Ventura vs. Heirs of Sps. Endaya, G.R. No. 190016 [Case Digest]

 

Ventura vs. Heirs of Sps. Endaya,

G.R. No. 190016,    October 2, 2013

Perlas-Bernabe, J.  Second Division

Case Digest

Facts:

            On June 29, 1981, Dolores Ventura (Dolores) entered into a Contract to Sell with spouses Eustacio and Trinidad Endaya for the purchase of two parcels of land, situated in Marian Road II, Marian Park (now Barangay San Martin de Porres), Parañaque City, Metro Manila.

            The contract to sell provides that the purchase price of ₱347,760.00shall be paid by Dolores in the following manner: (a) down payment of ₱103,284.00 upon execution of the contract; and (b) the balance of ₱244,476.00 within a 15-year period (payment period), plus 12% interest per annum (p.a.) on the outstanding balance and 12% interest p.a. on arrearages. It further provides that all payments made shall be applied in the following order: first, to the reimbursement of real estate taxes and other charges; second, to the interest accrued to the date of payment; third, to the amortization of the principal obligation; and fourth, to the payment of any other accessory obligation subsequently incurred by the owner in favor of the buyer. It likewise imposed upon Dolores the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties, or to reimburse Sps. Endaya for any tax payments made by them, plus 1% interest per month. Upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, Sps. Endaya undertook to execute a final deed of sale and transfer ownership over the same in favor of Dolores.

            Meanwhile, Dolores was placed in possession of the subject properties and allowed to erect a building thereon. However, on April 10, 1992, before the payment period expired, Dolores passed away.

            On November 28, 1996, Dolores’ children, Frederick Ventura, Marites Ventura-Roxas, and Philip Ventura (petitioners), filed before the RTC a Complaint and, thereafter, an Amended Complaint for specific performance, seeking to compel Sps. Endaya to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. In this regard, they averred that due to the close friendship between their parents and Sps. Endaya, the latter did not require the then widowed Dolores to pay the down payment stated in the contract to sell and, instead, allowed her to pay amounts as her means would permit. The payments were made in cash as well as in kind, and the same were recorded by respondent Trinidad herself in a passbook given to Dolores to evidence the receipt of said payments. As of June 15, 1996, the total payments made by Dolores and petitioners amounted to ₱952,152.00, which is more than the agreed purchase price of ₱347,760.00, including the 12% interest p.a. thereon computed on the outstanding balance.

            However, when petitioners demanded the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, Sps. Endaya refused. For their part, Sps. Endaya filed their Answer,19 admitting the execution and genuineness of the contract to sell and the passbook. However, they countered that Dolores did not pay the stipulated down payment and remitted only a total of 22 installments. After her death in1992, petitioners no longer remitted any installment. Sps. Endaya also averred that prior to Dolores' death, the parties agreed to a restructuring of the contract to sell whereby Dolores agreed to give a "bonus" of ₱265,673.93 and to pay interest at the increased rate of 24% p.a. on the outstanding balance. They further claimed that in April 1996, when the balance of the purchase price stood at ₱1,699,671.69, a final restructuring of the contract to sell was agreed with petitioners, fixing the obligation at ₱3,000,000.00. Thereafter, the latter paid a total of ₱380,000.00 on two separate occasions, leaving a balance of ₱2,620,000.00. In any event, Sps. Endaya pointed out that the automatic cancellation clause under the foregoing contract rendered the same cancelled as early as 1981 with Dolores’ failure to make a down payment and to faithfully pay the installments; hence, petitioners’ complaint for specific performance must fail. In addition, Sps. Endaya interposed a counterclaim for the alleged unpaid balance of ₱2,620,000.00, plus damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

            In their Reply with Answer to Counterclaim, petitioners denied the existence of any restructuring of the contract to sell, invoking the Dead Man's Statute and the Statute of Frauds. In turn, Sps. Endaya filed a Rejoinder, challenging the inapplicability of the foregoing principles since the case was not filed against an estate or an administrator of an estate, and in view of the partial performance of the contract to sell.

