Friday, December 10, 2021

AAA v BBB, GR No. 212448, [2018] Case Digest

 

AAA v BBB,

GR No. 212448, 2018

Facts:

            Petitioner AAA and BBB were married; their union produced two children. BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status. AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.

            AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

            The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. The counsel of BBB file a motion to quash the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Trial court grant the motion to quash and dismiss the case. 

            AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the Philippine Court has jurisdiction over the case.

 

Held:

            YES. "Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common." As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial.  It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.

            Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

 

 

 

 

èThe grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.

 

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.


It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.


Luisito Pulido vs. People G.R. No. 220149 [Case Digest]

 

Luisito Pulido vs. People

G.R. No. 220149

 

Facts:

            Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda were charged before the RTC with Bigamy. Records show that on September 5, 1983, then 16-year old petitioner married his teacher, then 22-year old private complainant Nora S. Arcon in a civil ceremony at the Municipal Hall of Rosario, Cavite solemnized by then Mayor Calixto D. Enriguez. Their marriage was blessed with a child born in 1984.

            The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31, 1995. Their Marriage Ce1iificate indicated Pulido's civil status as single.

            Hurt by the betrayal, Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy. In his defense, Pulido insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 is null and void for lack of a valid marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriage ceremony.

            Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she only knew of Pulido's prior marriage with Arcon sometime in April 2007. She alleged that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed a Petition to annul her marriage with Pulido before the RTC of lrnus, Cavite. RTC declared her marriage with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature.

            The trial court convicted petitioner of Bigamy and acquitted Baleda. CA sustained petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty. The appellate court anchored its ruling on Article 40 of the Family Code which requires one to first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage. It held that pursuant to Jarillo v. People (Jarillo), Article 40 applies even if the marriage of Pulido with Arcon was governed by the Civil Code. Rules of procedure should be given retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. The bigamist cannot obtain and use the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of his or her prior marriage to avoid his or her prosecution for bigamy. Moreover, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of Pulido for the crime of bigamy.

 

Issue:

            Whether Pulido is guilty for the crime of bigamy.

 

Held:

            NO. After a careful scrutiny of the records and rigorous re-examination of the applicable law and jurisprudence, SC find that there is enough basis to abandon SC’s earlier pronouncement and now hold that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.

 

            Upon the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the doctrine laid down in Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior "void" marriage was encapsulated in Article 40, which reads:

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The prevailing rule, therefore, is that even if the marriage is void, a final judgment declaring it void for purposes of remarriage is required.

            Pulido's first marriage with Arcon was contracted in 1983 or before the effectivity of the Family Code while his second marriage with Baleda was celebrated in 1995, during the effectivity of the said law. Pulido assails the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code on his case which requires him to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity before he can contract another marriage.

            When the prior marriage was contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code while the subsequent marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the said law, SC recognize the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code but only insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. In Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., and reiterated in Jarillo and in Montañez v. Cipriano (Montañez), SC declared thus:

            As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes. Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.

            The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

            Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and keeping in mind its purpose, SC hold that Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other words, in order to remarry, a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage having been obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first marriage.

            However, in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Such is still governed by the rulings in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat which are more in line with the rule that procedural rules are only given retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.

            èIn this case, Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect while his subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, Pulido is required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

 

            Does the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the first and second marriages constitute a valid defense in bigamy? è SC rule in the affirmative.

            Notably, during the pendency of the bigamy case, Pulido obtained a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage with Arcon which he presented as his defense. However, the courts a quo, relying on settled jurisprudence, denied the same and convicted him of bigamy.

            SC are not unmindful of the fact that we have consistently ruled in a long line of jurisprudence that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity obtained prior to the celebration of the second marriage is required as a valid defense in bigamy. Upon the enact1nent of the Family Code; specifically the requirement laid down in Article 40, SC overturned its earlier rulings in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat and declared that a subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage could not be considered as a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy. Corollary, a judicial declaration obtained subsequent to the celebration of the second marriage is considered immaterial in the criminal prosecution for bigamy as relied upon by the courts a quo in the case at bar.

            The existing rule, therefore, is that a judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a valid defense in bigamy nor a prejudicial question to a criminal action for bigamy.

            Now, SC has the timely opportunity to review and revisit the rationale of our earlier pronouncements, and therefore, adopt a more liberal view in favor of the accused. To start, a brief examination of our earlier rulings is in order.

            In Morigo v. People, the Court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia was considered a void and inexistent marriage, meaning there was no marriage to begin with, in view of the absence of an actual marriage ceremony performed by a solemnizing officer between the contracting parties. The Court declared that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.

            Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroactive to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was considered never married under the eyes of the law. Consequently, with the declaration of nullity of the first marriage, the first element of bigamy, that is, that the accused must have been legally married, was lacking. Thus, the accused was acquitted based on the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage as there was no first marriage to speak of.

            After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to abandon our [SC] earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. SC hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.

            The aforesaid conclusion is anchored on and justified by the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the legislative intent of Article 40 of the Family Code and the fundamental rules of construction governing penal laws.

            A void marriage produces no legal ci1ects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to void marriages.

            A void marriage is ipso facto without need of any judicial declaration of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.