Wilfredo Y. Antiquina v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Masterbulk Pte., Ltd., G.R. No. 168922 (Case Digest)

 

●     Wilfredo Y. Antiquina v.  Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Masterbulk Pte., Ltd., G.R. No. 168922. April 13, 2011

Facts:

                Wilfredo Y. Antiquina was hired, through respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the vessel, M/T Star Langanger, which was owned and operated by respondent Masterbulk Pte., Ltd. (Masterbulk). According to petitioner’s contract of employment. During a routine maintenance of the vessel’s H.F.O Purifier #1, petitioner suffered a fracture on his lower left arm after a part fell down on him. petitioner was diagnosed with "fractura 1/3 proximala cubitus stg." as shown by the medical certificate issued by the attending physician and his arm was put in a cast.

            Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines and mmediately reported to the office of MMC on October 4, 2000 and was referred to Dr. Robert Lim. Dr. Lim subsequently issued a medical report confirming that petitioner has an undisplaced fracture of the left ulna. Another company designated doctor, Dr. Tiong Sam Lim, evaluated petitioner’s condition and advised that petitioner undergo a bone grafting procedure whereby a piece of metal would be attached to the fractured bone. Upon learning from Dr. Tiong Sam Lim that the metal piece will only be removed from his arm after one and a half years, petitioner allegedly reacted with fear and decided not to have the operation. Petitioner filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against herein respondents.

            Respondents contended that petitioner’s monetary claims were premature by reason of the latter’s refusal to undergo the operation recommended by the company designated physician.

            Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded him the amount of US$3,614.00 as sickness allowance; US$80,000.00 "representing [his] permanent medical unfitness benefits under the pertinent provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement"; and attorney’s fees. The NLRC dismissed respondents’ appeal in a Decision and denied their (respondent) motion for reconsideration.

                Undeterred, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with CA. Court of Appeals held that: “Although said evidence were filed for the first time on appeal, it would have been prudent upon the NLRC to look into them since it was not bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity. In fact, labor officials are mandated by Article 221 of the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.”  CA hold that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision awarding [petitioner] US$80,000.00 as medical unfitness benefit, despite the fact that such claim was unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence.

            In his motion for reconsideration of the above Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner claimed that it was only by inadvertence that he previously failed to attach a copy of the CBA. Attached as annexes to his motion were: (a) a purported copy of the CBA (Masterbulk Vessels Maritime Officers Agreement 1999) which allegedly entitled him to US$110,000.00 in disability benefits (an amount even higher than the Labor Arbiter’s award of US$80,000.00); and (b) a copy of his monthly contributions as union member during the period that he was employed by respondents. Thus, he prayed that the Court of Appeals reconsider its May 31, 2005 Decision and award him the higher amount of US$110,000.00 in disability benefits in accordance with the Masterbulk Vessels Maritime Officers Agreement 1999.  Respondents objected to the annexes of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the grounds that his belated filing violated their right to due process and that the list of monthly contributions he presented did not prove he was a member of AMOSUP since the said list did not contain any validation/signature of an AMOSUP officer. Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

 

Issues:

                Whether or not CA committed grave error in NOT admitting and considering the evidence submitted by petitioner (as to his membership of the Union).

                Whether or not CA was clearly biased in favor of the respondents such that it showed liberality to the latter but strictly applied the rules against petitioner.

 

 

Held:

                YES. The Court finds merit in petitioner’s contention that it would be more in keeping with the interest of fairness and substantial justice for the Court of Appeals to likewise admit and review petitioner’s evidence despite being submitted only on appeal. There appears to be no justification for relaxing the rules of procedure in favor of the employer and not taking the same action in the case of the employee, particularly in light of the principle that technical rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class in accordance with the demands of substantial justice. “Rules of procedure and evidence should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases in order that technicalities would not stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties."

            In line with the objective of dispensing substantial justice, this Court has examined the evidence belatedly submitted by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, even with this procedural concession in favor of petitioner, we do not find any sufficient basis to overturn the Court of Appeals’ May 31, 2005 Decision on the merits.

            Although petitioner was able to submit to the Court of Appeals copies of his identification card as an AMOSUP member and a certification from AMOSUP’s Legal Department that he was a member of said union during the period of his employment on the M/T Star Langanger, he still failed to present any copy of respondents’ supposed CBA with AMOSUP. What petitioner belatedly presented on appeal appears to be a CBA between respondent Masterbulk and the Singapore Maritime Officers’ Union, not AMOSUP.

At the outset, it should be noted that the resolution of the foregoing issues entails a review of the facts of the case which ordinarily would not be allowed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

            However, this principle is subject to recognized exceptions. In the labor law setting, the Court will delve into factual issues when conflict of factual findings exists among the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals. Considering that in the present case there were differing factual findings on the part of the Court of Appeals, on one hand, and the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on the other, there is a need to make our own assiduous evaluation of the evidence on record.