            RTC found that petitioners were able to prove by a preponderance of evidence the fact of full payment of the purchase price for the subject properties. CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. It found that petitioners were not able to show that they fully complied with their obligations under the contract to sell. It observed that aside from the payment of the purchase price and 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell imposed upon petitioners the obligations to pay 12% interest p.a. on the arrears and to reimburse Sps. Endaya the amount of the pertinent real estate taxes due on the subject properties, which the former, however, totally disregarded as shown in their summary of payments.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not respondents should execute a deed of sale over the subject properties in favor of petitioners.

 

Held:

            No; a thorough review of the records reveals no sufficient reason to warrant the reversal of the CA’s August 18, 2006 Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint for specific performance which sought to enforce the contract to sell and to compel respondents to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties.

            A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price and/or compliance with the other obligations stated in the contract to sell. Given its contingent nature, the failure of the prospective buyer to make full payment and/or abide by his commitments stated in the contract to sell prevents the obligation of the prospective seller to execute the corresponding deed of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from arising.

            To note, while the quality of contingency inheres in a contract to sell, the same should not be confused with a conditional contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale. On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically transferring the seller’s ownership or title to the property to the buyer.

            Keeping with these principles, the Court finds that respondents had no obligation to petitioners to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. As aptly pointed out by the CA, aside from the payment of the purchase price and 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell likewise imposed upon petitioners the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties as well as 12% interest p.a. on the arrears. However, the summary of payments as well as the statement of account submitted by petitioners clearly show that only the payments corresponding to the principal obligation and the 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance were considered in arriving at the amount of ₱952,152.00. The Court has examined the petition as well as petitioners' memorandum and found no justifiable reason for the said omission. Hence, the reasonable conclusion would therefore be that petitioners indeed failed to comply with all their obligations under the contract to sell and, as such, have no right to enforce the same.

Cabrera vs. Ysaac, G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014 Leonen, J. [Case Digest]

Cabrera vs. Ysaac,

G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

Leonen, J.

Case Digest

Facts:

            The heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506. One of the co-owners is respondent, Henry Ysaac.

            Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986. On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to Juan Cabrera. He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for his needs because there was no parking space for his vehicle.

            In order to address Juan Cabrera’s concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of land have a combined area of 439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the two families agree to it.

            Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and Juan Cabrera settled on the price of ₱250.00 per square meter, but Juan Cabrera stated that he could only pay in full after his retirement on June 15, 1992.8 Henry Ysaac agreed but demanded for an initial payment of ₱1,500.00, which Juan Cabrera paid.

            According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him that the Borbe family and the Espiritu family were no longer interested in purchasing the properties they were leasing. Since Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family initially considered purchasing the property and had made an initial deposit for it, Juan Cabrera agreed to reimbursethis earlier payment. On June 9, 1990, Juan Cabrera paid the amount of ₱6,100.00. Henry Ysaac issued a receipt for this amount. ₱3,100.00 of the amount paid was reimbursed to Mamerta Espiritu and, in turn, she gaveJuan Cabrera the receipts issued to her by Henry Ysaac.

            On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However,at that time, Henry Ysaac was in the United States. The only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife. The wife refused to accept Juan Cabrera’s payment.

            On September 21, 1994, Henry Ysaac’s counsel, Atty. Luis Ruben General, wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Leoncio Clemente, Juan Cabrera’s counsel.16 Atty. General informed Atty. Clemente that his client is formally rescinding the contract of sale because Juan Cabrera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the land between May 1990 and May 1992. The letter also stated that Juan Cabrera’s initial payment of ₱1,500.00 and the subsequent payment of ₱6,100.00 were going to be applied as payment for overdue rent of the parcel of land Juan Cabrera was leasing from Henry Ysaac. The letter also denied the allegation of Juan Cabrera that Henry Ysaac agreed to shoulder the costs of the resurveying of the property. Juan Cabrera, together with his uncle, Delfin Cabrera, went to Henry Ysaac’s house on September 16, 1995 to settle the matter.19 Henry Ysaac told Juan Cabrera that he could no longer sell the property because the new administrator of the property was his brother, Franklin Ysaac.

            Due to Juan Cabrera’s inability to enforce the contract of sale between him and Henry Ysaac, he decided to file a civil case for specific performance on September 20, 1995. Juan Cabrera prayed for the execution of a formal deed of sale and for the transfer of the title of the property in his name. He tendered the sum of ₱69,650.00 to the clerk of court as payment of the remaining balance of the original sale price.

