Romualdez vs. CA G.R. No. 230391 / G.R. No. 250746 (Case Digest)

Romualdez vs. CA

G.R. No. 230391 / G.R. No. 250746

[July 05, 2023]

Facts:

            First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC) was the former owner of 6,299,177 shares in the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Subsequently, FPHC sold the PCIB shares to Trans Middle East (Phils.) equities, Inc. (TMEE) and one of the latter's incorporators, Edilberttj S. Narciso, Jr.

            PCGG, sequestered the said PCIB shares as these were deemed as ill-gotten wealth of its beneficial owner, Benjamin "Koko" Romualdez, petitioner's husband. A year after, the PCGG included the PCIB shares in the list of properties covered by its complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages filed against petitioner and Benjamin before the Sandiganbayan.

            Allegedly, FPHC's dummy board, formed through the machinations of Benjamin, illegally sold the PCIB shares to TMEE and Narciso without real consideration, the latter also being dummies of Koko Romualdez.

            The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. The dismissal became final after the Court affirmed the same in its Decision dated 04 December 2009, in the case entitled First Philippine Holdings Corp. v. Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc., and docketed as G.R. No. 179505.

            FPHC filed a second complaint-in-intervention dated 08 September 2012. This time, it tweaked its complaint by alleging that in case the PCIB shares are found to be ill-gotten wealth, PCGG has the legal and moral obligation to return them to FPHC as their rightful owner.  However, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the second complaint on the ground that the cause of action was similar to that in the first complaint-in-intervention.

            Consequently, FPHC filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court, Also, during the pendency of said petition, FPHC filed before the RTC the petition to perpetuate the testimony of petitioner, Benjamin's widow.

            FPHC alleged that Sandiganbayan had not conducted pre-trial proceedings despite the lapse of almost three decades and to consider the current age and physical condition of the proposed deponent. And that Mrs. Juliette Gomez Romualdez will be a material witness for petitioner FPHC.

            Petitioner opposed the petition while PCGG filed its manifestation, stating that it was not objecting to the taking of the deposition of petitioner.

            RTC granted FPHC's petition, holding that the perpetuation of the testimony of petitioner may prevent a failure or delay of justice since she was already of advanced age. CA GRANTS the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of FPHC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Protective Order, alleging that she was entitled to a protective order to prevent the taking of her written interrogatories. Allegedly, she was medically diagnosed with dementia of the Alzheimer's type in 2010 and her doctor was of the view that "she is unable to comprehend legal issues/or procedures" and should avoid any type of mental stress that could lead to her emotional breakdown or will affect her health.  C A denied the motion.

            Petitioner now argues that FPHC erroneously filed its petition to perpetuate her testimony before the RTC. According to her, the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the petition, considering that the real purpose of the perpetuation of her testimony was to use the same in the ongoing Civil Case No. 0035 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages. With the pendency of said civil case and its petition for review of the dismissal of its complaint-in-intervention, FPHC should have filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to perpetuate said testimony of petitioner under Section 7, Rule 24. Hence, the CA acted without jurisdiction in affirming the RTC's grant of FPHC's petition.

            Moreover, petitioner asserts that the CA also violated the longstanding doctrine that no court has the power to interfere with the judgments and decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction since it was the Sandiganbayan court which first acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 0035.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing execution pending appeal of the RTC's Orders, granting the petition to perpetuate the testimony of petitioner.

 

Held:

            Yes; being an exception rather than the rule, it is strictly required that the reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Villamar vs. National Power Corporation: "The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which, will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice."

            Clearly, therefore, while the exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution of the RTC's twin Orders was addressed to the sound discretion of the appellate court, the existence of good reasons was indispensable to the latter's grant of FPHC's motion for execution pending appeal. Absent any such good reason, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued by the CA with grave abuse of discretion.

            SC finds that the CA haphazardly allowed the execution pending appeal on a myopic reading of the facts that are heavily, albeit unduly, skewed in favor of FPHC. The CA merely looked into the physical and medical condition of petitioner without even considering that FPHC's complaints-in-intervention were already denied by the Sandiganbayan twice on the ground of prescription of action. What is more, this Court had already affirmed with finality the first Sandiganbayan ruling against FPHC's right of action to assail the validity of TMEE's acquisition of said PCIB shares. These facts alone should have been enough for the CA to take a pause and further assess the merits of FPHC's motion.

            It bears to mention on this score that the PCIB shares were registered in the name ofTMEE, not Benjamin, and certainly not his widow. The only reason for the existence of the petition was FPHC's insistence that said shares were ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin. However, at the time FPHC filed its motion in 2015, its petition no longer had factual and legal mooring because the third amended complaint ~ which finally impleaded TMEE in Civil Case No. 0035 - was subsequently dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision dated 25 January 2010 because ofPCGG's failure to sufficiently allege that TMEE, as well as its shares of stock, were part of the ill-gotten wealth of Romualdez. The Court affirmed said dismissal with finality in G.R. No. 192653. Effectively, the PCIB shares were no longer part of Civil Case No. 0035.

            Since the PCIB shares were no longer in the conversation insofar as Civil Case No. 0035 was concerned, petitioner cannot participate in Civil Case No. 0035 anymore. Evidently, there was no good reason to hasten the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony. Instead, sound discretion dictated the CA to speed up its resolution of petitioner's appeal to finally settle the issue as to the propriety of the RTC's order, allowing the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony.

