SPS. FELIPE PARINGIT AND JOSEFA PARINGIT v. MARCIANA PARINGIT BAJIT [Case Digest]

 

SPS. FELIPE PARINGIT AND JOSEFA PARINGIT v. MARCIANA PARINGIT BAJIT

GR No. 234429, July 10, 2019

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., Second Division

 

Subject:

Civil Law

 

Facts:

                 Respondents Marciana Paringit Bajit, Adolio Paringit, and Rosario Paringit Ordofio sued their brother and his wife herein petitioners Spouses Felipe and Josefa Paringit, for annulment of title and reconveyance of property.

                Respondents essentially alleged that the case involved a 150 square meter lot situated in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 172313 in petitioners' name. Before the lot was registered in petitioners' name, their parents Julian and Aurelia Paringit used to lease it from Terocel Realty, Inc .. It was their family home. When Terocel offered to sell the lot to their parents, the latter sought financial help from their children. Only petitioners were able to give financial assistance for this purpose. Their father Julian then executed an affidavit declaring that the lot was purchased for the benefit of all his children, namely, Florencio, Marciana, Adolio, Rosario, and Felipe, subject to the condition that the first four aforenamed siblings reimburse Felipe their respective shares in the purchase price.

                From the time their parents bought the property (January 30, 1984) they and petitioners had since resided thereon. In 1988, petitioners moved to another house along the same street. After their father died on December 21, 1994, however, petitioners demanded that they pay back rentals for their use and occupancy of the property from March 1990 to December 1995.

                Trial court ruled in petitioners' favor and dismissed the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed. It held that there was implied trust between petitioners, on one hand, and respondents, on the other. It ordered petitioners to reconvey to respondents (including Florencio, who was not a party to the case) their proportionate shares in the lot upon reimbursement to petitioners of respondents' shares in the purchase price plus legal interest.

                Following the finality of the aforesaid decision, the trial court issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. Even after the lapse of nine (9) years, however, the writ of execution has remained unimplemented mainly because of the multiple motions filed by petitioners, which the trial court had invariably denied.

                One of the last two (2) issuances of the trial court was the Order dated January 14, 2014, viz: As to the defendants' Manifestation, the Court cannot grant defendants' prayer that the deed of reconveyance should be limited only to 110 square meters and not 150 square meters considering that the Supreme Court Decision dated September 29, 2010 did not qualify as to the extent of the measurement of the subject property to be reconveyed to the plaintiffs upon reimbursement of their share in the purchase price of the subject property. Hence, in the absence of any qualification, the Court assumes that the deed of reconveyance covers the plaintiffs' proportionate share on the whole subject property (150 square meters) pursuant to the Supreme Court Decision dated September 29, 2010.

                The trial court reiterated the need to segregate respondents' 90 square meter share from the entire 150 square meter lot. But still insisting on the reconveyance to respondents of just 110 square meters, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dated June 26, 2015. The trial court denied it.  Puting grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals to nullify the aforesaid orders for allegedly altering this Court's final and executory Decision dated September 29, 2010 in G.R. No. 181844. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that contrary to petitioners' contention, the trial court did not vary the terms of this Court's Decision dated September 29, 2010, but in fact, effected a sound and logical implementation of the same.  CA denied the M.R.

 

Issue:

                Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule that when the trial court pronounced there was a need to segregate the 90 square meters from the 150 square meters lot, it actually conformed with the terms of this Court's Decision dated September 29, 2010?

 

Held:

                Yes; when the trial court specified the entire 150 square meters to be distributed among the five (5) siblings, Florencio, Felipe, Marciana, Adolio, and Rosario, each to get 30 square meters, the trial court computed the numbers correctly. And when the trial court said that the respective shares of respondents Marciana, Adolio, and Rosario totaled 90 square meters, or 30 square meters each, it again computed the numbers correctly.

                A final word. This Court keenly notes the propensity of petitioners and their counsel for devising various ways and means of delaying for almost nine (9) years now the implementation of its Decision dated September 29, 2010. This is contumacious disobedience. To borrow the words of Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, non-compliance with the lower court's order is no more than non-recognition of this Court's directive. Petitioners must know that this Court is not expected to yield to assaults of disrespect. 

 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019 [Case Digest]

 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. RIZAL TEACHERS KILUSANG BAYAN FOR CREDIT

GR No. 202097; July 3, 2019

LAZARO-JAVIER, J., Second Division

 

Subjects:

Constitutional Law

Remedial Law

 

Facts:

                For the benefit of public-school teachers, DepEd devised and implemented a payroll deduction scheme for the loans they secured from DepEd's duly accredited private lenders. RTKBCI was among DepEd's accredited private lenders which availed of the latter's payroll deduction scheme. To facilitate DepEd's collections and remittances, RTKBCI was assigned Deduction Codes 209 and 219. DepEd was also paid two percent of the total monthly deductions as administrative fees.