            Regional Trial Court of Naga City ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded when the former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price in the period agreed upon. CA ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was not validly rescinded. For the rescission to be valid under Article 1592 of the Civil Code, it should have been done through a judicial or notarial act and not merely through a letter. However, due to the sale of the entire property of the Ysaac family in favor of the local government of Naga City, the Court of Appeals ruled that the verbal contract between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac cannot be subject to the remedy of specific performance. The local government of Naga City was an innocent purchaser for value, and following the rules on double sales, it had a preferential right since the sale it entered into was in a public instrument, while the one with Juan Cabrera was only made orally.

 

Issue:

            Whether there was no valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent.

 

Held:

            No; unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their property, none of them may sell a definite portion of the land. The co-owner may only sell his or her proportionate interest in the co-ownership. A contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio.

            The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. If the seller is not the owner, the seller must be authorized by the owner to sell the object.

            Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract. Sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-owners. However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership.

            These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.

If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property. As summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, "if he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."

Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.

The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This is evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was under the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.

We rule that petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount of money because he paid it as consideration for ownership of the land. Since the ownership of the land could not be transferred to him, the money he paid for that purpose must be returned to him. Otherwise, respondent will be unjustly enriched.

Respondent’s claim for rent in arrears is a separate cause of action from this case. For petitioner’s earnestmoney payment to be considered payment for his rent liabilities, the rules of compensation under Article 1279 of the Civil Code must be followed.

Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina, G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022 [Case Digest]

 

Heirs of Yadao vs. Heirs of Caletina,

G.R. No. 230784, February 15, 2022

Lazaro- Javier J.

Case Digest

 

Subjects:

            Remedial Law – Jurisdiction and Evidence

            Civil Law - LTD

 

Facts:

            On June 22, 1993, respondents, heirs of Juan Caletina filed before the RTC, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, a complaint for ownership and recovery of possession against petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely: Angel Yadao and companions.

            Respondents averred that they are the grandchildren and surviving heirs of Juan, the registered owner of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 1087 of Cadaster 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-479 (S). Sometime in 1991, petitioners occupied the subject land and refused to leave despite their opposition and vigorous prohibition. Thus, they brought the matter to the Barangay Captain of Taggat Norte. They failed to reach an agreement.

            Petitioners countered that on September 28, 1962, their parents Josefina Yadao (Josefina) and Domingo Yadao (Domingo) bought Lot 1087 for value and in good faith from Juan's surviving heirs, i.e., his second wife Casiana Dalo, and their sons Hospicio, Jose, and William. The sale was covered by a Contrata written in Ilocano.

            The contract provides the following: We, Jose Calitina, Hospicio Calitina, William Calitina and our mother Marciana Calitina, all of legal age, married and residents of this place, confirm the truth of our agreement concerning our sale of the lot that we inherited from our father who had died, which lot is located at Barrio Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan.
The Contrata was not notarized. But Josefina and Casiana executed another Deed of Absolute Sale on October 15, 1962 on the same Lot 1087 for the same price though this time had it notarized.

            As alleged by petitioners, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 479 (S) was delivered to them. They also averred, without any dispute, that from the time their parents bought Lot 1087, they had been in public and continuous possession thereof. The other defendants in the case below were their tenants in Lot 1087. Petitioners maintained that even assuming that no sale was made on Lot 1087, the fact remained that they had been in possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. On the other hand, as petitioners stressed, respondents brought the matter to court only on June 22, 1993 or more than thirty (30) years after they have taken possession thereof on September 28, 1962. By petitioners' conclusion, acquisitive prescription has ripened their de facto possession of Lot 1087 into legal possession and ownership.

            To prove the allegations in the complaint, Hospicio, Jr. and his mother Dolores Corpuz-Caletina (Dolores) took the witness stand. Dolores, testified that Juan was her father-in-law, being the father of her husband Hospicio, Sr. She admitted that Jose and William were also heirs of Juan as his children. She knew Jose to be Juan's child with another woman before he (Juan) got married to Nicetas. William was also Juan's son from another woman during his marriage to Nicetas. They were the half-brothers of Hospicio, Sr.  Interestingly, Dolores admitted against respondents' interest that after Juan had died, they sold, at least going by her admission, a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest Domingo and Josefina.

