Constantino vs Asia Life Insurance Company (G.R. No. L-1669) Case Digest

 

 

 

Constantino vs. Asia Life Insurance Company

G.R. No. L-1669.

 

Facts:

            In consideration of the sum of 176.04 pesos as annual premium duly paid to it, the Asia Life Insurance Company; whereby it insured the life of Arcadio Constantino for a term of twenty years. The first premium covered the period up to September 26, 1942. The plaintiff Paz Lopez de Constantino was regularly appointed beneficiary.

                After that first payment, no further premiums were paid. The insured died on September 22, 1944. It is admitted that the defendant, being an American corporation, had to close its branch office in Manila by reason of the Japanese occupation, i.e. from January 2, 1942, until the year 1945.

                Plaintiffs maintain that, as beneficiaries, they are entitled to receive the proceeds of the policies minus all sums due for premiums in arrears. They allege that non-payment of the premiums was caused by the closing of defendant's offices in Manila during the Japanese occupation and the impossible circumstances created by war. The lower court absolved the defendant. Hence this appeal.

 

Issue:

            Whether the beneficiary in a life insurance policy may recover the amount thereof although the insured died after repeatedly failing to pay the stipulated premiums, such failure having been caused by the last war in the Pacific.

 

Held:

            No. Since the year 1917, the Philippine law on Insurance was found in Act Number 2427, as amended, and the Civil Code. Act Number 2427 was largely copied from the Civil Code of California.  Pursuant to the express terms of the policy, non-payment of premium produces its avoidance.

                Professor Vance of Yale, in his standard treatise on Insurance, says that in determining the effect of non-payment of premiums occasioned by war, the American cases may be divided into three groups, according as they support the so-called Connecticut Rule, the New York Rule, or the United States Rule.

                The first holds the view that "there are two elements in the consideration for which the annual premium is paid — first, the mere protection for the year, and second, the privilege of renewing the contract for each succeeding year by paying the premium for that year at the time agreed upon. According to this view of the contract, the payment of premiums is a condition precedent, the non-performance would be illegal necessarily defeats the right to renew the contract."

                The second rule, apparently followed by the greater number of decisions, hold that "war between states in which the parties reside merely suspends the contracts of the life insurance, and that, upon tender of all premiums due by the insured or his representatives after the war has terminated, the contract revives and becomes fully operative."

                The United States rule declares that the contract is not merely suspended, but is abrogated by reason of non-payments is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. It additionally holds that it would be unjust to allow the insurer to retain the reserve value of the policy, which is the excess of the premiums paid over the actual risk carried during the years when the policy had been in force. This rule was announced in the well-known Statham case which, in the opinion of Professor Vance, is the correct rule.

                The appellants and some amici curiae contend that the New York rule should be applied here. The appellee and other amici curiae contend that the United States doctrine is the orthodox view.

                We have read and re-read the principal cases upholding the different theories. Besides the respect and high regard we have always entertained for decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, we cannot resist the conviction that the reasons expounded in its decision of the Statham case are logically and judicially sound. Like the instant case, the policy involved in the Statham decision specifies that non-payment on time shall cause the policy to cease and determine. Reasoning out that punctual payments were essential, the court said:

                . . . it must be conceded that promptness of payment is essential in the business of life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance company are based on the hypothesis of prompt payments. They not only calculate on the receipt of the premiums when due, but on compounding interest upon them. It is on this basis that they are enabled to offer assurance at the favorable rates they do. Forfeiture for non-payment is a necessary means of protecting themselves from embarrassment. Unless it were enforceable, the business would be thrown into confusion. It is like the forfeiture of shares in mining enterprises, and all other hazardous undertakings. There must be power to cut-off unprofitable members, or the success of the whole scheme is endangered. The insured parties are associates in a great scheme. This associated relation exists whether the company be a mutual one or not. Each is interested in the engagements of all; for out of the co-existence of many risks arises the law of average, which underlies the whole business. An essential feature of this scheme is the mathematical calculations referred to, on which the premiums and amounts assured are based. And these calculations, again, are based on the assumption of average mortality, and of prompt payments and compound interest thereon. Delinquency cannot be tolerated nor redeemed, except at the option of the company. This has always been the understanding and the practice in this department of business. Some companies, it is true, accord a grace of thirty days, or other fixed period, within which the premium in arrear may be paid, on certain conditions of continued good health, etc. But this is a matter of stipulation, or of discretion, on the part of the particular company. When no stipulation exists, it is the general understanding that time is material, and that the forfeiture is absolute if the premium be not paid. The extraordinary and even desperate efforts sometimes made, when an insured person is in extremes to meet a premium coming due, demonstrates the common view of this matter.

                It should be noted that the parties contracted not only for peacetime conditions but also for times of war, because the policies contained provisions applicable expressly to wartime days. The logical inference, therefore, is that the parties contemplated uninterrupted operation of the contract even if armed conflict should ensue.

                After perusing the Insurance Act, we are firmly persuaded that the non-payment of premiums is such a vital defense of insurance companies that since the very beginning, said Act number 2427 expressly preserved it, by providing that after the policy shall have been in force for two years, it shall become incontestable (i.e. the insurer shall have no defense) except for fraud, non-payment of premiums, and military or naval service in time of war (sec. 184 [b], Insurance Act). And when Congress recently amended this section (Rep. Act Number 171), the defense of fraud was eliminated, while the defense of non-payment of premiums was preserved. Thus the fundamental character of the undertaking to pay premiums and the high importance of the defense of non-payment thereof, was specifically recognized.

                In keeping with such legislative policy, we feel no hesitation to adopt the United States Rule, which is in effect a variation of the Connecticut rule for the sake of equity. In this connection, it appears that the first policy had no reserve value, and that the equitable values of the second had been practically returned to the insured in the form of loan and advance for premium.