                By Memorandum dated July 4, 2001, DepEd Undersecretary Ernesto S. Pangan directed Dr. Blanquita D. Bautista, Chief Accountant and Officer-in- Charge, Finance and Management Service to hold the remittance of the collections for February to June 2001; and suspend as well the salary deduction scheme for RTKBCI pending resolution of the teachers' numerous complaints against RTKBCI's alleged unauthorized excessive deductions and connivance with some DepEd's personnel in charge of effecting these deductions.

                Responding to Undersecretary Pangan's directive, RTKBCI wrote the former demanding the release of the collections. By letter dated September 12, 2001, Undersecretary Pangan denied the demand. He asserted that the suspension of the salary deduction scheme was necessary to protect the concerned public school teachers.

                RTKBCI filed with RTC-Manila the petition for mandamus to compel DepEd and then Secretary Raul Roco and Undersecretary Pangan to remit to RTKBCI the loan collections and continue with the salary deduction scheme until the loans of the public school teachers should have been fully paid. Trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for and ordered DepEd to release to RTKBCI the collections amounting to P111,989,006.98. DepEd was also ordered to pay actual damages of P5,000,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500,000.00.

                CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of actual damages.

 

Issue:

                Whether the Department of Education (DepEd) be compelled by writ of mandamus to collect, by salary deductions, the loan payments of public-school teachers and remit them to the Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc. (RTKBCI).

 

Held:

                No; the rules governing the writ of mandamus: One. For the writ of mandamus to prosper, the applicant must prove by preponderance of evidence that "there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act."

                Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station. A clear legal right is one that is founded or granted by law. Unless the right to relief is clear, mandamus will not issue. If there is any discretion as to the taking or non-taking of the action sought, there is no clear legal duty. [Pacheco v. Court of Appeals].

                Further, Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council distinguished a ministerial act from a discretionary act, viz: "A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive."

                Conversely, mandamus will not compel a public official to do anything which is not his or her duty or otherwise give the applicant anything to which he or she is not entitled to under the law. Here, RTKBCI must prove that a law or regulation compels DepEd to continue as RTKBCI's collecting and remitting agent for the loans the latter extended to public school teachers and that RTKBCI is, by such law or regulations, entitled to the collection and remittance of these payments.

                Section 7 of RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) sets forth the power, duties and functions of DepEd and the different levels of supervision and regulation of educational activities. Notably, DepEd's activities as collection and remittance agent for accredited private lending institutions are not among its core power, duties, and functions.

                DepEd, nonetheless, has no legal duty to act as a collecting and remitting agent for RTKBCI. The latter has not shown that it remains an accredited private lending institution entitled to avail of the payroll deduction system. Assuming that RTKBCI is still DepEd accredited, DepEd is not precluded from suspending its activities under the payroll deduction scheme vis-a-vis a private lending agency such as RTKBCI. The payroll deduction scheme expressly describes the services it offers as a privilege. As such, DepEd may act as a collecting and remitting agent for a private lending agency, but doing so must always be in consonance with DepEd's power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155.

                RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its collecting and remitting agent. To reiterate, this is not one ofDepEd's power, duties, and functions. Rather, it is an accommodation that DepEd does - - - not for the benefit of any private lending agency but as a means to protect and promote the teachers' welfare. Hence, the only feasible characterization of this activity its being a mere privilege. To otherwise characterize this activity is to demean and degrade the stature of DepEd as the sovereign regulator and supervisor of basic education and to reduce it to being a mere collection and remittance agency for private lending institutions.

                Second. Neither estoppel nor practice engenders a clear legal duty for DepEd to act as RTKBCI's collection and remittance agent. As held in Pena v. Delos Santos, "[estoppel is a principle in equity and pursuant to Article 1432, Civil Code, it is adopted insofar as it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code and other laws." Estoppel, thus, cannot supplant and contravene the provision of law clearly applicable to a case, and conversely, it cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.

                Continued practice in domestic legal matters does not rise to the level of a legal obligation. The first sentence of Article 7 of the Civil Code states, "[laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary." There can be no clear legal duty and clear legal right where to do so would compel DepEd to violate its power, duties, and functions under Section 7 of RA 9155, specifically toward the protection and promotion of the teachers' welfare. In the latter case, no practice, continued or otherwise, would establish and validate such clear legal duty and clear legal right.