            Notably, the owner's duplicate of OCT No. P-479 (S) was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. Although it is not clear who gave the OCT to them, records bear that petitioners were the ones who offered this document in evidence. The delivery and voluntary cession of the OCT to their predecessors-in-interest and petitioners' eventual possession thereof were not contested by respondents. Respondents were able to offer in evidence only a certified copy of OCT No. P-479 (S) from the Register of Deeds in Cagayan.

            Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed Lot 1087 after its sale on September 28, 1962 and thereafter until the present time. Dolores did not deny and has never denied this fact. She has known of their occupation and possession since September 28, 1962.

            Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the assessed value of Lot 1087 was only P5,390.00.

            Trial court at first granted the motion to dismiss; but upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents; trial court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the complaint. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed at the tail end of the hearing when only one witness of petitioner had not testified. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction at that late time of the day.

            RTC decided in favor of respondent. The RTC held that there was no evidence to prove the alleged sale of Lot 1087 to the Yadaos. The Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr., Jose, William, and Casiana was not notarized, hence, it was only a private document which was unenforceable. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, on the other hand, was signed by Casiana who had no authority to do so as she was not a legal heir of Juan Caletina, being his non-marital partner. The RTC also opined that Lot 1087 was acquired during the marriage of Juan to Nicetas.  CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

 

Issue 1:

            Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the present case?

 

Held:

            Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the present case. The general rule is that the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time in the proceedings, even on appeal. By way of an exception, however, Tijam v. Sibonghanoy has ruled that estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised later in the proceedings of the case and only after the party raising the argument has actively participated during trial and lost.

            The delay in raising the argument and the moving party's participation in the proceedings has led the court and the opposing party of the waiver of this issue, and as a result, the belated claim if considered and more so if granted would be inefficient and iniquitous as it is opportunistic. The trial was on going for years. In fact, petitioners, as defendants, was about to present their last witness.

 

Issue 2:

            Did petitioners acquire ownership of the subject lot through acquisitive prescription?

 

Held:

            No; Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) declares that "no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. ruled that the ownership and possession of registered land cannot be obtained or acquired by prescription no matter the length of time of one's physical occupation and exercise of juridical rights of possession over the land.

            Hence, since ownership cannot be gained through this means, it follows that the registered owner is not automatically dispossessed of the registered land and foreclosed from getting it back through the passage of time as the registered owner may resort to appropriate remedies to recover the property. Appropriateness, however, requires that the rule on extinctive prescription as explained below has not set in.

 

Issue 3:

            Is respondents' action already barred by prescription?

 

Held:

            Yes; extinctive prescription refers to the rule that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their right over the subject lot. It is a shield rather than a sword – the mere fact that the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own. The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.

            There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.

            In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

            To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

            Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144. The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten­-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

            In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

            Hence, the result of the successful invocation of this rule is that while the registered owner keeps their substantive right over the lot, since acquisitive prescription is not a mode of acquiring ownership of a registered land, they are nonetheless prevented by law from invoking the legal remedies otherwise available to them. When extinctive prescription sets in, the damage done to the registered owner is not recognized as a legal injury – a legal case of damnum absque injuria – and they do not stand to enjoy any legal relief so far as their property (in both senses of title or right and the tangible lot) is concerned.

            The rule is that extinctive prescription does not lie against the heirs of the registered owner seeking recovery of the disputed lot in two instances: first, if the heirs are in actual possession of the lot; and second, if the conveyance to the party in possession of the lot is unlawful, void, or non-existent. In either of these instances, the action to recover the lot is imprescriptible.

            As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

            Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. The rule of imprescriptibility protects not only the registered owner but also the latter's heirs because they step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.

            These truths, however, do not affect the validity and enforceability of the presumably unregistered and factually unnotarized sale. An unregistered and unnotarized sale is valid and enforceable against the parties to the sale. Hospicio, Sr., respondents' predecessor-in-interest, is bound by the sale.

