People vs Pelones G.R. Nos. 86159-60 [Case Digest]

 

People vs Pelones
G.R. Nos. 86159-60

Facts:
    Jose Malto and Guillermo Solina were co-employees of Rogelio Pelones in the New Star Farm. Pelones was however subsequently dismissed from the service when Solina reported to Rudy Tan, owner of the farm, that he (Pelones) stole chickens and brought a girl to the nipa hut in the farm.
    Shortly before midnight of 18 August 1986, Malto and Solina were inside the poultry farmhouse when Pelones, together with five others, armed with bladed weapons, suddenly appeared, forcibly dragged the two outside, and made them face the wall. Upon signal of one of the malefactors, Pelones started attacking Solina, and after a second, another unidentified attacker assaulted Malto with a bladed weapon. Although critically wounded, Malto was able to escape finally from his assailants. He sought refute in the office of the New Star Farm where he fainted and regained consciousness only in the Quezon Memorial Hospital, Lucena City. Although his wounds were considered fatal, he nonetheless survived to testify against Pelones.
    In attempting to reverse the verdict of the trial court, appellant engages in pathetic excuses, concocting a scenario of what might have happened instead, and posing questions that should have been asked during the trial. Worse, without questioning the competence of the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination on the remains of victim Solina, appellant challenges as without basis the doctor's findings that wounds Nos. 1 and 2 of Solina were fatal and instantaneous cause of death, absent any indication that such wounds penetrated the heart.
    Accused Pelones disputes the claim that the critically wounded Malto could have escaped from the grips of the two (2) aggressors who were holding his shoulders, with a third one behind him.


Issue:
    Whether Pelones is guilty for the crimes charges against him.

Held:
    YES. Far from being indicative of fabrication, this circumstance could be considered a manifestation of candor since a person mortally wounded, struggling to bolt from eventual death, would not be in a position to notice details of his own escape.
    The excuse of alibi bows down to the primacy of positive identification in the absence of any compelling motive for Malto to falsely accuse another of committing a heinous crime.    

Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434, [Case Digest]

Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 87434, August. 5, 1992

Facts:
    SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance.
    The said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.
    Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier. These were commingled with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilco.
    The cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were delivered to the consignee 5,413 bags in good order condition. The survey shows shortages, damages and losses.  Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on the same day shows an actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise noted were the following losses, damages and shortages.
    Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the claim against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."  The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners.
    Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of prescription. Respondent file petition for certiorari in SC. respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon by parties, to wit:
5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or loss, non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier.
    On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which unequivocally prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with the carrier in case of loss of or damage to the cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an action in court, which periods must concur, petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive period which is in the nature of a limitation on petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the earlier case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. They postulate this on the theory that the bills of lading containing the same constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore, void for being contrary to public policy, supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al.
    SLI asserts and defends the reasonableness of the time limitation within which claims should be filed with the carrier; the necessity for the same, as this condition for the carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly all shipping companies if they are to survive the concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and the countervailing balance afforded by such stipulation to the legal presumption of negligence under which the carrier labors in the event of loss of or damage to the cargo.

Issue:
    Whether or not prescription can be maintained as defense by herein respondent.

Held:
    YES. It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overland and river transportation but also to maritime transportation.  Moreover, we agree that in this jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is more accurate to state that the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under Article 366 actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for damages caused to the merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition and if he omits such allegations and proof, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in his favor. As the requirements in Article 366, restated with a slight modification in the assailed paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent, they are not limitations of action. Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede a suit for enforcement and the vesting of the right to file spit does not take place until the happening of these conditions.
    Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition.
    More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action for loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not an empty formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.
    Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim for loss of or damage to goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to prevent the enforcement of the contract when not complied with, that is, notice is a condition precedent and the carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation, as the failure to comply with such a stipulation in a contract of carriage with respect to notice of loss or claim for damage bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered.
    On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier period than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations.
    In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for the filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that effect. It may then be said that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the above condition precedent they lost whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, token in another sense, that remedial right or right to relief had prescribed.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 182864 [Case Digest]

 

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. BPI/MS Insurance Corp.,

G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015

Facts:

            BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS) and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company Limited (Mitsui) filed a Complaint before RTC Makati against ESLI and ATI to recover actual damages amounting to US$17,560.48 with legal interest, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

            In their complaint, BPI/MS and Mitsui alleged that on 2 February 2004 at Yokohama, Japan, Sumitomo Corporation shipped on board ESLI’s vessel M/V "Eastern Venus 22" 22 coils of various Steel Sheet weighing 159,534 kilograms in good order and condition for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of consignee Calamba Steel Center, Inc. (Calamba Steel) located in Saimsim, Calamba, Laguna as evidenced by a Bill of Lading.

            The complaint alleged that the shipment arrived at the port of Manila in an unknown condition and was turned over to ATI for safekeeping. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by the Calamba Steel’s representative, it was found out that part of the shipment was damaged and was in bad order condition such that there was a Request for Bad Order Survey.

            On 12 May 2004 at Kashima, Japan, Sumitomo Corporation again shipped on board ESLI’s vessel M/V "Eastern Venus 25" 50 coils in various Steel Sheet weighing 383,532 kilograms in good order and condition for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of the same consignee Calamba Steel asevidenced by a Bill of Lading. ESLI’s vessel withthe second shipment arrived at the port of Manila partly damaged and in bad order. The coils sustained further damage during the discharge from vessel to shore until its turnover to ATI’s custody for safekeeping.

            RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the ESLI and ATI liable for the damages sustained by the two shipments. Court of Appeals absolved ATI from liability thereby modifying the decision of the trial court.

            ESLI bases of its non-liability onthe survey reports prepared by BPI/MS and Mitsui’s witness Manuel which found that the cause of damage was the rough handling on the shipment by the stevedores of ATI during the discharging operations. However, Manuel does not absolve ESLI of liability. The witness in fact includes ESLI in the findings of negligence. ESLI cites the affidavit of its witness Rodrigo who stated that the cause of the damage was the rough mishandling by ATI’s stevedores.

 

 

Issue:

            Whether or not ESLI is liable for the damages of the coils transported by them.

 

Held:

            YES. In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a common carrier as a contract, receipt and symbol of the goods covered by it.  If it has no notation of any defect or damage in the goods, it is considered as a "clean bill of lading." A clean bill of lading constitutes prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described.

            Based on the bills of lading issued, it is undisputed that ESLI received the two shipments of coils from shipper Sumitomo Corporation in good condition at the ports of Yokohama and Kashima, Japan. However, upon arrival at the port of Manila, some coils from the two shipments were partly dented and crumpled as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982 dated 13 February 2004 and Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 68363 and 683655 both dated 24 May 2004 signed by ESLI’s representatives, a certain Tabanao and Rodrigo together with ATI’s representative Garcia. According toTurn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982, four coils and one skid were partly dented and crumpled prior to turnover by ESLI to ATI’s possession while a total of eleven coils were partly dented and crumpled prior to turnover based on Turn Over Survey Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 68363 and 68365.

            Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible. From the foregoing, the fault is attributable to ESLI.

 

Yu Con vs. Ipil, G.R. No. L-10195 [Case Digest]

 

 

 

Yu Con vs. Ipil,

G.R. No. L-10195. Dec. 29, 1916

Facts:

            Plaintiff file an action to recover from the defendants the sum of P450, which had been delivered by the plaintiff to Ipil and Solamo, master and supercargo, respectively, of a banca named Maria belonging to Lauron, to be carried, together with various merchandise belonging to the plaintiff, from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon of the Province of Cebu. By virtue of the contract executed between Lauron and the plaintiff, the money and merchandise were to be transported by the said craft between the points above-named in consideration of the payment of a certain sum for each voyage. The money disappeared from said craft during the night of October 18, 1911, while it was anchored in the port of Cebu and ready to sail for its destination, Catmon, and was not afterwards found. The plaintiff based his action on the charge that the disappearance of said sum was due to the abandonment, negligence, or voluntary breach, on the part of the defendants, of the duty they had in respect to the safe-keeping of the aforementioned sum. Plaintiff chartered the said banca from the defendant Lauron for the transportation of various merchandise from the port of Cebu to Catmon.