            Accordingly, executions pending appeal require the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.

 

 

Issue 2:

            Whether the RTC lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance and dispose of FPHC's petition

 

Held:

            After a scrutiny of the facts on hand, the Court holds that even assuming the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition, the CA nevertheless erred in affirming the RTC's ruling to allow the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony, as the petition was utterly devoid of merit.

            The subject matter of the FPHC's petition are the PCIB shares supposedly obtained through fraudulent means from FPHC by TMEE, the latter being a dummy corporation created through the instance of Benjamin. With the death of Benjamin, FPHC now anchors its relentless pursuit to invalidate the sale of the PCIB shares on the testimony of herein petitioner, the wife/widow/heir of Benjamin. Allegedly, petitioner has personal knowledge of the circumstances of the acquisition of said PCIB shares by Benjamin through his dummy, TMEE.

            To stress, the PCIB shares is registered in the name of TMEE. There is no showing, though, that petitioner is part of TMEE. Notably, too, FPHC's petition failed to allege the ultimate facts on how petitioner knew the manner by which TMEE acquired said shares from FPHC's alleged dummy board. FPHC did not even allege petitioner's actual participation in the negotiation and purchase of said PCIB shares by TMEE.

            What is clear, therefore, is that petitiqner's only connection to the PCIB shares is her relationship with her late husband, Benjamin, the alleged beneficial owner of said shares. However, FPHC failed to allege sufficient cause for the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony. Since FPHC insists that the PCIB shares were the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin, dragging petitioner into the controversy, without any proof of her actual knowledge of the alleged fraudulent acquisition of the PCIB shares, will mean that she will have to be examined about communications received by her in confidence from Benjamin regarding said PCIB shares. This is proscribed under the marital privilege rule under Section 24, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus: Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines vs DOLE G.R. No. 202275, [Case Digest]

 

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines vs DOLE

G.R. No. 202275,  July 17, 2018,

Facts:

            To ensure road safety and address the risk-taking behavior of bus drivers as its declared objective, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 requiring “all Public Utility Bus (PUB) operators to secure Labor Standards Compliance Certificates” under pain of revocation of their existing certificates of public convenience or denial of an application for a new certificate.

            On January 9, 2012, the DOLE issued Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating on the part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation system referred to in the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001. Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for computing the fixed and the performance-based component of a public utility bus driver’s or conductor’s wage.

On January 28, 2012, Atty. Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf of the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, and other bus companies, wrote to then Secretary of Labor and Employment Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, requesting to defer the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12. The request, however, was not acted upon.

On February 27, 2012 and in compliance with Rule III, Section 3 of Department Order No. 118-12, the National Wages and Productivity Commission issued NWPC Guidelines No. 1 to serve as Operational Guidelines on Department Order No. 118-12. NWPC Guidelines No. 1 suggested formulae for computing the fixed-based and the performance-based components of a bus driver’s or conductor’s wage.

On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition with Urgent Request for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,4 impleading the DOLE and the LTFRB as respondents. They pray that this Court enjoin the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 for being violative of their right to due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of obligation of contracts.

Respondents counter that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present Petition considering that Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are directed against bus operators, not against associations of bus operators such as petitioners. They add that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy courts in directly filing their Petition before this Court. For these reasons, respondents pray for the dismissal of the Petition.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether or not petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., Inter City Bus Operators Association, and City of San Jose Del Monte Bus Operators Association have legal standing to sue and whether or not this case falls under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

 

Held:

            No; this Court dismisses the Petition. Petitioners fail to respect the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by directly invoking this Court's jurisdiction without any special reason. They fail to present an actual controversy ripe for adjudication and do not even have the requisite standing to file this case.

            The issues raised in this Petition are not justiciable. The Petition presents no actual case or controversy. As a rule, "the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned." A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.

            An actual case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented are "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action.

            Like any rule, the rule on legal standing has exceptions. This Court has taken cognizance of petitions filed by those who have no personal or substantial interest in the challenged governmental act but whose petitions nevertheless raise "constitutional issue[s] of critical significance." This Court summarized the requirements for granting legal standing to "nontraditional suitors" in Funa v. Villar, thus:

    1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

    2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

    3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

    4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

    5.) Third-party standing. Under this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties provided the following criteria are met: first, "the [party bringing suit] must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute"; second, "the party must have a close relation to the third party";  and third, "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."

   6.) Associations were likewise allowed to sue on behalf of their members - An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

            As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have standing to bring this suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their members are and if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. While alleging that they are composed of public utility bus operators who will be directly injured by the implementation of Department Order No. 118- 12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof, such as board resolutions of their alleged members or their own articles of incorporation authorizing them to act as their members' representatives in suits involving their members' individual rights.

            Some of the petitioners here are not even persons or entitles authorized by law or by the Rules allowed to file a suit in court. As intervenor MMDA sufficiently demonstrated, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. had their certificates of incorporation revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission for failure to submit the required general information sheets and financial statements for the years 1996 to 2003. With their certificates of incorporation revoked, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. have no corporate existence.  They have no capacity to exercise any corporate power, specifically, the power to sue in their respective corporate names.