 

Mojica vs CA [G.R. No. 94247 ] Case Digest

 

Mojica vs CA

G.R. No. 94247

 

Facts:

                Leonardo Mojica contracted a loan of P20,000.00 from defendant Rural Bank of Kawit, Inc.  This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage executed on the same date by the plaintiffs spouses Leonardo Mojica and Marina Rufido. 

The real estate mortgage contract states among others:

... agreement for the payment of the loan of P20,000.00 and such other loans or other advances already obtained or still to be obtained by the mortgagors ..

... but if the mortgagors shall well and truly fulfill the obligation above stated according to the terms thereof then this mortgage shall become null and void.

The spouses mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Kawit, a parcel of land consisting of 218,794 square meters, located in Naic, Cavite. The loan of P20,000.00 by the plaintiffs spouses was fully and completely paid. On March 5, 1974, a new loan in the amount of P18,000.00 was obtained by plaintiffs spouses from the defendant Rural Bank which loan matured on March 5, 1975. No formal deed of real mortgage was constituted over any property of the borrowers, although the top of the promissory note dated March 5, 1974, contained the following notation.

This promissory note is secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed before the Notary Public of the Municipality of Kawit, Mrs. Felisa Senti under Doc. No. 62, Page No. 86, Book No.__, Series of 1971. The Real Estate Mortgage mentioned above is the registered mortgage which guaranteed the already paid loan of P20,000.00 granted on February 1, 1971. 

The spouses Leonardo Mojica and Marina Rufido failed to pay their obligation after its maturity on March 5, 1975. Respondent rural bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the justification that it was adopted as a mortgage for the new loan of P18,000.00.  The subject property was set for auction sale by the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite for June 27, 1979. In that auction sale, defendant rural bank was the highest bidder, and its bid corresponded to the total outstanding obligation of plaintiffs spouses Mojica and Rufido.

The refusal of the same bank to allow Dionisio Mojica to pay the unpaid balance of the loan as per the "Computation Slip" amounting to P21,272.50, resulted in the filing of a complaint. 

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the foreclosure sale by the Sheriff on June 27, 1979, had for its basis, a valid and subsisting mortgage contract.

 

Held:

                YES. It has long been settled by a long line of decisions that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts; that the amounts named as consideration in said contract do not limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. A mortgage given to secure advancements is a continuing security and is not discharged by repayment of the amount named in the mortgage, until the full amount of the advancements are paid. In fact, it has also been held that where the annotation on the back of a certificate of title about a first mortgage states "that the mortgage secured the payment of a certain amount of money plus interest plus other obligations arising there under' there was no necessity for any notation of the later loans on the mortgagors' title. It was incumbent upon any subsequent mortgagee or encumbrances of the property in question to the books and records of the bank, as first mortgagee, regarding the credit standing of the debtors.

 

People v. Taliman 2000 [G.R. No. 109143] Case Digest

 

·         People v. Taliman 2000 [G.R. No. 109143]

Facts:

            The victim was Renato Cuano. Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson was the uncle and employer of Renato, who was the caretaker of his gravel and sand truck. Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that armed and hooded persons4 were asking for money amounting to six thousand pesos (₱6,000.00). The amount was reduced to six hundred pesos (₱600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (₱200.00). Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed him a letter delivered to her by a child. In the letter, purportedly members of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (₱8,000.00) from him.

            Lacson told his employee, prosecution witness Elizer Obregon, to go to the crossing of Nalisbitan, the place mentioned in the letter to investigate who the persons demanding money were.  Elizer complied and reached the place at around five o’clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the same day.

                Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the vicinity, Elizer saw accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and C1C Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte Constabulary/Integrated National Police Command.12 Elizer saw two other civilians in their company. Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take Renato14 to a hilltop, where he was guarded by accused who were armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must be taken as "he must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)." 

                Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that Renato was taken by accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano.

A custodial investigation was conducted. On July 23, 1990, Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to "assist" accused during their custodial investigation. Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the commission of the crime.

            It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did not give them the money they were demanding. This confession was given without the assistance of counsel and was not reduced to writing.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not Accused-appellant's extra-judicial confessions on which the trial court relied were inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.

 

Held:

            YES. Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides: "Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel (underscoring ours)."

 

Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial investigation.

In People v. Culala, SC held that the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant was inadmissible as he was "assisted" by the incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs. Bandula, we held that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.

Besides, lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are suspects. In many areas, even less obvious than that obtaining in the present case, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

            Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation, still the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. This, accused-appellants did not do.

            However, while we agree that the extra-judicial statements of the accused are inadmissible in evidence, we find that there is still sufficient evidence to convict. While no one saw the actual killing of Renato, circumstantial evidence proved its commission. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential, when to insist on direct testimony would set felons free.