Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232724-27, February 15, 2021 (Case Digest)

 

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. Nos. 232724-27, February 15, 2021,

Third Division [LEONEN, J.]

Facts:

                        This Petition is an offshoot of a criminal case, People v. P/Dir. General Jesus Versoza. In Versoza, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged former First Gentleman Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Arroyo) with, among others, plunder for his involvement in the Philippine National Police's anomalous purchase of two secondhand helicopters.

            The seller, Lionair, Inc., sold the helicopters as brand new, as required by law, even if they were already used. Lionair's president Archibald L. Po, however, testified that Arroyo was the helicopters' real owner. He alleged that Lionair imported the helicopters from the United States and sold it to Arroyo, who, in turn, deposited partial payment to Lionair's account with the Union Bank.

            Lionair's savings account passbook reflected the following deposits:

Teller	Date	Transaction	Amount (USD)
S733	02/27/04	Credit Memo	408,067.06
S733	02/27/04	Credit Memo	509,065.41
T731	03/01/04	Cash	148,217.538

            To verify the source of the deposits, the Office of the Special Prosecutor presented Katrina Cruz-Dizon, the manager of the Union Bank branch where the account was maintained. Cruz-Dizon testified that the account was closed on March 6, 2006, and as five years had lapsed since, the bank has already disposed the account records. She suggested that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the Anti-Money Laundering Council (Council) may have reports on the transactions, as banks are required to report covered transactions.

            Thus, the Sandiganbayan, upon the Office of the Special Prosecutor's request, issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum directing Executive Director Julia C. Bacay-Abad, then Secretariat of the Council, to testify and to produce Lionair's bank records.

            The Council moved to quash the Subpoena, arguing that whatever information it has on Lionair's bank account is confidential under Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act. However, on March 28, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to Quash.

            The Sandiganbayan ruled that the Council's misgivings on the disclosure of the bank records were outweighed by the importance of these documents. The Council moved for reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. The Sandiganbayan noted that the Council was not present during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, and that the accused and their counsels were not furnished copies of the pleading.

            Petitioner argues that it cannot disclose Lionair's bank records because they are confidential. It avers that the disclosure of reports on covered and suspicious transactions is prohibited under Section 9(c) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. It explains that Section 9(c) adheres to international standards, which recommend that financial institutions and their officers be prohibited from disclosing covered and suspicious transaction reports, or "tipping-off" that a case is being filed.

            Petitioner likewise argues that respondent failed to reasonably describe the documents subpoenaed, saying that the description falls short of the requirement under the Rules of Court because the electronic database contains millions of reports from millions of entities. Without a specific description, petitioner says it would be difficult to trace the records demanded.

            Respondent avers that while the Anti-Money Laundering Act does intend to preserve the confidentiality of bank transactions, its fundamental objective remains to prohibit money laundering through the reporting of covered and suspicious transactions.

            Besides, respondent says that Lionair has waived its rights to confidentiality through a written permission, and granted the prosecution access to its bank account under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act. In any case, respondent asserts that petitioner's contentions are outweighed by the need to materialize the objectives of the Anti-Money Laundering Act and to enforce the principles of public accountability.

 

 

Issue:

            Whether or not petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council is required to furnish the respondent a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration.

 

Held:

            Yes; Rule 15 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rules on the filing and hearing of a motion: SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

            Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

            SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

            SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. - No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

            Under Rule 15, Section 4, every written motion must be set for hearing by the applicant, except when the court deems it prejudicial to the other party. The motion shall then be served together with its notice of hearing in a manner that would ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court, for good cause, sets the hearing on shorter notice.

            Sections 5 and 6 state that the notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing. No motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of its notice, except when the court is satisfied that the adverse party's rights are not affected. [Note: This Rule had been amended by 2019 Rules of Court].

           

 

Issue 2:

            Whether or not Section 9(c) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act prohibits petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council from disclosing confidential and suspicious transaction reports.

 

Held:

            No; Anti-Money Laundering Council is the financial intelligence unit tasked to analyze the covered transaction reports and suspicious transaction reports submitted to it. It "shall require and receive [covered transaction reports] and [suspicious transaction reports] from covered persons"; "formulate guidelines and develop protocols necessary to require covered persons to submit relevant information"; and "access all relevant financial, administrative and law enforcement information for a holistic financial intelligence analysis of [covered transaction reports] and [suspicious transaction reports]."

            Aside from collecting and analyzing reports of covered and suspicious transactions, the Anti-Money Laundering Council is also tasked to be the investigator and complainant in money laundering or money terrorism finance cases.

