Monday, August 22, 2022

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA G.R. No. 122191 (Case Digest)

 

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA

G.R. No. 122191

 

Facts:

            Saudia hires Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with two male attendants, and on the following morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help. The Indonesian police arrested the two.

            Morada learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI.

            On June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

            On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found Morada guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

            Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

            Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and its country manager. SAUDIA contended that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

            CA ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of trial Court. Saudia claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thus the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

 

Issue:

            Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to try the case?

 

Held:

            YES. Foreign element in conflict of law is a factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.  The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State.

            Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the herein private respondent should be upheld.

 

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law.

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.

 

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

 

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.

 

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Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

 

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, SC find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

 

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue:

(a) the place where the injury occurred;

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

 

 

            The Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter."

 

Saturday, August 20, 2022

Alvarez vs Guingona G.R. No. 118303 (Case Digest)

 

Alvarez vs Guingona

G.R. No. 118303

Facts:

            Petitioners assail the validity of RA. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," because the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.

                By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.

                The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.

 

Issue:

            Whether Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of LGC.

 

Held:

            NO. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

                The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

 

 

 

Mandanas vs Ochoa G.R. No. 199802 / G.R. No. 208488 (April 10, 2019) Case Digest

 

Mandanas vs Ochoa

G.R. No. 199802 / G.R. No. 208488

 

Facts:

            Implementing the constitutional mandate for decentralization and local autonomy, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC), in order to guarantee the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs by specifically providing that:

    SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows…:

Petitioners averred that the insertion by Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes found in Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and should be declared unconstitutional

            SC on July 3, 2018 declares that the phrase "internal revenue" appearing in Section 284 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and DELETES the phrase from Section 284.

            OSG contends that the affected provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) are not contrary to Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, under which the plenary power of Congress extends nut only to the determination of they just share of local government units (LGUs) but also to the determination of which national taxes serve as base for the computation of such just share.

                The OSG premises its contention on the fact that the article "the" immediately precedes the phrase "national taxes" in Section 6, thereby manifesting the intent to give Congress the discretion to determine which national taxes the just share will be based on considering that the qualifier "the" signals that the succeeding phrase "national taxes" is a specific class of taxes; that if it was the intention of the framers to include all national taxes, the Constitution should have so stated; that the phrase internal revenue should be restored in the affected provisions of the LGC considering that the deletion of the phrase constitutes an undue encroachment on the power of Congress to determine the LGUs' just share; that the effect of broadening the base for computing the just share is to modify Congress' internal revenue allocations (IRA) in favor of the LGUs, which the Court cannot do because imposing the new base was not intended by Congress.

 

Issue:

            Whether SC should reverse its decision that the phrase "internal revenue" appearing in Section 284 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and DELETES the phrase from Section 284.

 

 

Held:

            NO. Constitution itself set national taxes as the base amount from which to reckon the just share of the LGUs; and Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to the LGUs of a just share in the national taxes.

            Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.

            SC's agrees with Garcia contention that Congress has exceeded its constitutional boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of the LGUs.

            Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.