            As a result, we cannot accept Justice Caguioa's claim that there was no valid or even enforceable sale of Lot 1087 to petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, or that the sale was only for a portion thereof. As stated, the unnotarized Contrata signed by Hospicio, Sr. and his half­-brothers sold to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest the whole of Lot 1087 for P850, and not only for 400 square meters as subsequently intercalated in the notarized Deed of Sale that Hospicio, Sr. witnessed. But whether for the whole of Lot 1087 or 400 square meters thereof, Hospicio, Sr. more likely than not agreed to these series of sales since the certificate of title for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest as they too at once occupied the entire lot, and collected rentals from the lessees of the portions they did not occupy – without objection from Hospicio, Sr. and Dolores.

            Given these factual circumstances, petitioners' present occupation and possession of Lot 1087 is not unlawful, void, or based on non-existent claim. They have long planted themselves on Lot 1087 under the series of sales by the heirs of the registered owner – without any objection from any of them until 1993 when the relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. For this reason, respondent's action to recover the lot is definitely not imprescriptible. It will be both inefficient and unfair to the truth­-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the courts to insist that prescription has not set in.

            To stress, respondents are now barred from assailing the sale of Lot 1087 and petitioners' possession of this lot by reason of extinctive prescription. The reckoning point for extinctive prescription to set in was when the right of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, i.e., Hospicio, Sr. as Dolores' spouse and respondents' father, who was the heir of Juan, accrued and was violated. This was when Juan died and Hospicio, Sr. acquired property (in the sense of rights) by succession to Lot 1087 and when this lot was sold to and possessed and openly occupied by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, whichever came later.

            Here, this means that the starting date for extinctive prescription was September 28, 1962 and has since been interrupted only on June 22, 1993 when the complaint was filed with the RTC. Hospicio, Sr. could not have but known of his right to Lot 1087 and the violation of his right because –

    (i) he himself sold this lot to petitioners' predecessor-in-interests on September 28, 1962, and

    (ii) they at once openly possessed Lot 1087 by physical occupation for their own use and by leasing portions thereof to other individuals.

 

Issue 4:

            Is there a valid and binding contract selling Lot 1087 to the Yadaos?

 

Held:

           

            In sum, the fact that the Contrata was not notarized does not mean that there was no sale of Lot 1087 between the Caletina's (or Calitina) and the Yadaos. As discussed, even an oral sale of a real property is valid and binding between the parties, their heirs, and assigns.

            More important, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the other pieces of evidence proving that: (i) respondents' privies themselves in fact sold supposedly a portion of Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; (ii) the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT for the whole of Lot 1087 was delivered contemporaneously to petitioners' predecessors-in-­interest; and (iii) on September 28, 1962, contemporaneously with the execution of the Contrata, petitioners started their occupation and possession of the entirety of Lot 1087 with respondents' privies' knowledge and without complaints from them and their successors-in-­interest until well into June 22, 1993.

            All in all, what is clear from the evidence is that the heirs of Juan sold Lot 1087 to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and petitioners and their successors occupied and possessed the entire lot. There were admissions to this effect from respondents themselves and respondents did not complain for thirty-one (31) years until June 22, 1993. By then, respondents have compromised the truth-seeking and grievance-redressing functions of the RTC as a result of the fact that relevant parties are long dead, truthful memory has faded and compromised, and crucial evidence may no longer be availed of. It is thus now too late for respondents to assail and for the courts to upend the validity and enforceability of the Contrata. As we have concluded above, since there is nothing in and about the Contrata that makes it invalid and unenforceable, and in view of the presence of all the elements of a valid and enforceable sale, the Contrata must be upheld in toto to affirm the validity of petitioners' ownership including of course possession of the whole of Lot 1087.

Republic vs. Heirs of Sta. Ana, G.R. No. 233578, March 15, 2021, [Case Digest]

 

Republic vs. Heirs of Sta. Ana,

G.R. No. 233578, March 15, 2021,

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

Case Digest

Subjects:

            Remedial Law – Immutability of Judgment

            Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds

 

Facts:

            Respondents Heirs of Julian Sta. Ana and Mercedes Sta. Ana filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City an application for registration of Lot 459, Pasig Cadastre, Psc-14 docketed as LRC Case No. N-5999.

            On March 22, 1999, respondents filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of a Decree3 on the basis of a final and executory Decision dated October 26, 1967 previously rendered by the trial court in a similar application for registration of the same lot initiated by their predecessors-in-interest Julian Sta. Ana and Mercedes Sta. Ana.

