from "M204X2" to "M204A2." This was eventually granted by the RTC.

RTC rendered a joint judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand grenade, for the following reason: an accused may be arrested and searched without warrant when he/she is attempting to commit an offense. However, it dismissed the case of illegal possession of a .25 caliber pistol replica against accused-appellant because the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-831 was defective. It only alleged that the pistol replica was merely possessed and not used in the commission of a crime as contemplated in Section 35, Article V of R.A. No. 10591.

CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling in Crim. Case No. 2014-830 of the RTC, ratiocinating that: (a) accused-appellant never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal; (b) accused-appellant was validly arrested and searched without a warrant as he was caught attempting to commit a robbery, making the hand grenade admissible in evidence as it was validly obtained; (e) it does not matter if the fuse assembly marking on the grenade, as stated in the information (Criminal Case No. 2014-830), differs from that stated in the arresting officers' judicial affidavits; the alleged discrepancy being "clearly a clerical error" as supported by other documentary evidence (July 28, 2014 Certification, Seizure Receipt, and Extract Blotter), thereby justifying the amendment of the information; and others. 

Accused insists that: (a) his arrest was illegal because PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar merely assumed that he was "Boy Solo" based on CCTV footages and that "one cannot, without a warrant, arrest anyone based on similarities of physical attributes;" (b) "[a] waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest;"  (c) the corpus delicti is doubtful because, when the subject hand grenade was presented in court, the marking "RJVII2" was not found on it and the fuse assembly marking stated in the original information did not match the grenade's serial number and others.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest is valid and the hand grenade seized from the accused-appellant is admissible in evidence.

Held:

Yes. The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless arrests based on probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been committed." Here, the offense had already been consummated but not in the presence of the peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More importantly, there is durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace officer or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or immediate vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases where the peace officer or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act of committing an offense.

"Probable cause" (in the context of warrantless arrests) has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.  While probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest is required only in instances where the peace officer or private person who was present only at the time when the offense was committed believes (based on his/her immediate perception) that an offense had just been committed, some of its yardsticks for determination may be of help in ascertaining whether an accused is attempting to commit an offense. This is because the probable cause needed to justify a warrantless arrest ordinarily involves a certain degree of suspicion, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense based on actual facts.  And such determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior."

Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a reasonable suspicion to arrest accused-appellant who was seen to have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common sense dictates that police officers need not wait for a serious crime, such as robbery, to be consummated before they move in and make the arrest because it will definitely endanger the lives and safety of the public, as well as their own. This is consistent with the jurisprudential dictum that the obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose, as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.  Moreover, even if the firearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the police officers were not expected to know on sight whether the firearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second to act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient ground to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it.  As a result of the validity of the accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the incidental search and seizure of the items in his possession is also valid "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."

Additionally, accused-appellant's argument that the CCTV footage cannot be considered as a valid basis for his arrest fails to persuade. While it is a long-standing rule that reliable information alone (such as footage from a CCTV recording) is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, the rule only requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.  Therefore, it does not matter that accused-appellant was previously identified only from a CCTV footage supposedly covering his previous criminal conduct because he was seen by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar performing an overt act of drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC.

In this case, accused-appellant failed to timely question the illegality of his arrest and to present evidence (or at least some reasonable explanation) to substantiate his alleged wrongful detention. This renders the warrantless arrest and the accompanying search valid; thus, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over his person and making all the items, confiscated from accused-appellant, admissible in evidence. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's validation of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and incidental search.

Object evidence is classified into: (a) actual, physical or "autoptic evidence: those which have a direct relation or part in the fact or incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal examination by the presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual or physical object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or to aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness. Further, actual evidence is subdivided into three categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects); (b) those that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those with no identifying marks (non-unique objects).

The Court promulgated the Judicial Affidavit Rule which mandates parties to file, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference, judicial affidavits executed by their witnesses which shall take the place of their direct testimonies.  Here, parties seeking to offer documentary and/or object evidence are now required to describe, authenticate, and make the same evidence form part of the witness' judicial affidavit under the said Rule. Therefore, as a rule, object evidence now requires authentication or testimonial sponsorship before it may be admitted or considered by the court.

