Vitarich Corporation vs Femina Dagmil [ G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020 ] Case Digest

 

Vitarich Corporation vs Femina Dagmil

[ G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020 ]

Facts:

            Vitarich Corporation filed an action for sum of money against Femina Dagmil before the RTC Branch 11 of Malolos City.  Upon receipt of summons, Femina's counsel, Atty. Nepthali Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case on ground of improper venue. On August 17, 2010, the RTC denied the motion and directed Femina to answer the complaint.4 Atty. Solilapsi received the Order on November 3, 2010 but Femina did not submit any responsive pleading. On January 5,2011, Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default.6 Meantime, Femina's new counsel, Atty. Emilio Quianzon, Jr, entered his appearance and filed on January 31, 2011 a motion to admit answer.

            RTC declared Femina in default and allowed Vitarich to present its evidence ex-parte. Meanwhile, on March 1, 2011, the RTC denied Atty. Quianzon, Jr.'s entry of appearance and Femina's motion to admit answer. On April 1, 2011, the RTC granted the complaint and ordered Femina to pay Vitarich.

            Aggrieved, Femina filed a petition for relief from judgment based on her former counsel's excusable negligence. Allegedly, Atty. Solilapsi failed to timely read the order directing her to file an answer because his secretary placed it on a wrong case folder. Moreover, Atty. Solilapsi was saddled with health issues and seldom reported to his office that made it difficult for her to correspond with him. Femina also filed a motion for new trial claiming mistake and/or excusable negligence and that she has a meritorious defense. On June 7, 2012, the RTC denied the motion for new trial emphasizing that Femina is bound by the action of her counsel. Dissatisfied, Femina filed motions for reconsideration and to resolve the petition for relief from judgment. On May 20, 2013, the RTC denied the motions. CA reversed the April 1, 2011 judgment of default and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also ordered the RTC to admit Femina's answer.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not Femina be declared in default.

 

Held:

            NO. Given these precepts, we find that the CA correctly reversed the judgment of default. Foremost, Femina moved to admit her answer before she was declared in default. Femina filed her motion through registered mail on January 31, 2011 while the order of default was issued on February 8, 2011. The fact of mailing on the said date is undisputed. It was mentioned in the RTC and CA's findings and admitted in the parties' pleadings. Notably, Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.27 Thus, this circumstance must be fully appreciated in favor of Femina. Applying the Sablas ruling, the RTC should have considered Femina's answer since it was filed before the declaration of default.

            Moreover, persuasive reasons justified the belated filing of the motion to admit answer.28 The records reveal that Atty. Solilapsi had been confined in the hospital twice in January 2011. He was treated for Pulmonary Tuberculosis Class 3 (Intensive Phase) and was advised to take a rest for two months.29 This caused Atty. Solilapsi to be absent from office most of the time and to ask for his discharge as counsel. The delay was compounded by the mistake of Atty. Solilapsi's secretary who placed the order to file answer in the wrong case folder. These predicaments forced Femina to hire a new counsel to defend her case. Further, Femina's answer shows that she has a prima facie meritorious defense. The allegations that Femina did not receive several deliveries and that Vitarich money claims of P15,829,840.00 were bloated must be determined in a full-blown trial. The outcome of the case, after all, will still depend on the strength of the parties' respective evidence. Applying the Hernandez ruling, the RTC should have liberally exercised its discretion and permitted the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period.

            To be sure, there is no showing that Femina intended to delay the proceedings. As the CA aptly held, Femina availed several post-judgment remedies which evinced her desire to file an answer and to establish her defenses. More importantly, Vitarich did not suffer any damage. It appears that Femina's counsel received on November 3, 2010 the notice to file answer and had 15 days or until November 18, 2010 to comply. Yet, Vitarich moved to declare Femina in default only on January 5, 2011 or 48 days from the expiration of the reglementary period. The only conclusion is that Vitarich has not been prejudiced by the delay. Otherwise, Vitarich would not have been lenient and opted to wait that long before invoking its right.