Drug Education [Republic Act 9165] for NSTP

 

Drug Education [Republic Act 9165]

 

§  Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

§  is Mala Prohibita – meaning that it is punishable by law even in the absence of intent [(People v. Morilla, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014).]

§  Dangerous Drugs - Include those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Sec. 3 (j), RA 9165).

§  Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals - Includes those listed in Tables I and II of the 1988
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

§  PUNISHABLE ACTS:

o   1. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (Sec. 4, RA 9165);

o   2. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (Sec. 5, RA 9165);

o   3. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. (Sec. 6, RA 9165);

o   4. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort (Sec. 7, RA 9165);

o   5. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (Sec. 8, RA 9165);

o   6. Illegal Chemical Diversion of Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (Sec. 9, RA 9165);

o   7. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (Sec. 10, RA 9165);

o   8. Possession of Dangerous Drugs (Sec. 11, RA 9165) (BAR 2015);

o   9. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs (Sec. 12, RA 9165);

o   10. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings (Sec. 13, RA 9165);

o   11. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings (Sec. 14, RA 9165);

o   12. Use of Dangerous Drugs (Sec. 15, RA 9165);

o   13. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof (Sec. 16, RA 9165);

o   14. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous Drugs and/or

o   Controlled Precursors and Essential

o   Chemicals (Sec. 17, RA 9165);

§  DRUG PUSHING - SALE, TRADING, ADMINISTRATION, DISPENSATION, DELIVERY, DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS AND/OR CONTROLLED PRECURSORS AND ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS (SEC. 5)

§  Constructive possession under RA 9165

o   While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under the accused’s control or possession. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs (Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012).

§  It is amended by R.A. 10640 which provides the two-witness rule required during the seizure of illegal drugs at the buy bust operation or by virtue of warrant of arrest.

 

 

ROLE OF THE YOUTH ON THE DRUG DETECTION AND PREVENTION

§  There is a need for youth participation in the drug prevention and rehabilitation efforts as drug abuse and addiction is an increasing trend in younger generation.

§  Young people or organizations are assets to the community who can help alleviate or eradicate the possibility of drug abuse.

§  Whether individually or as a group, the youth is a good driving force that could shape the drug abuse prevention initiative of the country.

§  It is imperative to include the youth in the drug prevention for they know their needs better than anyone else.

§  With active youth involvement, young people are better protected, better outcomes are achieved, innovative approaches are realized, decisions are more applicable to youth needs and young people improve upon important skills such as communication and cooperation.

§  Participation also builds character and confidence when young people feel needed and appreciated.

 

Province of Camarines vs COA [G.R. No. 227926] Case Digest

 Province of Camarines vs COA

G.R. No. 227926, March 10, 2020

 

Facts:

            To accommodate the growing number of enrollees in public schools, petitioner started hiring in 1999 temporary teaching personnel to handle extension classes of existing public schools, as well as non-teaching personnel in connection with the establishment and maintenance of these extension classes. The salaries of the personnel hired were charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF).

            Audit Team Leader and Supervising Auditor-in-Charge issued Notice of Disallowance No. 2011-200-010(08)8 dated November 15, 2011 disallowing the payments of allowances/honoraria to locally funded teaching and non-teaching personnel of DepEd-Division of Camarines Sur which were charged to the 2008 SEF for the following violations: 1. The payments for the allowances of locally funded teachers were in violation of the provisions of Section 272 of RA 7160 which explicitly provide that the proceeds of Special Education Fund shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools and DECS-DBM-DILG Joint Circular No. 01 s of 1998 dated April 14, 1998, clarified under JC No. 01-A dated March 14, 2000 and JC No. 01-B dated June 25, 2001 which state that payments of salaries, authorized allowances and personnel-related benefits are only for hired teachers that handle new classes as extension of existing public elementary [or] secondary schools established and approved by DepEd; and others.

            ATL and the Supervising Auditor (SA) maintained that the payments of allowances/honoraria to locally funded teachers were rightfully disallowed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of law and joint circulars on the utilization of SEF, particularly the establishment of extension classes wherein the approval of the DECS Secretary, upon the recommendation of the DECS Regional Director is necessary, as well as the certification of the division superintendent concerned of the necessity or urgency of establishing such extension classes.

            In asserting non-culpability, the petitioner attacks the validity of DECS-DBM-DILG Joint Circular No. 1-A, alleging that it constitutes an invalid exercise of the administrative rule-making power of the concerned agencies and violates the principle of local autonomy granted to LGUs.