            According to respondents, the aforesaid decision was assailed before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24531. By Decision dated October 8, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It also denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by a certain Anita Gonzal. On May 19, 1992, the corresponding entry of judgment was issued.

            Back to respondents' Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of a Decree in LRC Case No. N-5999, the trial court granted it and consequently issued an Order for the Issuance of Decree dated May 19, 1999. There, the trial court directed the Commissioner of the LRA to comply with Section 398 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).

            In response, the Director of LRA's Department on Registration, Pelino Cortez submitted his Supplementary Report dated October 11, 2000, informing the trial court that a portion of subject lot was already covered by a prior registration proceeding in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984 and that a second registration thereof on the basis of the trial court's Decision dated October 26, 1967 would result in double registration.

            Acting thereon, the court, by Order dated December 5, 2013, directed respondents to submit, within twenty (20) days from notice, the amended plan of Lot 459, Pasig Cadastre, Psc-14, together with its technical description, segregating the already titled portion of the subject lot per Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984.

            In their Manifestation with Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, respondents posited that their painstaking effort to comply with the said order was all in vain because: 1) there was no copy of the decision in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984; 2) no record of the decision can be found either in the files of the concerned government agencies, except a notation on page 80 of Book "K" of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots; and 3) the Regional Technical Director for Lands has no record of any public land application or patent on the subject lot.

            In its Opposition, the Republic countered that the urgent motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and respondents did not comply with the directive.

            Trial court required the LRA to issue a title in the name of respondents' predecessors-in-interest over Lot 459, Pasig Cadastre, Psc-14 consistent with its final and executory Decision dated October 26, 1967.  Court of Appeals dismissed the Republic's petition for certiorari.

            SolGen argues that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of a lot already decreed in the name of another through an earlier land registration case. The LRA reported on three (3) separate occasions that a portion of subject lot is already covered by a title issued in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984. The LRA has invariably recommended that respondents submit an amended plan of the subject lot, together with its technical description, segregating the already titled portion to ascertain which part of the subject lot is covered by the trial court's Decision dated October 26, 1967. The trial court even ordered respondents to comply with the LRA's recommendation but they failed to do so.

 

Issue:

            Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it affirmed the trial court's directive to issue a registration decree on the entire Lot 459 in the name of respondents' predecessors-in-interest?

 

Held:

            No; the issue hinges on whether respondents are legally entitled to a registration decree issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest covering the whole Lot 459, Pasig Cadastre, Psc-14. The LRA though had reported to the court that a portion of Lot 459, Psc-14, Pasig Cadastre is already covered by a certificate of title issued in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals nonetheless adopted that portion of the same LRA report as well as the factual finding of the trial court that no single record exists bearing this proceeding, much less, a copy of the purported title or decree. The courts thus ruled that the issuance of a registration decree or title in the name of respondents' predecessors-in-interest over the entire Lot 459 per Decision dated October 26, 1967 is the correct and logical thing to do.

            We agree that indeed, there are no available records bearing the so called Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984 or the decision or decree of registration or title issued therein. The only single entry in the records is found on page 80 of the LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots: "a portion of said lot is already covered by a certificate of title pursuant to the decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 10." But no matter how we look at it, we cannot deduce therefrom the actual text of the decision, the exact portion of Lot 459 affected, or the parties in whose favor the supposed title was issued, including the details of this supposed title. For sure, it would be the height of injustice for respondents to be held hostage or punished by reason of the plain scarcity of the records on file with the government agencies concerned. It is certainly illegal, immoral, and against public policy and order for respondents who have been vested with a legal right to be precluded from exercising it, sans any real remedy under the law.

            In Tichangco v. Enriquez, this Court emphasized that the fundamental purpose of the land registration law is to finally settle title to real property. Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession. The Court also held that proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of a registration decree - ninety (90) years ago – were presumed to have regularly and properly been conducted. To overturn this legal presumption carelessly, will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.

            Here, the trial court's Decision dated October 26, 1967 in LRC Case No. N-5999 was rendered almost sixty-seven (67) years ago. Surely, to challenge its validity now and to deny a registration decree to respondents would be an affront to the fundamental purpose of the registration law.

