Azuela vs. CA, G.R. No. 122880; April 12, 2006 [Case Digest]

 

Azuela vs. CA,

G.R. No. 122880; April 12, 2006

Facts:

            The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.

            The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

            The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent. It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.

            Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.

            RTC admitted the will to probate. RTC held that "on the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will." Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.

            Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."

 

Issue:

            Whether the will should be admitted.

 

Held:

            No; the appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.

            As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left un-complied with.

            In Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty."

            The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanimity upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."

            In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

            It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

            Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

            It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

Mitra vs. Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018 [Case Digest]

 

Mitra vs. Sablan-Guevarra,

G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018

Second Division [REYES, JR., J.:]

Facts:

            On June 26, 2006, Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left real and personal properties with the approximate total value of P1,032,237.00 and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the will.

            Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written; and that the will was executed under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the document to be her last will and testament.

            RTC admit the will of Legaspi. The probate court explained that the last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the witnesses are not required to sign. Also, it held that inasmuch as the number of pages upon which the will was written was stated in the Acknowledgement, the will must be admitted to probate. The respondents' allegation of undue influence or improper pressure exerted upon Legaspi was disregarded for failure on their part to adduce evidence proving the existence thereof.

            CA reversed the judgment of the RTC, as the CA adhered to the view of strictly complying with the requirement of stating the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause. Moreover, the CA detected another supposed fatal defect in the will: the photocopy of the will submitted by the respondents on appeal did not contain the signatures of the instrumental witnesses on each and every page thereof.

            The petitioner, in assailing the findings of the CA, argues that in the original copy of the will that was offered before the probate court as Exhibit "L," it is clear that the instrumental witnesses signed on the left margin of every page of the will except the last, as did Legaspi.  The petitioner advances that the confusion arose when the respondents, in their record of appeal, submitted an altered photocopy of the will to the CA, in which the signatures of the instrumental witnesses were covered when photocopied, to make it appear that the witnesses did not sign on every page. This misled the CA to rule that the will was defective for the lack of signatures.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether the CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will failed to sign on each and every page thereof on the left margin, except the last, as required under Article 805 of the Civil Code.

 

Held:

            Yes; it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses signed on each and every page of the will, except the last page. Such being the case, the CA erred in concluding otherwise. There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805 of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was complied with.

            It should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last page of the subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.

 

Issue 2:

            Whether the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state the number of pages comprising the will on the attestation clause renders such will defective.

 

Held:

            Yes; in Singson vs. Florentino, the Court adopted a more liberal approach and allowed probate, even if the number of pages of the will was mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the attestation clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.

            The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides that: Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

            Thus, in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA, the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.

            What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."

            An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included. As with the will, the Acknowledgment is written in Filipino, quoted in part below: Ang HULING HABILlNG ito ay binubuo ng apat (4) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito.

            In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with all the formalities required of a notarial will. It has been proven that Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will, except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment page. With regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion, such omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate.

Vaporoso vs. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

Vaporoso vs. People,

G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

Second Division [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

Facts:

            At around 7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D. Torculas (PO2 Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo City, he noticed two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road. When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped away. At this point, the owner of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark, secluded area in Bangoy Street, prompting him to call for back-up. Shortly after, Police Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1 Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area.

            About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them. Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to apprehend them. After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from petitioners, the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought them to the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inventory in the presence of Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban.

            RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC that the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the second search conducted to herein appellant which yielded an illegal drug valid.

 

Held:

            No; in warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

            The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

            In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he. did not waver in his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.

            On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."

            Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.

            In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

 

Saluday vs. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018 [Case Digest]

 

Saluday vs. People,

G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018

En Banc [Carpio, Acting C.J.]

Facts:

            On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

            Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

            Petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866 by the RTC. Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification.

            Saluday argues that seized items are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

 

Issue:

            Whether the seized items are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

 

Held:

            No; the elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. As regards the second and third elements, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority.

            Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, reads: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction, may shed light on the matter.

            In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus: Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this cast. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

            Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

            The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

            A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable.

            Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy.

            Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security .measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is. diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.