In the case at hand, the chain of custody rule does not apply to an undetonated grenade (an object made unique), for it is not amorphous and its form is relatively resistant to change. A witness of the prosecution need only identify the hand grenade, a structured object, based on personal knowledge that the same contraband or article is what it purports to be—that it came from the person of accused-appellant. Even assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary value of the explosive had been sufficiently established by the prosecution. As aptly observed by the CA:  As previously stated, PO2 Intud, SPO2 Radaza and SPO2 Tingson positively testified as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the grenade presented in court, marked as Exhibit "B-1." PO2 Intud testified that it is the same grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant at the time of his arrest. SPO2 Radaza testified that it is the same grenade turned over [to] him by PO2 Intud. SPO2 Tiongson testified that it is the same grenade turned over to him by SPO2 Radaza. Thus, there is no break in the chain of custody of the grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant.

Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. Nos. 82585/82827, November 14, 1988 [Case Digest]

 

Soliven vs. Makasiar,

G.R. Nos. 82585/82827, November 14, 1988

En Banc [Per Curiam]

Facts:

           

 

Issue 1:

            Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President

 

Held:

            Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

            It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

 

Issue 2:

            Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

 

Held:

            No; the addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

            What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

 

Issue 3:

            Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

 

Held:

            Yes. Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

            The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

            But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

            Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

 

People vs. Gabiosa, G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020 [Case Digest]

 

People vs. Gabiosa,

G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020

First Division [Caguioa, J]

 

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Facts:

            Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner before the Executive Judge Balagot.  In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero attached the Affidavit of his witness, PO1 Geverola. On the basis of the Affidavit, Judge Balagot conducted a preliminary examination to PO1 Geverola.

            Judge Balagot, then, issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 after finding a probable cause for such issuance. Thereafter, the aforementioned search warrant was served against petitioner.

            Petitioner, however, questioned the validity of the search warrant issued against him. Thus, on March 13, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence claiming that the issuance of the search warrant is grossly violative of his fundamental constitutional and human right.

            RTC denied the Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence (Motion to Quash) filed by Gabiosa. The RTC ruled against Gabiosa's contention that the search warrant was invalid as the judge did not examine the complainant but only his witness. The RTC explained that the judge was not mandatorily required to examine both the complainant and his witness.

            CA granted Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari and set aside the decision of RTC. CA held that the Search Warrant No. 149-2017 is null and void, and the search conducted on its authority is also rendered void. Consequent thereto, any evidence gathered by virtue of the aforementioned search warrant are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

 

Issue:

            Whether the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa.

 

Held:

            Yes. The Petition is granted. The Court rules that the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari, considering that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the validity of the search warrant.

            Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — one of two provisions in the Bill of Rights preserving the citizens' right to privacy  — protects every citizen's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It preserves, in essence, the right of the people "to be let alone" vis-à-vis the far-reaching and encompassing powers of the State, with respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects. It thus ensures protection of the individual from arbitrary searches and arrests initiated and perpetrated by the State. The rationale for the right, particularly of the right to be secure in one's home, was explained in the early case of US. v. Arceo, where the Court elucidated: The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.

            In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause;" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

                The CA's construction of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was inaccurate.  Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the CA, in invalidating the search warrant subject of this case, focused on a word used by the Constitution — "and" — and then ruled that it was the intent of the Constitution that both the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined by the judge before any warrant may be issued.  As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither supported by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the right.

                As early as 1937, in the case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the Court explained that ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause.

                The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary.

                If, despite the use of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as probable cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse — the judge examined the witness only and not the applicant — would not be valid as well. Again, the purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant only, or the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual's privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing undue importance on the Constitution's use of the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or."

In addition, it would be a fruitless exercise to insist that the judge should have examined the complainant as well when, as here, he admittedly did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that constitute the probable cause. Based on the affidavit submitted, it was Police Officer 1 Rodolfo M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola) and his "Action Agent" who had personal knowledge of the circumstances as they were the ones who conducted the surveillance and test buy. Even if, for instance, Judge Balagot examined the complainant, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero (P/Supt Ajero), he would have obtained nothing from the latter because of his lack of personal knowledge. P/Supt Ajero was the complainant only because he was the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City Police Station, but it was never alleged that he participated in any of the prior surveillance conducted.

Porteria vs. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Porteria vs. People,

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

Third Division [Reyes, A., Jr.]

Facts:

            Wilfredo Christian P. Mien is the registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle, 2004 model, with Plate No. EL5401.

            After finishing his shift at about 2:00 p.m., Christian discovered that his motorcycle was no longer in its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian went to the PNP Naga to report that his motorcycle was stolen. The following day, Christian and his brother, Wilfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5-Camarines Sur to report the incident again.

