Raffy Tulfo vs. People,
G.R. No. 187113, January 11, 2021
Third Division [Leonen, J.]
Facts:
The bulk of the Informations accuses Tulfo of writing columns that, allegedly, maliciously impute Atty. So for his "shady dealings in the Bureau of Customs"; particularly, his reported extortion activities against brokers and shippers. Tulfo also wrote about Atty. So allegedly having an affair with a married woman.
Assistant City Prosecutor Abdulkalim A. Askali issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause against the three accused for 14 counts of libel.
For his defense, Tulfo contended that the statements he used in his articles were merely reported to him by brokers-complainants whose identities he could not reveal. He said that he verified these statements from "other sources" who were Bureau of Customs employees and KCJS staff members, among others. He claimed that his column serves as the voice of those with complaints but who are at a disadvantage against those being complained of. He argued lack of malicious intent to publish as both he and Atty. So had not known each other before the complaints were filed.
For their part, Macasaet and Quijano insisted that the law does not mention a publisher and managing editor as those liable for libel.
Regional Trial Court found Tulfo, Macasaet, and Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 14 counts of libel. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On motion for reconsideration, Court of Appeals issued its Amended Decision; it acquitted the three accused on eight counts of libel, but sustained their conviction for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463, 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 991474, and 99-1475.
Acquitted the three accused on eight counts of libel, but sustained their conviction for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1463, 99-1465, 99-1471, 99-1473, 991474, and 99-1475.
Petitioners argue that the prosecution failed to prove the falsity of the allegations subject of Criminal Case No. 99-1463, much less actual malice in making these imputations. They further argue that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling, the imputations in the other five cases relate to Atty. So's public functions, and thus, fall within the ambit of qualified privileged communications.
Petitioners add that the allegations on Atty. So's immorality and impropriety of conduct involve his failure to meet the standards of conduct required of public officials under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6713, the Administrative Code, the Civil Service Law, and the Lawyer's Oath,among others.
Respondent contends that the attacks on Atty. So's personal life, such as being a disgrace to the Iglesia Ni Cristo and allegedly having an illicit affair, cannot be considered as privileged communication under Articles 354 and 361 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue 1:
Whether or not petitioner Raffy T. Tulfo is liable for libel under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No; in construing libel laws, regard must always be made to the guarantees provided by our Constitution. Criminal prosecutions for libel must undergo the rigorous and exacting standard of ensuring that they do not violate the right to free expression and the press. Our libel laws must not be broadly construed as to deter comments on public affairs and the conduct of public officials. Courts must examine libel cases involving a public officer's exercise of official functions within the context of these constitutional guarantees.
Unless the prosecution proves that the defamatoiy statements were made with actual malice—that is, "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" — a criminal case for libel involving a public officer's exercise of official functions cannot prosper.
Freedom of the press rests its philosophical basis within the larger scope of the right to free discussion and expression. Freedom of the press "is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed."
However, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not absolute, but subject to certain restrictions, such as laws against libel. The recognition of libel as a limitation is rooted in one's right to protect their reputation from malicious attacks.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is farther the duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
In sustaining a conviction for libel, the prosecution must prove the existence of four elements: "(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice."
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.
Insulting words are not actionable as libel per se, and a consequent personal embarrassment does not mean this is automatically equivalent to defamation. The court must still be satisfied that, from the entirety of the impugned writing, it is defamatory.
Malice exists when the prosecution proves that the author made the defamatory statement knowing it was false, or even if true, there is no showing of good intention and justifiable motive. It "implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm" and exists when "the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed."
The requisite of malice has evolved, there being a distinction between libel cases involving private persons and those involving public officers and public figures. Thus, whether the complainant is a private or public person is a factor that must be considered.
As early as 1918, this Court in Bustos emphasized the need for full discussion of public affairs and how those in public positions should not be too thin-skinned when comments are made on their official functions.
The United States Supreme Court in New York Times vs. Sulivan went on to introduce the "actual malice" test. Under this test, a public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood on their official conduct unless they prove "that the statement was made . . . with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
In our jurisdiction, this Court adopted with approval the actual malice test and has since applied it to several cases involving libel. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Hon. Capulong, this Court extended the "actual malice" requirement in libel cases involving public officers to "public figures." It decreed that owing to the legitimate interest of the public in his or her affairs "the right of privacy of a 'public figure' is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that except for privileged communications, every defamatory imputation is deemed malicious. On the other hand, Article 361 recognizes the truth of an imputation as a defense in a criminal prosecution for libel. Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
As an exception to the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, privileged communication has two kinds: absolute and qualified. The distinction between these two was discussed in Orfanel v. People, where this Court decreed: A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by witness in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith. It has, moreover, been held that there is malice when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed.
In Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, this Court recognized that the enumeration of qualified privileged communications under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not exclusive. It decreed that "fair commentaries on matters of public interest" are likewise deemed privileged by reason of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, this Court reiterated the actual malice test and discussed Article 361 on the defense of truth: In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. This is the rule of "actual malice.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements aire inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
Every prosecution for libel, therefore, must undergo the rigorous and exacting standard of ensuring that it does not violate the fundamental right to free speech and the press. Unless the prosecution proves that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice, a criminal case for libel against critics of a public officer's exercise of official functions cannot prosper.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner Tulfo acted with malice, or with reckless disregard in determing the truth or falsity of the imputations.