            In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggage. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

            Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

            While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on board. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

            In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be continued to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

            The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminal, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

            Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

            To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

People vs. Mentoy, G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019, [Case Digest]

 

People vs. Mentoy,

G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019,

First Division [Bersamin, C.J.]

Facts:

            On May 31, 2008, at about 8 a.m., PSI Socrates briefed the operation team (team). At about 4:30 p.m., the informant relayed to the team that accused-appellant will be boarding a Charing 19 shuttle van (van) with plate number VRA 698. Thus, the team proceeded to the National Highway, Barangay Malatgao, Nan-a, Palawan. At a distance of one (1) to two (2) meters, PO1 Rosales, while on board his motorcycle, saw accused-appellant board the van. PO1 Rosales flagged down the van as it approached them. The team introduced themselves as police officers. They declared that they were conducting a checkpoint because of information about persons transporting illegal drugs. PO1 Rosales told the driver that they will check the van passengers. The driver then opened the van's side door. PO1 Rosales asked the van passengers who among them was Rose. Accused-appellant replied, "Aka po" (I am). PO1 Rosales asked accused-appellant where her baggage was. Accused-appellant apprehensively requested the driver to hand her the pink bag placed at the rear portion of the van. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales, however, noticed that accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, from the pink bag to a black one. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales suspected this bundle to contain marijuana leaves. Accused-appellant then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. SPO2 Felizarte also noticed that accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, but he and PO1 Rosales restrained her. Afterwards, PO1 Rosales called Barangay Captain Ernesto Maiguez (Brgy. Captain Maiguez) to proceed to the area.

            When Brgy. Captain Maiguez arrived, SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales asked him if he knew accused-appellant. Brgy. Captain Maiguez said he knew accused-appellant as a rice seller who resided in Barangay Malatgao where he was chairman. The police officers asked Brgy. Captain Maiguez to pick up the black bag, which accused-appellant held beside her. Brgy. Captain Maiguez got (the) said bag and placed it by the road. SPO2 Felizarte requested him to open it. Brgy. Captain Maiguez opened said bag in the presence of accused-appellant and the other van passengers. PO1 Rosales took photographs while said bag was being opened. The black bag contained, inter alia: (a) one (1) L-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape; (b) one (1) block-shaped bundle wrapped in newspaper; and (c) one (1) sachet (covered with tissue paper), all suspected to contain marijuana leaves. The police officers smelled the bundles and sachet and confirmed that these contained marijuana leaves. The police officers returned the items inside the black bag. They arrested and informed accused-appellant that she violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and apprised the latter of her constitutional rights. Since accused-appellant lived near the crime scene, the police officers brought her and the seized items immediately to the police station to avoid any untoward incident.

            PO1 Rosales carried the black bag from the crime scene to the police station. Thereat, PO1 Rosales prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of a media representative and Brgy. Captain Maiguez. PO1 Rosales also marked the L-shaped bundle as "ADR-1", blocked-shaped bundle as "ADR-2", and sachet as "ADR-3", respectively, in the presence of accused-appellant. PO1 Rosales brought the bundles and sachet to the Palawan Crime Laboratory (crime laboratory) where Forensic Chemist and Police Chief Inspector Mary Jane Cordero (PCI Cordero) examined the seized items. She found the contents of the bundles and sachet positive for marijuana and prepared Chemistry Report No. D-005-08 stating her findings.

            RTC convicted the accused-appellant as charged.  CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant. It opined that a search could precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused­-appellant had been an incident of her lawful arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the crucial links in the chain of custody.

 

Issue:

            Whether the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from her bag were inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule.

 

Held:

            No; a lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal effects of an individual. The process cannot be reversed. Hence, the search must rest on probable cause existing independently of the arrest.

            Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause - the existence of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to do so; or the person whose property is to be searched has used the same to commit crime, and its issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or conjecture,,,, or hearsay. The right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures is so sacred that no less than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution declares the right to be inviolable, and for that reason expressly prohibits the issuance of any search warrant or warrant of arrest except upon probable cause to be personally determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

            To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the exclusionary rule by unqualifiedly declaring that "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusionary rule is intended to deter the violation of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.

