Halili vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019
En Banc, CARPIO, J.
Facts:
Petitioner
Marino P. Morales was elected and served as Mayor of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010. He was elected again as
mayor during the 2010 elections. On 15 May 2012, or during Morales' second
term, Congress passed Republic Act No. (RA) 10164, converting the Municipality
of Mabalacat into a component city. Thereafter a plebiscite was held. In the
2013 elections, Morales ran again and was elected as mayor of the new Mabalacat
City. On 8 December 2015, Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the 2016 elections for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City, as substitute
candidate for Wilfredo Feliciano of Aksyon Demokratiko Party.
On 4
January 2016, respondent Pyra Lucas, also a candidate for the position of mayor
of Mabalacat City, filed a Petition for Cancellation of the COC and/or
Disqualification of Morales for the Mayoral Position of Mabalacat City. Lucas
alleged that Morales was disqualified to run for mayor, since he was elected
and had served three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections. Lucas also
alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat
City did not interrupt Morales' service for the full term for which he was
elected.
On 10
May 2016, following the canvass of all election returns, the City Board of
Canvassers of Mabalacat City proclaimed Morales as elected city mayor, and
petitioner Christian C. Halili (Halili) as elected city vice mayor.
Respondent
Crisostomo Garbo (Garbo), another candidate for the position of mayor of
Mabalacat City, filed a Motion for Leave To Intervene and To Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention alleging that he was interested in the outcome of the
case, since he obtained the second highest number of votes and he should be
proclaimed as mayor of Mabalacat City should Morales' COC be cancelled.
On 28
June 2016, Halili also filed a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene (as
Respondent) and Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention alleging that, as
incumbent vice mayor of Mabalacat City, he should be proclaimed as mayor of
Mabalacat City should Morales' COC be cancelled pursuant to the rule on
succession under Section 44 of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code.
COMELEC
First Division granted the petition, cancelled Morales' COC, and ordered the
proclamation of the qualified mayoralty candidate with the next higher number
of votes. COMELEC En Banc declared that Garbo, being the qualified mayoralty
candidate with the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed.
Issue 1:
Whether
Comelec erred in finding that Morales committed a false material representation
in his COC when he declared that he was eligible to run as mayor of Mabalacat
City for the 2016 elections despite his violation of the three-term limit rule.
Held:
No; the
three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
The
intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the
"monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials
from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" but also to
"enhance the people's freedom of choice." There are two conditions
which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In
the present case, Morales admits that he has been elected and has served as
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three consecutive terms: (1) 2007-2010; (2)
2010-2013; and (3) 2013-2016. However, Morales insists that his second term as
mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat was interrupted by the conversion of the
municipality into a component city. Morales claims that Mabalacat City is an
entirely different political unit from the Municipality of Mabalacat, having an
increased territory, income and population.
We
have already ruled upon the same issue in the case of Latasa v. COMELEC
(Latasa), where we held that the conversion of a municipality into a city does
not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of
service. We held that to be considered as interruption of service, the
"law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit."
In
Aratea v. Commission on Elections (Aratea), we found that Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knew fully well that he had been
elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three
consecutive terms, yet, he still certified that he was eligible to run for
mayor for the next succeeding term. We held that such misrepresentation
constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or
eligibility for the office.
Contrary
to Morales' argument that since he had been proclaimed and had assumed office
as mayor in 2016, disputes as to his COC became moot and the proper remedy is
to file a quo warranto proceeding questioning his eligibility, we held in
Velasco v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due
course to and cancel a COC continues, to wit:
If the
disqualification or COC cancellation/denial case is not resolved before
election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the
proclamation of the winner. In the meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for
and be proclaimed if he or she wins, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due
course and cancel his or her COC continues. This rule applies even if the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number
of votes, and even if the candidate is proclaimed and has taken his oath of
office. The
only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional or senatorial
candidates with unresolved disqualification or COC denial/cancellation cases
after the elections. Pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution,
the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction over these unfinished cases in favor
of the respective Senate or the House of Representatives electoral tribunals
after the candidates take their oath of office. Moreover, we held in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections that the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of
the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate.
Issue 2:
Whether
Comelec erred in declaring Crisostomo Garbo the qualified mayoral candidate
with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed.
Held:
No; As
we held in Aratea, a violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility
affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office and the
misrepresentation of such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due course
to or cancel a COC. A
person whose COC had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78
is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his COC is considered
void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily
to valid votes.
In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we
explained that: Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate
of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place,
or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. If the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed
such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at
any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the
day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that
all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy
void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for
such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect
of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio.
Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one
or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. The rule on succession under
Section 44 of RA 7160, as espoused by Halili, would not apply if the permanent
vacancy was caused by one whose COC was void ab initio. In case of vacancies
caused by those with void ab initio COCs, the person legally entitled to the
vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of
votes among those eligible. In this case, it is Garbo who is legally entitled
to the position of mayor, having garnered the highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates. Thus, the COMELEC correctly proclaimed Garbo as
mayor of Mabalacat City.
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