 

Issue:

            Whether petitioner, through the approving officers, is liable to refund the disallowed fund subject of ND No. 2011-200-101(08) in the total amount of P5,820,843.30.

 

Held:

            No; this provision [Sec.4, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution] has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms — supervision and control — differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

            In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.

            In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

            In this case, petitioners failed to question the validity of the subject circular at the earliest opportunity. It was only before this Court, that they are now raising the circular's validity vis-a-vis the principle of local autonomy. Our concurrence with respondent on this point, notwithstanding, still, we find that petitioner is not liable to pay for the disallowed funds.

            Under the principle of quantum meruit, a person may recover a reasonable value for the thing he delivered or the service that he rendered. Literally meaning "as much as he deserves," this principle acts as a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.

            It is apparent, based on the rulings of the COA, COA-RO V, Auditor and ATL that, the disallowance was made not because no service was rendered by the concerned recipients. Rather, it was due to the failure of petitioners to comply with the mandatory requirements of DECS-DBM-DILG JCs particularly as to: (1) the prior approval of DECS (now DepEd) Secretary of the extension classes; and (2) the recommendation of the DECS Regional Director. It is only the third requirement, certification by the division superintendent as to the necessity and urgency of establishing extension classes in the LGUs, which petitioners were able to meet.

            In light of the principles of quantum of meruit and unjust enrichment, we find that it would be the height of injustice if the personnel who rendered services for the period in question would be asked to return the honoraria and allowances they actually worked for, simply because the approving officers failed to comply with certain procedural requirements. By necessary implication, it would also be inequitable if the approving officers would be required to shoulder the return of the disallowed funds, even though such were given for actual service rendered.

            Indeed, it cannot be said that the approving officers acted in bad faith as the COA did not question the subject allowances/honoraria from 1999 to 2008. Thus, there were no indicia that would have alerted them that there was something remiss or irregular with the questioned allowance.

            As for the non-teaching personnel, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the authority to expend the SEF for the operation and maintenance of extension classes of public schools carries with it the authority to utilize the SEF not only for the salaries and allowances of the teaching personnel, but those of the non-teaching personnel alike who were hired as a necessary and indispensable auxiliary to the teaching staff. It is beyond question that the services of these non-teaching personnel are essential to the sound and efficient operation and maintenance of these extension classes. Without them, it would be impossible to hold these extension classes as teachers would have to concern themselves not only with their duty to teach, but also the maintenance of classrooms and other logistical needs pertaining to the holding of these extension classes.

 

Villafuerte vs. Robredo G.R. No. 195390 (Case Digest)

Villafuerte vs. Robredo G.R. No. 195390 (Case Digest)

 

Facts:

            Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local government units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report,showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160.

            DILG issued MC No. 95-216, enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20% development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended."

            DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83, entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.

            The petitioners argue that the assailed issuances of the respondent interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC. In particular, they claim that MC No. 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the meaning of "development" and enumerated activities which the local government must finance from the 20% development fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes stated therein. They argue that the respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.

 

Held:

            No; local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. In Limbona v. Mangelin, the Court elaborated on the concept of decentralization, thus: “autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

            To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision. "The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own."

            A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC. This intention was highlighted in the very first paragraph of MC No. 2010-138, which reads: Section 287 of the Local Government Code mandates every local government to appropriate in its annual budget no less than 20% of its annual revenue allotment for development projects. In common understanding, development means the realization of desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential in the attainment of the constitutional objective of a desired quality of life for all.

            That the term development was characterized as the "realization of desirable social, economic and environmental outcome" does not operate as a restriction of the term so as to exclude some other activities that may bring about the same result. The definition was a plain characterization of the concept of development as it is commonly understood. The statement of a general definition was only necessary to illustrate among LGUs the nature of expenses that are properly chargeable against the development fund component of the IRA. It is expected to guide them and aid them in rethinking their ways so that they may be able to rectify lapses in judgment, should there be any, or it may simply stand as a reaffirmation of an already proper administration of expenses.

            Contrary to the petitioners’ posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature of the development fund by delineating it from other types of expenses. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. In such case, however, the concerned LGU must ascertain that applicable rules and regulations on budgetary allocation have been observed lest it be inviting an administrative probe.

            Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires."