Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco, et. al., vs. NLRC, [G.R. No. 151309] Case Digest

 

●     Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco, et. al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 151309, 15 October 2008

 

 

Facts:

                Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines and its principal office is located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito Lariño, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are its regular employees, occupying the positions of helper, shipment helper and factory workers, respectively, assigned to the Production Department. They are members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco (BMT), the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees.

                                Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memorand[a] of Agreement (MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule to be implemented in the company effective May 20, 1996. The MOA was entered into pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Order (D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek.

                In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new agreement.

                Tryco received the Letter dated March 26, 1997 from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan City.

                Tryco issued a Memorandum dated April 7, 1997 which directed petitioner Aya-ay to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan. When petitioner Aya-ay refused to obey, Tryco reiterated the order on April 18, 1997. Subsequently, through a Memorandum dated May 9, 1997, Tryco also directed petitioners Egera, Lariño and Barte to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan.

                BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on May 26, 1997.

                Petitioners filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay and service incentive leave, and refusal to bargain against Tryco and its President, Wilfredo C. Rivera. In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that the company acted in bad faith during the CBA negotiations because it sent representatives without authority to bind the company, and this was the reason why the negotiations failed. They added that the management transferred petitioners Larino, Barte, Egera and Aya-ay from Caloocan to San Rafael, Bulacan to paralyze the union.

                In their defense, respondents averred that the petitioners were not dismissed but they refused to comply with the management's directive for them to report to the company's plant in San Rafael, Bulacan. They denied the allegation that they negotiated in bad faith, stating that, in fact, they sent the Executive Vice-President and Legal Counsel as the company's representatives to the CBA negotiations. They claim that the failure to arrive at an agreement was due to the stubbornness of the union panel.

                Respondents further averred that, long before the start of the negotiations, the company had already been planning to decongest the Caloocan office to comply with the government policy to shift the concentration of manufacturing activities from the metropolis to the countryside. The decision to transfer the company's production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan was precipitated by the letter-reminder of the Bureau of Animal Industry.

                Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit.   NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.  CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and ruled that the transfer order was a management prerogative not amounting to a constructive dismissal or an unfair labor practice.

 

Issue:

                Whether or not Tryco's decision to transfer its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan is within the management prerogative of Tryco.

 

Held:

                Yes.

 

Ratio:

                This prerogative extends to the management's right to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business. Management's prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is, therefore, generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal. Thus, the consequent transfer of Tryco's personnel, assigned to the Production Department was well within the scope of its management prerogative.

 

                When the transfer is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal. However, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for valid and legitimate grounds. The employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.

 

Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners. Petitioners, therefore, anchor their objection solely on the ground that it would cause them great inconvenience since they are all residents of Metro Manila and they would incur additional expenses to travel daily from Manila to Bulacan.

 

The Court has previously declared that mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal. Objection to a transfer that is grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.

                To begin with, we cannot see how the mere transfer of its members can paralyze the union. The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location.

 

More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners' right to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. With the exception of Article 248(f) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.

 

Adiong vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 103956] Case Digest

 

Adiong vs COMELEC

[G.R. No. 103956]

Facts:

            COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347.  Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

            Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. Petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.

 

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC is constitutional.

 

Held:

            No.

 

Ratio:

            First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.

                        The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections).

 

            The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

 

            The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.

 

            Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

 

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.

 

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

 

NewSounds Broadcasting vs Dy [G.R. No. 170270] Case Digest

 

NewSounds Broadcasting vs Dy

[G.R. No. 170270]

 

Facts:

            Petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit on 2002.  Bagnos Maximo [the City Zoning Administrator-Designate] required the petitioner to submit "either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial land."  Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as commercial.

            Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayor’s permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayor’s permit.

            RTC denied the application of the petitioners; CA dismissed the case due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial court.

            Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan) granted the application [of the petitioner] and issued an Order that stated that "there remains no doubt on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural classification of subject land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."

            On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayor’s permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order.

                The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004 mayor’s permit, again with the DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004, respondent Meer claimed that no record existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI. As a result, petitioners were informed that there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s permit.

            On 17 February 2004, respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, arrived at the property and closed the radio stations. Petitioners proceeded to file a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibited the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period. On 23 March 2004, the COMELEC issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before 17 February 2004, thus allowing the operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following day.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.

 

Held:

            Yes.

 

Ratio:

            Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.  While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.

            That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior.

               

                At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.  Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.  Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.