            The defendants, besides denying the allegations of the complaint, pleaded in special defense that the plaintiff, at his own expense and under his exclusive responsibility, chartered the said banca, the property of the defendant Lauron, for the fixed period of three days, at the price of P10 per diem, and that, through the misfortune, negligence, or abandonment of the plaintiff himself, the loss complained of occurred, while said banca was at anchor in the port of Cebu, and was caused by theft committed by unknown thieves.

            The Trial Court held that there was no room to doubt that the sole cause of the disappearance of the money from the said banca was the negligence of the master and the supercargo, the defendants Ipil and Solamo, respectively, and that the defendant Narciso Lauron was responsible for that negligence, as owner of the banca, pursuant to articles 589, 587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the master and the supercargo (Ipil and Solamo) were negligent in guarding the money of the plaintiff.

 

Held:

            YES. It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss or disappearance, on the night aforementioned, of the P450, the property of the plaintiff, which, were in the possession of the defendants, the master and the supercargo of the banca Maria, occurred through the manifest fault and negligence of said defendants.

            Liability of carriers. — In order that a thing may be transported, it must be delivered to the carrier, as the Code says. From the time it is delivered to the carrier or shipper until it is received by the consignee, the carrier has it in his possession, as a necessary condition for its transportation, and is obliged to preserve and guard it; wherefore it is but natural and logical that he should be responsible for it. [Manrresa]

            The said two defendants being the depositaries of the sum in question, and they having failed to exercise for its safe-keeping the diligence required by the nature of the obligation assumed by them and by the circumstances of the time and the place, it is evident that, in pursuance of the provisions of articles 1601 and 1602, in their relation to articles 1783 and 1784, and as prescribed in articles 1770, of the Civil Code, they are liable for its loss or misplacement and must restore it to the plaintiff, together with the corresponding interest thereon as an indemnity for the losses and damages caused him through the loss of the said sum.

            AS TO LIABLITY OF LAURON

            The word vessel serves to designate every kind of craft by whatever particular or technical name it may now be known or which nautical advancements may give it in the future. According to the foregoing definitions, then, we should that the banca called Maria, chartered by the plaintiff Yu Con from the defendant Narciso Lauron, was a "vessel", pursuant to the meaning this word has in mercantile law, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force.

            The Code of Commerce previous to the one now in force, to wit, that of 1829, in its article 624, provided that the agent or shipowner should not be liable for any excesses which, during the navigation, might be committed by the captain and crew, and that, for the reason of such excesses, it was only proper to bring action against the persons and property of those found guilty.

            It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force, which are applicable to the instance case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as the proprietor and owner of the craft of which Glicerio Ipil was the master and in which, through the fault and negligence of the latter and of the supercago Justo Solamo, there occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the plaintiff and were delivered to said master and supercargo, a theft which, on the other hand, as shown by the evidence, does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft, should, for said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to the plaintiff, who executed with said defendant Lauron the contract for the transportation of the merchandise and money aforementioned between the port of Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of the said craft.

National Development Company vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-49407] (Case Digest)

 

National Development Company vs. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-49407, August 19, 1988

Facts:

            A memorandum agreement entered into between defendants NDC and MCP on September 13, 1962, NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean going vessels including one with the name 'Dona Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent to manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account.  E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on board the vessel "Dona Nati" at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank and Trust Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., who represents Riverside Mills Corporation. Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum foil . En route to Manila the vessel Dofia Nati figured in a collision on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as damaged were landed and sold on the authority of the General Average Surveyor for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not landed and deemed lost.  The damaged and lost cargoes was worth P344,977.86 which amount, the herein private respondent as insurer, paid to the Riverside Mills Corporation.

            Development Insurance and Surety Corporation filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the recovery of the sum of P364,915.86 plus attorney's fees of P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP. Interposing the defense that the complaint states no cause of action and even if it does, the action has prescribed, MCP filed on May 12, 1965 a motion to dismiss.

            Trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC the sum of P364,915.86 plus the legal rate of interest. CA affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.

