DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT

GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., Second Division

 

Subjects:

Constitutional Law

Remedial Law

 

Facts:

                For the benefit of public-school teachers, DepEd devised and implemented a payroll deduction scheme for the loans they secured from DepEd's duly accredited private lenders. RTKBCI was among DepEd's accredited private lenders which availed of the latter's payroll deduction scheme. To facilitate DepEd's collections and remittances, RTKBCI was assigned Deduction Codes 209 and 219. DepEd was also paid two percent of the total monthly deductions as administrative fees.

                By Memorandum dated July 4, 2001, DepEd Undersecretary Ernesto S. Pangan directed Dr. Blanquita D. Bautista, Chief Accountant and Officer-in- Charge, Finance and Management Service to hold the remittance of the collections for February to June 2001; and suspend as well the salary deduction scheme for RTKBCI pending resolution of the teachers' numerous complaints against RTKBCI's alleged unauthorized excessive deductions and connivance with some DepEd's personnel in charge of effecting these deductions.

                Responding to Undersecretary Pangan's directive, RTKBCI wrote the former demanding the release of the collections. By letter dated September 12, 2001, Undersecretary Pangan denied the demand. He asserted that the suspension of the salary deduction scheme was necessary to protect the concerned public school teachers.

                RTKBCI filed with RTC-Manila the petition for mandamus to compel DepEd and then Secretary Raul Roco and Undersecretary Pangan to remit to RTKBCI the loan collections and continue with the salary deduction scheme until the loans of the public school teachers should have been fully paid. Trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for and ordered DepEd to release to RTKBCI the collections amounting to P111,989,006.98. DepEd was also ordered to pay actual damages of P5,000,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500,000.00.

                CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of actual damages.

 

Issue:

                Whether the Department of Education (DepEd) be compelled by writ of mandamus to collect, by salary deductions, the loan payments of public-school teachers and remit them to the Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc. (RTKBCI).

 

Held:

                No; the rules governing the writ of mandamus: One. For the writ of mandamus to prosper, the applicant must prove by preponderance of evidence that "there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act."

                Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station. A clear legal right is one that is founded or granted by law. Unless the right to relief is clear, mandamus will not issue. If there is any discretion as to the taking or non-taking of the action sought, there is no clear legal duty. [Pacheco v. Court of Appeals].

                Further, Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council distinguished a ministerial act from a discretionary act, viz: "A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive."

                Conversely, mandamus will not compel a public official to do anything which is not his or her duty or otherwise give the applicant anything to which he or she is not entitled to under the law. Here, RTKBCI must prove that a law or regulation compels DepEd to continue as RTKBCI's collecting and remitting agent for the loans the latter extended to public school teachers and that RTKBCI is, by such law or regulations, entitled to the collection and remittance of these payments.

                Section 7 of RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) sets forth the power, duties and functions of DepEd and the different levels of supervision and regulation of educational activities. Notably, DepEd's activities as collection and remittance agent for accredited private lending institutions are not among its core power, duties, and functions.

                DepEd, nonetheless, has no legal duty to act as a collecting and remitting agent for RTKBCI. The latter has not shown that it remains an accredited private lending institution entitled to avail of the payroll deduction system. Assuming that RTKBCI is still DepEd accredited, DepEd is not precluded from suspending its activities under the payroll deduction scheme vis-a-vis a private lending agency such as RTKBCI. The payroll deduction scheme expressly describes the services it offers as a privilege. As such, DepEd may act as a collecting and remitting agent for a private lending agency, but doing so must always be in consonance with DepEd's power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155.

                RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its collecting and remitting agent. To reiterate, this is not one ofDepEd's power, duties, and functions. Rather, it is an accommodation that DepEd does - - - not for the benefit of any private lending agency but as a means to protect and promote the teachers' welfare. Hence, the only feasible characterization of this activity its being a mere privilege. To otherwise characterize this activity is to demean and degrade the stature of DepEd as the sovereign regulator and supervisor of basic education and to reduce it to being a mere collection and remittance agency for private lending institutions.

                Second. Neither estoppel nor practice engenders a clear legal duty for DepEd to act as RTKBCI's collection and remittance agent. As held in Pena v. Delos Santos, "[estoppel is a principle in equity and pursuant to Article 1432, Civil Code, it is adopted insofar as it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code and other laws." Estoppel, thus, cannot supplant and contravene the provision of law clearly applicable to a case, and conversely, it cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.

                Continued practice in domestic legal matters does not rise to the level of a legal obligation. The first sentence of Article 7 of the Civil Code states, "[laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary." There can be no clear legal duty and clear legal right where to do so would compel DepEd to violate its power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155, specifically toward the protection and promotion of the teachers' welfare. In the latter case, no practice, continued or otherwise, would establish and validate such clear legal duty and clear legal right.