            On February 1, 2011, the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. The Chief of Police of the Ocampo Police Station, Police Inspector Samuel De Asis Villamer (P/Insp. Villamer), dispatched a team to verify the report.

            The report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along me highway of Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, for the illegal possession of firearm. He was, thereafter, subjected to a search of his body and of the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the bag, the arresting officer found an assortment of documents, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian's stolen motorcycle.

            At the Ocampo Police Station, Marvin was asked regarding the documents discovered in his bag. P/Insp. Villamer stated that Marvin responded voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas (Felix) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Later on, P/Insp. Villamer sent a text message to Christian's brother, notifying Him that Marvin was arrested, and that they found the registration of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Christian and his brother then went to the Ocampo Police Station, where they were advised thait Marvin has been transferred to the Naga City District Jail (NCDJ).

            On February 5, 2011, the mother of Christian, Virgie P. Mien (Virgie), went to the NCDJ, intending to talk to Marvin. She asked Marvin about the registration of the subject motorcycle found in his possession, to which Marvin apparently replied by confessing his guilt. Virgie testified that Marvin admitted taking Christian's motorcycle and going on a road trip to Quezon. Marvin also allegedly told Virgie that he left the motorcycle with a certain "Insan Joy," whose address is Phase 5, Southville Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

            That night, Virgie called her friend, who was a police officer, to relay the information she obtained from Marvin. This friend of hers, Police Superintendent Teodorico Bolitic, called her a week later to inform her that the motorcycle was not at the address Marvin provided.

            On March 11, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., a checkpoint was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime A. Cariaso (SPO3 Cariaso) and several other police officers were manning the checkpoint-at that time. By 3:20 p.m., a blue motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Seeing that the driver was not wearing a helmet, the police flagged down the motorcycle, who refused to stop and continued to pass the checkpoint. The police officers chased the motorcycle using their police car, and finally caught up with the driver at around 3:30 p.m.

            The police officers asked the driver of the motorcycle for his license, and for the registration documents of the motorcycle. The driver, later identified as Albert Orino (Albert), was unable to present any document. The police officers, thus, brought Albert to the barangay hall to record the incident in the barangay blotter. He was thereafter taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, together with the motorcycle.

            At the police station, Albert supposedly told the police officers that he does not own the motorcycle. According to SPO3 Cariaso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left him the motorcycle. The police then charged Albert with a traffic violation for driving without a license. After verifying the ownership of the motorcycle, the police notified Christian regarding its recovery.

            Marvin, for his part, denied the accusations of the prosecution. According to him, he met a friend at Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur on February 1, 2011. His friend, a certain Francis Aguilar, was driving a motorcycle and carrying a bag. His friend left the area, leaving behind the motorcycle, with the bag on top of it. Several moments later, police officers approached Marvin and invited him to go to the police station. The invitation was purportedly pursuant to a report of a suspicious person in the area. Marvin refused, but the police officers forced him to go with them.

            The trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of Marvin's co-accused, including Albert, the person in whose possession he motorcycle was found. Nonetheless, in its Judgment promulgated on December 5, 2014, the trial court found Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping, punishable under R.A. No. 6539 [Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972].  C A affirmed Marvin’s conviction.  The CA held that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sufficiently supported the conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of events, which eventually resulted in the recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

 

Issue:

            Whether the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid.

 

Held:

            Yes; the search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was not valid. Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose. Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances.

            Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For the case at bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot apply.

            An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it.

            Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in flagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense.

            According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to send a team to verify the report. One of the police officers, SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of Marvin. However, he did not specify the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious person.

            [Direct examination of SPO4 Pequiras by Prosecutor Alan Fernando]:

Q: What is your purpose in conducting the search on his body and his bag that he was carrying?

A: On February 1, 2011[,] we received information that a certain person was seen with a suspicious thing tucked on his waist.

            From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to believe that Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing how Marvin committed a crime, was committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.

            In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot pursuit arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers about the commission of an offense. In Veridiano v. People, the Court ruled on the validity of the warrantless arrest made pursuant to a report of illicit or suspicious activity: Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

            A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

            The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Here, Marvin may no longer raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest.

            As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession of firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized from Marvin's possession as part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

            Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search. A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct.

            In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion or a hunch. Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.

            In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. This is determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the police officers approaching him, or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. For this particular case, however, the Court cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk Marvin.

            Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.

            The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity. As the Court explained in People v. Satorre: At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.

            Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to: (a) cause the immediate release of the petitioner, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause; and (b) inform this Court of the date of his release, or the reason for his continued confinement as the case may be, within five (5) days from notice.