            We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

            Warrantless search of the accused-appellant's personal belongings was not based on probable cause.  For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block­ shaped bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.

            The general rule is that an arrest or search and seizure should be effected upon a judicial warrant. A lawful warrantless arrest may be effected by a peace officer or private person but only when any of the exceptions listed in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest to be issued is applicable.

            On its part, the CA upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of the accused-appellant having been. caught in flagrante delicto, the situation covered by Section 5(a), supra. An arrest made in flagrante delicto means that the arrestee is caught in the very act of committing the crime, and the phrase necessarily implies that the positive identification of the culprit has already been done by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification constitutes direct evidence of culpability because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." But we find otherwise, because there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.

            Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused­ appellant once she had identified herself as Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really contained marijuana. As earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2 Felizarte's afterthought justification considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It is noteworthy in this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had opened the bag.

            The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.  As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.

            What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her.

People vs. Olarte, G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019 [Case Digest]

 People vs. Olarte,

G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019

First Division [Germundo, J.]

Facts:

PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were members of Task Force "Boy Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to be responsible for several robbery incidents at Pabayo and Chavez Streets in Cagayan de Oro City. On July 19, 2014, at around 1:30 P.M., PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were conducting discreet monitoring operations in the area. During their watch, they noticed a man walking towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. His features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image was shown in closed circuit television (CCTV) footages of past robberies in the area. As "Boy Solo" was about to enter the establishment, he pulled out a firearm. This prompted PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar to immediately run towards the suspect.  "Boy Solo," however, noticed the police officers running towards him so he ran away. "Boy Solo's" companions – Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and Rodel B. Rubilla, acting as his lookouts, also fled from their posts. They all boarded a Cugman Liner, a public utility jeepney heading towards the Cogon Market. Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested near Ororama Superstore in Cogon after a chase by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.

During the arrest, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar searched accused-appellant's person and recovered a .25 caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly, a flathead screwdriver, and a transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. PO2 Intud then wrapped the grenade with masking tape and marked it with his initials RMI2. Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant to Police Station 1-Divisoria where the incident was recorded in the police blotter.  PO2 Intud then turned over the grenade to the prosecutor but the latter refused to take custody of It. He handed it to Chief Investigator Senior Police Officer 2 Allan Radaza (SPO2 Radaza) who, in turn, entrusted it to the PNP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.  The police officers found out that accused-appellant had no license or permit to possess the M61 hand grenade as well as the .25 caliber pistol, though a replica.

In the course of reconstituting the records, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-830 (illegal possession of hand grenade) seeking to change the reflected fuse assembly marking from "M204X2" to "M204A2." This was eventually granted by the RTC.

RTC rendered a joint judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand grenade, for the following reason: an accused may be arrested and searched without warrant when he/she is attempting to commit an offense. However, it dismissed the case of illegal possession of a .25 caliber pistol replica against accused-appellant because the Information in Criminal Case No. 2014-831 was defective. It only alleged that the pistol replica was merely possessed and not used in the commission of a crime as contemplated in Section 35, Article V of R.A. No. 10591.

CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling in Crim. Case No. 2014-830 of the RTC, ratiocinating that: (a) accused-appellant never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal; (b) accused-appellant was validly arrested and searched without a warrant as he was caught attempting to commit a robbery, making the hand grenade admissible in evidence as it was validly obtained; (e) it does not matter if the fuse assembly marking on the grenade, as stated in the information (Criminal Case No. 2014-830), differs from that stated in the arresting officers' judicial affidavits; the alleged discrepancy being "clearly a clerical error" as supported by other documentary evidence (July 28, 2014 Certification, Seizure Receipt, and Extract Blotter), thereby justifying the amendment of the information; and others. 

Accused insists that: (a) his arrest was illegal because PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar merely assumed that he was "Boy Solo" based on CCTV footages and that "one cannot, without a warrant, arrest anyone based on similarities of physical attributes;" (b) "[a] waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest;"  (c) the corpus delicti is doubtful because, when the subject hand grenade was presented in court, the marking "RJVII2" was not found on it and the fuse assembly marking stated in the original information did not match the grenade's serial number and others.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest is valid and the hand grenade seized from the accused-appellant is admissible in evidence.