 

 

Issue 1 :

            WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 827 OF THE CODE OF COMMERCE AND NOT SECTION 4(2a) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 65, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT IN DETERMINING THE LIABILITY FOR LOSS OF CARGOES RESULTING FROM THE COLLISION OF ITS VESSEL "DONA NATI" WITH THE YASUSHIMA MARU"OCCURRED AT ISE BAY, JAPAN OR OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

 

Held 1:

            NO. This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC (1 50 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it was held under similar circumstance "that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil Code.

            It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision of vessels.

            More specifically, Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert appraisal. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code, which provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.

Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage (Y'eung Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., 12 Phil. 751 [1909]).

 

Issue 2:

            Whether or not COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION IF ANY EXISTS AS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

 

Held 2:

            NO. Trial court correctly found that the bills of lading issued allow trans-shipment of the cargo, which simply means that the date of arrival of the ship Dona Nati on April 18,1964 was merely tentative to give allowances for such contingencies that said vessel might not arrive on schedule at Manila and therefore, would necessitate the trans-shipment of cargo, resulting in consequent delay of their arrival. In fact, because of the collision, the cargo which was supposed to arrive in Manila on April 18, 1964 arrived only on June 12, 13, 18, 20 and July 10, 13 and 15, 1964. Hence, had the cargoes in question been saved, they could have arrived in Manila on the above-mentioned dates. Accordingly, the complaint in the instant case was filed on April 22, 1965, that is, long before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the lost or damaged cargo "should have been delivered" in the light of Section 3, sub-paragraph (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

 

Issue 3:

            Whether or not COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LOSS OF OR DAMAGES TO THE CARGO OF 550 BALES OF AMERICAN RAW COTTON, DAMAGES WERE CAUSED IN THE AMOUNT OF P344,977.86 INSTEAD OF ONLY P110,000 AT P200.00 PER BALE AS ESTABLISHED IN THE BILLS OF LADING AND ALSO IN HOLDING THAT PARAGRAPH 1O OF THE BILLS OF LADING HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE THERE BEING NO GENERAL AVERAGE TO SPEAK OF.

 

Held 3:

            NO. MCP's contention is devoid of merit. The declared value of the goods was stated in the bills of lading and corroborated no less by invoices offered as evidence ' during the trial. Besides, common carriers, in the language of the court in Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Barrette et al., (51 Phil. 90 [1927]) "cannot limit its liability for injury to a loss of goods where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence." Negligence of the captains of the colliding vessel being the cause of the collision, and the cargoes not being jettisoned to save some of the cargoes and the vessel, the trial court and the Court of Appeals acted correctly in not applying the law on averages (Articles 806 to 818, Code of Commerce).

 

AS TO THE SUBJECT OF AGENCY

MCP next contends that it cannot be liable solidarity with NDC because it is merely the manager and operator of the vessel Dona Nati not a ship agent. As the general managing agent, according to MCP, it can only be liable if it acted in excess of its authority.

 

As found by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, the Memorandum Agreement of September 13, 1962 (Exhibit 6, Maritime) shows that NDC appointed MCP as Agent, a term broad enough to include the concept of Ship-agent in Maritime Law. In fact, MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the NDC (Decision, CA G.R. No. 46513, p. 12; Rollo, p. 40). Consequently, under the circumstances, MCP cannot escape liability.

 

It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both are impleaded (Philippine Shipping Co. v. Garcia Vergara, 96 Phil. 281 [1906]); that in case of collision, both the owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain (Yueng Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., supra citing Article 586 of the Code of Commerce; Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Castelo, 42 Phil. 256, 262 [1921]); that while it is true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or agent, is not expressly provided in Article 826 of the Code of Commerce, it is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence under the Civil Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article 586 of the Code of Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a tortious act and did not arise from contract (Verzosa and Ruiz, Rementeria y Cia v. Lim, 45 Phil. 423 [1923]). Consequently, the agent, even though he may not be the owner of the vessel, is liable to the shippers and owners of the cargo transported by it, for losses and damages occasioned to such cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the ship, to the extent of the value of the vessel, its equipment, and the freight (Behn Meyer Y Co. v. McMicking et al. 11 Phil. 276 [1908]).