Romualdez vs. CA
G.R. No. 230391 / G.R. No. 250746
[July 05, 2023]
Facts:
First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC) was the former owner of 6,299,177 shares in the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Subsequently, FPHC sold the PCIB shares to Trans Middle East (Phils.) equities, Inc. (TMEE) and one of the latter's incorporators, Edilberttj S. Narciso, Jr.
PCGG, sequestered the said PCIB shares as these were deemed as ill-gotten wealth of its beneficial owner, Benjamin "Koko" Romualdez, petitioner's husband. A year after, the PCGG included the PCIB shares in the list of properties covered by its complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages filed against petitioner and Benjamin before the Sandiganbayan.
Allegedly, FPHC's dummy board, formed through the machinations of Benjamin, illegally sold the PCIB shares to TMEE and Narciso without real consideration, the latter also being dummies of Koko Romualdez.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. The dismissal became final after the Court affirmed the same in its Decision dated 04 December 2009, in the case entitled First Philippine Holdings Corp. v. Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc., and docketed as G.R. No. 179505.
FPHC filed a second complaint-in-intervention dated 08 September 2012. This time, it tweaked its complaint by alleging that in case the PCIB shares are found to be ill-gotten wealth, PCGG has the legal and moral obligation to return them to FPHC as their rightful owner. However, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the second complaint on the ground that the cause of action was similar to that in the first complaint-in-intervention.
Consequently, FPHC filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court, Also, during the pendency of said petition, FPHC filed before the RTC the petition to perpetuate the testimony of petitioner, Benjamin's widow.
FPHC alleged that Sandiganbayan had not conducted pre-trial proceedings despite the lapse of almost three decades and to consider the current age and physical condition of the proposed deponent. And that Mrs. Juliette Gomez Romualdez will be a material witness for petitioner FPHC.
Petitioner opposed the petition while PCGG filed its manifestation, stating that it was not objecting to the taking of the deposition of petitioner.
RTC granted FPHC's petition, holding that the perpetuation of the testimony of petitioner may prevent a failure or delay of justice since she was already of advanced age. CA GRANTS the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of FPHC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Protective Order, alleging that she was entitled to a protective order to prevent the taking of her written interrogatories. Allegedly, she was medically diagnosed with dementia of the Alzheimer's type in 2010 and her doctor was of the view that "she is unable to comprehend legal issues/or procedures" and should avoid any type of mental stress that could lead to her emotional breakdown or will affect her health. C A denied the motion.
Petitioner now argues that FPHC erroneously filed its petition to perpetuate her testimony before the RTC. According to her, the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the petition, considering that the real purpose of the perpetuation of her testimony was to use the same in the ongoing Civil Case No. 0035 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages. With the pendency of said civil case and its petition for review of the dismissal of its complaint-in-intervention, FPHC should have filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to perpetuate said testimony of petitioner under Section 7, Rule 24. Hence, the CA acted without jurisdiction in affirming the RTC's grant of FPHC's petition.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the CA also violated the longstanding doctrine that no court has the power to interfere with the judgments and decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction since it was the Sandiganbayan court which first acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 0035.
Issue 1:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing execution pending appeal of the RTC's Orders, granting the petition to perpetuate the testimony of petitioner.
Held:
Yes; being an exception rather than the rule, it is strictly required that the reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Villamar vs. National Power Corporation: "The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which, will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice."
Clearly, therefore, while the exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution of the RTC's twin Orders was addressed to the sound discretion of the appellate court, the existence of good reasons was indispensable to the latter's grant of FPHC's motion for execution pending appeal. Absent any such good reason, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued by the CA with grave abuse of discretion.
SC finds that the CA haphazardly allowed the execution pending appeal on a myopic reading of the facts that are heavily, albeit unduly, skewed in favor of FPHC. The CA merely looked into the physical and medical condition of petitioner without even considering that FPHC's complaints-in-intervention were already denied by the Sandiganbayan twice on the ground of prescription of action. What is more, this Court had already affirmed with finality the first Sandiganbayan ruling against FPHC's right of action to assail the validity of TMEE's acquisition of said PCIB shares. These facts alone should have been enough for the CA to take a pause and further assess the merits of FPHC's motion.
It bears to mention on this score that the PCIB shares were registered in the name ofTMEE, not Benjamin, and certainly not his widow. The only reason for the existence of the petition was FPHC's insistence that said shares were ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin. However, at the time FPHC filed its motion in 2015, its petition no longer had factual and legal mooring because the third amended complaint ~ which finally impleaded TMEE in Civil Case No. 0035 - was subsequently dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision dated 25 January 2010 because ofPCGG's failure to sufficiently allege that TMEE, as well as its shares of stock, were part of the ill-gotten wealth of Romualdez. The Court affirmed said dismissal with finality in G.R. No. 192653. Effectively, the PCIB shares were no longer part of Civil Case No. 0035.
Since the PCIB shares were no longer in the conversation insofar as Civil Case No. 0035 was concerned, petitioner cannot participate in Civil Case No. 0035 anymore. Evidently, there was no good reason to hasten the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony. Instead, sound discretion dictated the CA to speed up its resolution of petitioner's appeal to finally settle the issue as to the propriety of the RTC's order, allowing the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony.
Accordingly, executions pending appeal require the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
Issue 2:
Whether the RTC lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance and dispose of FPHC's petition
Held:
After a scrutiny of the facts on hand, the Court holds that even assuming the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition, the CA nevertheless erred in affirming the RTC's ruling to allow the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony, as the petition was utterly devoid of merit.
The subject matter of the FPHC's petition are the PCIB shares supposedly obtained through fraudulent means from FPHC by TMEE, the latter being a dummy corporation created through the instance of Benjamin. With the death of Benjamin, FPHC now anchors its relentless pursuit to invalidate the sale of the PCIB shares on the testimony of herein petitioner, the wife/widow/heir of Benjamin. Allegedly, petitioner has personal knowledge of the circumstances of the acquisition of said PCIB shares by Benjamin through his dummy, TMEE.
To stress, the PCIB shares is registered in the name of TMEE. There is no showing, though, that petitioner is part of TMEE. Notably, too, FPHC's petition failed to allege the ultimate facts on how petitioner knew the manner by which TMEE acquired said shares from FPHC's alleged dummy board. FPHC did not even allege petitioner's actual participation in the negotiation and purchase of said PCIB shares by TMEE.
What is clear, therefore, is that petitiqner's only connection to the PCIB shares is her relationship with her late husband, Benjamin, the alleged beneficial owner of said shares. However, FPHC failed to allege sufficient cause for the perpetuation of petitioner's testimony. Since FPHC insists that the PCIB shares were the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin, dragging petitioner into the controversy, without any proof of her actual knowledge of the alleged fraudulent acquisition of the PCIB shares, will mean that she will have to be examined about communications received by her in confidence from Benjamin regarding said PCIB shares. This is proscribed under the marital privilege rule under Section 24, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus: Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
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