            We therefore fully concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the only right and logical thing to do under the circumstances is to allow the execution of the final and executory Decision dated October 26, 1967 for registration of the entire Lot 459 filed by the same Julian Sta. Ana and Mercedes Sta. Ana who are respondents' predecessors-in-interest thereto. Remarkably, no private party has ever come forward to oppose the claim of ownership invariably asserted by respondents' predecessors-in-interest over the entire Lot 459 or a portion thereof. In any event, whatever decision, if any, may have been issued over a portion of Lot 459 in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984, there is no existing title found in the records pertaining to that portion. Consequently, there can be no double titling to speak of resulting from the order of execution in LRC Case No. N-5999 (in relation to the Decision dated October 26, 1967), as affirmed in CA-G.R. SP No. 139385.

Maristela-Cuan vs. Cuan, Jr. G.R. No. 248518. December 07, 2021, [Case Digest]

 

Maristela-Cuan vs. Cuan, Jr.

G.R. No. 248518. December 07, 2021,

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Case Digest

Facts:

            Janice testified that she met Marcelino sometime in 1997 when she and her friends were playing lawn tennis in Quezon City. Marcelino introduced himself and invited them to have some drinks thereafter. Then she met Marcelino again and they started playing tennis together. Marcelino courted her. He would call her regularly and they would go out on dates. After two (2) months of courtship, she finally accepted Marcelino's proposal and she became his girlfriend.

            In the course of their relationship, she noticed that Marcelino was overprotective toward her. He would constantly ask where she was and who she was with. She thought it was normal for any person in a relationship to be in such state of emotion. Their relationship was on and off during the first five (5) months because of Marcelino's constant jealousy. Marcelino later on told her that only marriage could remove his anxiety.  Thus, to mend their turbulent affair, they got married on June 20, 1997 in the City Hall of Quezon City.

            Their parents were unaware of their decision to get married. After the wedding ceremony, they just shared a meal at a restaurant and then parted ways. They went home to their respective houses. There was no honeymoon. They did not live together under one roof. They only saw each other after work and during weekends.

            Days and months passed by but they continued to live their respective lives as they used to. In her heart and mind and on paper, she was married to Marcelino. But they never lived together as husband and wife. They went to motels for about five (5) times, yet, they never engaged in sex. Marcelino would attempt to have sex with her but then, he would suddenly stop. She did not know why and it constantly puzzled her.

            Three (3) months after their wedding, Marcelino's jealousy escalated and took a turn for the worse. He barred her from talking to any other man. He got angry whenever they passed by a handsome man thinking she was staring at the latter.  He was furious every time he saw her talking to a male co-worker. He turned violent and even physically hurt her whenever he got jealous.  There was one incident when he hit her because he thought she was staring at some random man in a disco.

            Janette Velasco corroborated the testimony of Janice. She testified that she met Janice in college at AMA Computer College. Back then, they were close friends but they lost communication for a while. They met again when they were already working. She met Marcelino when he and Janice were still sweethearts. Janice confided to her that they got married and their parents knew nothing about it. She also confided to her about Marcelino's unfounded jealousy over a friend. She suspected that Marcelino had insecurities in their relationship.

            She (Dr. Tayag) diagnosed Janice with Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder.  Janice was emotionally unstable whose weak disposition drove her to enter into relationships to cater to her deep emotional longings. The root-cause of her condition was her desire for control. As a middle child, Janice struggled to gain favor from significant others through passive compliance and blind obedience. She longed for a relationship to boost her need for attachment and nurturance. This, she found in the arms of Marcelino and she accepted whatever fate had prepared for her.

            Marcelino, on the other hand, did not appear for clinical examination despite her (Dr. Tayag) invitation. She, nonetheless found Marcelino to be suffering from Paranoid Personality Disorder with Narcissistic and Antisocial Features based on the psychodynamic analysis of his behavior, attitude, and character known to both Janice and Janette. Marcelino was a self-centered man highly engrossed with immediate satisfaction of his pleasures. He had very low tolerance for stress and frustration. Having been raised from a broken-family, he lacked a sense of responsibility and proper chastisement. Since he always got what he wanted, he became highly sensitive to deprivation. He was preoccupied with his needs and desires which prevented him from performing his spousal functions.

            Trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of Janice to Marcelino void on ground of psychological incapacity of both parties. It ruled that Janice and Marcelino did not observe love, respect, and support for each other. They were abnormally involved in the union as their personality disorders deprived them from performing their marital obligations.

            Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Janice failed to prove that she and Marcelino were suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

 

Issue:

            Did the evidence on record sufficiently support the petition of Janice for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Marcelino on ground of psychological incapacity?

 

Held:

            Yes; Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. As expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, the marital covenants include the mutual obligations of husband and wife to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity and to help and support each other.

            Psychological incapacity is not only a mental incapacity nor only a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There may now be proof of the durable aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations [Tan-Andal vs. Andal].

Proof of these aspects of personality need not only be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.

To stress, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality which show lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations. But every case involving the alleged psychological incapacity of a spouse should be resolved based on its particular set of facts and Article 36 of the Family Code, applied on a case-to-case basis.

Tan-Andal correctly stated the threshold of evidence in psychological incapacity cases, i.e., the spouse alleging psychological incapacity is required to prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario did not appear for psychiatric evaluation.

Verily, Tan-Andal democratized the forms of evidence proving psychological incapacity. The Court allowed lay persons to prove psychological incapacity through evidence of a personality structure or psychic causes that manifest itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family. The types of evidence that a lay person may adduce for this purpose are (i) the reputation of the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated – that is, the view-point of reasonable members of the spouses' relevant communities; (ii) the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative of such incapacity, (iii) the every day behavior, acts or conduct of the incapacitated spouse, (iv) the offended spouse's own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.

These types of evidence may establish circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the family. The relevant circumstances to be proven may include (i) instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262), (ii) zero probability of reconciliation between the spouses, and (iii) failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or their marital duties and obligations in a manner clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The third category of circumstances refers to the characterization, i.e., clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, that was once used to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological incapacity.

Since Tan-Andal has abandoned the focus on personality disorders and expert opinions, this characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological incapacity. Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such facts as (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of actual loss of trust, love, and respect for each other. This notwithstanding the reality of meaningless marriages which force either or both spouses into chronically unproductive and detached lives, thus, physically and psychologically endangering themselves in the process.

Applying Tan-Andal here, we find that Janice was able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, indeed, her marriage to Marcelino should be declared void on ground of psychological incapacity. We find though, that based on the evidence presented, only Marcelino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties.

Marcelino is psychologically incapacitated in the legal sense.

First - Juridical Antecedence (i.e., the condition existed prior to the celebration of marriage): Marcelino's condition has juridical antecedence since it manifested even before the celebration of his marriage to Janice. When he and Janice were only in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, he manifested early on his overprotective tendencies toward her. His constant but unfounded feeling of jealousy was the cause of his "on and off" relationship with Janice. He convinced Janice that his anxiety would only go away if she would marry him.

But even after they got married, Marcelino’s attitude took a turn for the worse. He got jealous of other men and barred Janice from talking to them altogether. He also became violent and started physically assaulting Janice.

 

Second - Gravity (i.e., the condition cannot be categorized as mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts):

Marcelino never accorded Janice the love and respect that was due her as his wife and partner. During their marriage, he never lived with Janice under one roof. He never even had sex with her. According to Janice, although he attempted to have sex with her in a motel for about five (5) times, he suddenly stopped each time. For reasons unknown to Janice, Marcelino was not able to consummate even a single sexual intercourse with her.

 

Finally – Incurability (i.e., the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable breakdown of the marriage):

Marcelino's psychological incapacity is incurable in the legal sense. To recall, Marcelino brought up the idea of marriage to Janice, not for reasons such as mutual love or settling down and starting a family with Janice, but to remove his anxiety.[64] He himself admitted to Janice that marriage was the only way for him not to feel anxious, jealous, and overprotective of Janice. As it was though, his overprotectiveness, extreme jealousy, and violent tendencies were the very same reasons why he never got to fulfill his spousal obligations toward Janice. Marcelino was so preoccupied with his own needs and insecurities which prevented him from performing his spousal functions. In the end, he got so consumed by them that he abandoned his wife and ended their union over the telephone.