Held:

Yes. The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless arrests based on probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been committed." Here, the offense had already been consummated but not in the presence of the peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More importantly, there is durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace officer or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or immediate vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases where the peace officer or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act of committing an offense.

"Probable cause" (in the context of warrantless arrests) has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.  While probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest is required only in instances where the peace officer or private person who was present only at the time when the offense was committed believes (based on his/her immediate perception) that an offense had just been committed, some of its yardsticks for determination may be of help in ascertaining whether an accused is attempting to commit an offense. This is because the probable cause needed to justify a warrantless arrest ordinarily involves a certain degree of suspicion, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense based on actual facts.  And such determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior."

Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a reasonable suspicion to arrest accused-appellant who was seen to have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common sense dictates that police officers need not wait for a serious crime, such as robbery, to be consummated before they move in and make the arrest because it will definitely endanger the lives and safety of the public, as well as their own. This is consistent with the jurisprudential dictum that the obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose, as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.  Moreover, even if the firearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the police officers were not expected to know on sight whether the firearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second to act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient ground to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it.  As a result of the validity of the accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the incidental search and seizure of the items in his possession is also valid "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."

Additionally, accused-appellant's argument that the CCTV footage cannot be considered as a valid basis for his arrest fails to persuade. While it is a long-standing rule that reliable information alone (such as footage from a CCTV recording) is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, the rule only requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.  Therefore, it does not matter that accused-appellant was previously identified only from a CCTV footage supposedly covering his previous criminal conduct because he was seen by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar performing an overt act of drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC.

In this case, accused-appellant failed to timely question the illegality of his arrest and to present evidence (or at least some reasonable explanation) to substantiate his alleged wrongful detention. This renders the warrantless arrest and the accompanying search valid; thus, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over his person and making all the items, confiscated from accused-appellant, admissible in evidence. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's validation of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and incidental search.

Object evidence is classified into: (a) actual, physical or "autoptic evidence: those which have a direct relation or part in the fact or incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal examination by the presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual or physical object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or to aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness. Further, actual evidence is subdivided into three categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects); (b) those that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those with no identifying marks (non-unique objects).

The Court promulgated the Judicial Affidavit Rule which mandates parties to file, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference, judicial affidavits executed by their witnesses which shall take the place of their direct testimonies.  Here, parties seeking to offer documentary and/or object evidence are now required to describe, authenticate, and make the same evidence form part of the witness' judicial affidavit under the said Rule. Therefore, as a rule, object evidence now requires authentication or testimonial sponsorship before it may be admitted or considered by the court.

In the case at hand, the chain of custody rule does not apply to an undetonated grenade (an object made unique), for it is not amorphous and its form is relatively resistant to change. A witness of the prosecution need only identify the hand grenade, a structured object, based on personal knowledge that the same contraband or article is what it purports to be—that it came from the person of accused-appellant. Even assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary value of the explosive had been sufficiently established by the prosecution. As aptly observed by the CA:  As previously stated, PO2 Intud, SPO2 Radaza and SPO2 Tingson positively testified as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the grenade presented in court, marked as Exhibit "B-1." PO2 Intud testified that it is the same grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant at the time of his arrest. SPO2 Radaza testified that it is the same grenade turned over [to] him by PO2 Intud. SPO2 Tiongson testified that it is the same grenade turned over to him by SPO2 Radaza. Thus, there is no break in the chain of custody of the grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant.

Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. Nos. 82585/82827, November 14, 1988 [Case Digest]

 

Soliven vs. Makasiar,

G.R. Nos. 82585/82827, November 14, 1988

En Banc [Per Curiam]

Facts:

           

 

Issue 1:

            Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President

 

Held:

            Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

            It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

 

Issue 2:

            Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

 

Held:

            No; the addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

            What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

 

Issue 3:

            Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

 

Held:

            Yes. Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

            The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

            But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

            Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.