"Ayon sa aking mga impor[m]ante ay nagyayabang pa si So matapos kong bombahin. Ipinagmamalaki niya na hindi siya apektado sa kahit na anumang batikos dahil kaibigan daw niya si Boy Manalo(,) na kamag-anak ninyo, at ito raw ang pader na sinasandalan niya sa INC. Kaya walang sin urn an daw ang puwedeng gumalaw sa kanya;" "Kaya naman, ayon sa aking source, naging arogante lalo si So at palagi nitong bukambibig na (malakas) siya sa INC;" "Matagal na siyang nasibak pero nabalik din dahil tumatakbo ito sa INC at ito an[g] ipinagmamalaki niya kapag natatanggal siya sa puwesto diyan sa Customs;" "Isa pang INC member na nakakakilala rin kay Ding So ang nagsabi naman na 'ikinahihiya namin siya (So). Kasi alam naman sa NAIA na pinapatos niya ang babaing may-asawa." "Nagtanong-tanong ngayon ang mga (tauhan ng mga) Laurel sa mga brokers at sa ibang Customs employees para ikumpirma ang sinulat ko. Nagagalak naman ang mga brokers na galit (na galit) sa abusadong si Ding So sa pagkumpirma sa mga tauhan ng mga Laurel. Sinasabi nila na totoo nga ang umano'y pakikialam ni (Ding) So kay Gemma;" "[N]akipag[-]ugnayan sa akin si Gemma. Umiiyak ito at nakikiusap na linawin ko ang panig nya. Ayon kay Gemma, hindi toto[o]ng may kaugnayan siya kay So. Okey, kung nabanggit ko man ang pangalan mo rito ay hindi ko intensiyon na siraan ka. Ang layunin ko kung bakit ibinu[bu]lgar ko ang mga kawalanghiyaan ni So ay para masibak na ito sa Customs at matigil na ang kanyang pagkaabusado. Wala sa intensiyon ko na ibulgar pati ang personal na aktibidad ni So."
From these, it can be deduced that the impugned articles fall within the purview of qualified privileged communications. These columns relate to Atty. So's exercise of his official functions. His alleged actuations refer to matters of public interest which the citizenry ought to know. As an official of the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So is subject to a closer scrutiny by members of the media, who act as sentinels of the public.
Having established the privileged nature of the Abante Tonite articles, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that actual malice exists. The prosecution is duty bound to show that the alleged defamatory statements were made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The reason for this rule is based on the New York Times doctrine, which provides: To require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to prove it.
The "reckless disregard" standard "cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition" and must be applied depending on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, in Flor v. People, this Court decreed that the existence of reckless disregard cannot be based on "whether a reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have investigated before publishing." Instead, it depends on whether sufficient evidence has been adduced "to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication."
Here, petitioner Tulfo's testimony on cross-examination does not show that the allegations were false, or that they were made with reckless disregard of ascertaining whether the statements were false or not. His testimony that no administrative case was filed against Atty. So does not mean that the statements in the articles were false.
That petitioner Tulfo has never bothered obtaining Atty. So's side of the story, as respondent insists, cannot amount to malice. While substantiatiating facts does play an important role in reporting standands, a reporter may rely on a lone source's information, even if such information only shows one side of the story, for as long as the reporter "does not entertain a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.'"
Public officers are accountable to the people, and must serve them "with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." Speech that guards against abuses of those in public office should be encouraged. Petitioner Tulfo should be acquitted.
Issue 2:
Whether or not petitioners Allen A. Macasaet and Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., as publisher and managing editor of Abante Tonite, are also liable for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No; since the author of the impugned articles himself is not guilty of libel, it follows that petitioners Macasaet and Quijano, the publisher and managing editor of the Abante Tonite columns, must likewise be acquitted.
"According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers."
"The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent.
"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or manager."
Nevertheless, since this Court did not find petitioner Tulfo, who authored the allegedly libelous articles, to be liable, neither should liability attach to those persons enumerated in Article 360. Petitioners Macasaet and Quijano must likewise be acquitted.
Issue 3:
Should petitioners be found guilty, whether or not the penalty of fine should be imposed instead of imprisonment, pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases.
Held:
Of course, since this Court finds that the articles are not libelous, petitioners should be acquitted, and Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 finds no application.
Nevertheless, the constitutionally protected freedoms enjoyed by the press cannot be used as a shield to advance the malicious propagation of false information carried out by unscrupulous entities to injure another's reputation.
The acquittal meted out to petitioners does not mean that journalists have unbridled discretion in publishing news and information below the standards expected of them. These standards are prominently provided under the Philippine Press Institute's (PPI) Journalist's Code of Ethics and the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Code of Ethics.
Under the PPI's Code of Ethics, journalists and members of the press shall scrupulously report news while avoiding the suppression and distortion of facts. In disseminating news, they "shall refrain from writing reports which will adversely affect a private reputation unless the public interests justifies it." Moreover, they shall not "ridicule ... or degrade any person by reason of sex, creed, religious belief, political conviction, cultural and ethnic origin."