            To perform these functions, the Anti-Money Laundering Council is authorized to "issue orders addressed to the appropriate [supervising authority] or the covered person to determine the true identity of the owner of any monetary instrument or property: (a) subject of [covered transaction report] or [suspicious transaction report]; (b) subject of request for assistance from a foreign State or jurisdiction; or (c) believed by the Council, on the basis of substantial evidence, to be, in whole or in part, wherever located, representing, involving, or related to, directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the proceeds of any unlawful activity."

            First, as the text of the Anti-Money Laundering Act reveals, petitioner is not one of the covered institutions prohibited from disclosing information on covered and suspicious transactions. Section 3(a) enumerates those that are prohibited from disclosing such information, and petitioner is not one of them.

            Second, contrary to petitioner's claim, the rationale behind the prohibition does not extend and apply to it. To reiterate, covered institutions are precluded from disclosing the reports or the fact they are reported to petitioner, because it will impede the possible investigation on the covered and suspicious transactions. Unlike covered institutions, petitioner is mandated to investigate and use the information it has to institute cases against violators. The international standards that petitioner cites, which advocate confidentiality of the transaction reports and prohibits their disclosure, only apply to covered institutions. As the wording of the standards shows, the prohibition avoids "tipping-off" or situations where covered transactions will warn depositors and possible violators that they are being reported to petitioner.

            Third, the prohibition and confidentiality provisions cannot apply to petitioner; otherwise, it would contravene its direct mandate under Section 7 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

            Petitioner is not merely a repository of reports and information on covered and suspicious transactions. It is created precisely to investigate and institute charges against the offenders. Section 7 clearly states that it is tasked to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and other remedial proceedings, and to file complaints with the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman for anti-money laundering offenses.

            In addition, the criminal prosecution of anti-money laundering offenses would be unduly hampered if petitioner were prohibited from disclosing information regarding covered and suspicious transactions. It would be antithetical to its own functions if petitioner were to refuse to participate in prosecuting anti-money laundering offenses by taking shelter in the confidentiality provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

           

Issue 3:

            Whether or not the written permission of Lionair, Inc. is sufficient to disclose the transaction reports.

 

Held:

            Yes; as a rule, foreign currency deposits are absolutely confidential, and thus, are not susceptible to examination and inquiry by any person. The law further mandates that foreign currency deposits are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court or government agency.

            Nevertheless, this rule admits an exception. Section 8 itself states that a foreign currency deposit may be inquired into and examined if there is a written permission from the depositor.

            Here, there is no question that the owner of the bank account submitted its written permission to allow the inquiry and examination of its accounts. Lionair, the owner of the dollar account subject of the Subpoena, waived its rights under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act and granted the prosecution access to its account.

Lopez vs Lopez G.R. No. 1899984, November 12, 2012 [Case Digest]

 

Lopez vs Lopez

G.R. No. 1899984, November 12, 2012

 

Facts:

            On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.

            Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria.

            RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.  CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the will was in compliance with Art. 805 in relation with Art. 809 of Civil Code; when although it does not mentioned the number of pages used in the will in the attestation clause but on the acknowledgement of the will there was a statement that the will was composed of 7 pages yet the total number of pages of the will was 8.

 

Held:

            NO; the law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

            While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, GR No. 1641, January 19, 1906 [Case Digest]

 

Jaboneta vs. Gustilo,

GR No. 1641, January 19, 1906

 

Facts:

            Macario Jaboneta ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.

            The probate court denied the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the law.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not signature of Javellana is in compliance with the law even the other witness also saw the latter in the act of signing not the actual signing as instrumental witness of the will.

 

Held:

            YES. SC cannot agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with the provisions of the law. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.

 

           

Lopez vs. Liboro, G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948 [Case Digest]

 

Lopez vs. Liboro,

G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948

 

Facts:

            Agustin Liboro opposed the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez.  Liboro questioned the validity of the will because of the following:

§  The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals.

§  There are contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses

§  The testator affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name.

§  That the will is silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament.

CFI held that the will was executed in all particulars as required by law.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the will is defective as point out by Liboro.

 

Held:

            NO; as to the issue that first sheet of the will is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals; the purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other than page one.

 

            As to the issue that there are contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses; SC held that the contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.

 

            With regards to the issue that the testator affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name; the reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)

 

            As to the issue that the will is silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament; SC held that there is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.

Taboada v. Hon Rosal, GR. No. L-36033, Nov. 5, 1982 [Case Digest]

 

Taboada v. Hon Rosal,

GR. No. L-36033, Nov. 5, 1982

 

Facts:

            In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will; but in the acknowledgement of the said will itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page".

            The CFI denied the probate of the will for want of a formality in its execution. The respondent Judge interprets the Art. 805 NCC to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not will in questioned lack of formality in its execution.

 

Held:

            NO. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444).

 

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

SC have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page".

            The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will"