MONCADO vs People’s Court
FULL TEXT in ENGLISH
G.R. No. L-824 January 14, 1948
HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO, recurrente,
vs.
THE COURT OF PEOPLE AND JUAN M. LADAW, as Special Procurator, appealed.
D. Vicente J. Francisco en representacion del recurrente.
El Primer Procurador General Auxiliar Sr. Jose B.L. Reyes, Procurador General
Auxiliar Sr. Carmelino G. Alvendia, y el Procurador Especial Sr. Juan M. Ladaw
en representacion de los recurridos.
PABLO, J.:
[English by Microsoft Translator]
In an original application by certiorari, the appellant, accused of the crime of treason in criminal case No. 3522 of the People's Court, alleges that on April 4, 1945 at around 6pm, he was arrested by members of the United States Army CIc at his residence at Calle San Rafael, No. 199-A Manila, with no arrest warrant and was taken to the prisons of Muntinglupa, Rizal; that a week later his wife who had moved to his house-residence at Calle Rosario, No. 3, Ciudad de Quezon, was invited by several CIC members under the command of Lieutenant Olves to witness the registration of his house on Calle San Rafael; that I refuse to follow because they did not carry a commandment of record; because they ensured that even without their presence they had to do registration anyway, she accompanies them; that upon his arrival in the house, he saw that various effects were scattered on the ground among which several documents; That Lieutenant Olves informed her that he carried with her some documents to prove her husband's guilt; that on 27 June 1946 the appellant filed a motion with the People's Court asking for the return of such decuments on the grounds that they were obtained from their residence without a warrant for registration, and that court, with serious abuse of discretion or over-jurisdiction and following the doctrine set out in Alvero v. Dizon's case (76 Phil. , 637) denegotiation; that unless this Court orders the Special Procurator to return them to the appellant, his constitutional rights guaranteed by the constitution would be violated. And because it has no simple, quick and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, it requests that this Court (a) annul the order of the People's Court of 9 July 1946; (b) that the Tribunal be required to order the return to the appellant of such deocuments; (c) an injunction order prohibiting the Special Prosecutor from presenting them as evidence against the appellant in the treacherous case. These requests demonstrate that docments are relevant evidence, as well as adminisable because there is no rule preventing it.
The appellant's contention that the decision in Alvero v. Dizon's case (76 Phil., 637) does not apply to the particular case is well founded. Documents in the Alvero case have been seeded by CIC members when the Miliar government exercises its occupation functions throughout its heyday. By contrast, when they seized on April 11, 1945, the docoments that are the subject of this cause, General MacArthur, on behalf of the United States Government, already restored on February 27 of the same year, the Commonwealth with all its powers and prerogatives (41 Off. Gaz., 86). The Commonwealth government was already exercising all its constitutional and legal powers without limitation in Manila City. The President had not suspended constitutional guarantees.
It is well-established doctrine in the Philippines, the United States, England and Canada that the adminisibility of the evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means that the party has used to obtain it. 1 It is doctrine followed by many years "until it arose," said this People's Court against Charles, 47 Jur. Phil., 660 — the dissyest opinion of most in the cause of Boyd vs. Boyd. U.S. in 1885, which has exerted pernicious influence in many states over subsiquient judicial oppositions."
"The development of this doctrine of the Boyd vs. Boyd affair. The U.S. went as follows. (a) Boyd's case continues without being called into question in his own court for twenty years; meanwhile he received frequent disapproval in the courts of State (ante, parrafo 2183). (b) Then in Adams v. New York, in 1904, it was implicitly dismissed in the Federal Supreme Court, and the Orthodox precedents recorded in the courts of states (before, paragraph 2183) were expressly approved. (c) Then, after another twenty years, in 1914, in the case of Weeks vs. U.S., the Federal Supreme Court moved at this time not by erroneous history, but by misplaced sentiment — recoiled to the original doctrine of Boyd's cause, but with a condition, namely that the illegality of registration and confiscation should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion , made before the trial, for the return of the things seeded; so that, after that motion, and only then, illegality could be noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus obtained should be excluded. ... ." Under the authority of this Weeks vs. U.S. doctrine, and other decisions of the same school, the appellant exercises the present appeal, asking for the return of documents illegally taken out by CIC members.
The Constitution grants the inviolability of individual rights in the following terms; "The right of the people to the safety of their persons, abodes, papers and effects against arrest records and abductions would not be violated, unless it is likely to be determined by the judge after examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he will present, and with detailed description of the site to be searched and of the persons to be apprehended or of the things to be seized." (Title III, article 1st, parrafo 3rd.)
We have the appellant's claim that, under these constitution grants, he was entitled to have his house respected, his documents should not be seized by any authority or agent of authority, without a duly issued search warrant.
These constitutional limitations, however, do not go so far as to exclude as competent evidence documents obtained illegally or improperly from it. The Rules of Procedure of the Courts, Rule 123, determine which evidence should be excluded, which is admissible and competent and does not classify illegally obtained as incompetent evidence. The fundamental law adds the limits to where the executive, legislative and judicial powers can go in the exercise of their foundations. The executive must not abuse his power, vilando the address of the citizen or miserably seize his property and documents; the legislator should not pass laws that make the household's sagrdo illusory and the courts must punish the offenders of the constitution, regardless of whether they are public officials or not. As President Lumpkin said in Williams vs. Williams. States, 28 S.E., 624:
As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our constitutional inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, was to place a salutary restriction upon the powers of government. That is to say, we believe the framers of the constitutions of the United States and of this and other states merely sought to provide against any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify, or declare lawful, any unreasonable search or seizure. This wise restriction was intended to operate upon legislative bodies, so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the people expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful; upon executives, so that no law violative of this constitutional inhibition should ever be enforced; and upon the judiciary, so as to render it the duty of the courts to denounce as unlawful every unreasonable search and seizure, whether confessedly without any color of authority, or sought to be justified under the guise of legislative sanction. For the misconduct of private persons, acting upon their individual responsibility and of their own volition, surely none of the three divisions of government is responsible. If an official, or a mere petty agent of the state, exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as acting, not for the state, but for himself only; and therefore he alone, and not the state, should be held accountable for his acts. If the constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by a mere individual, the most that any branch of government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as a possible, and bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful conduct. . . . .
We believe that the authors of the Philippine constitution have never had the slightest idea of granting criminal immunity to the one who violates household holiness, or to any violation of criminal law just because the evidence against him has been obtained illegally. The healthy, juto and orderly procedure is that the individual who, under the cloak of a pubic official, is punished in accordance with article 128 of the Revised Criminal Code, without registration, unduly desecrates the domicile of a citizen and takes over his papers and who also punishes that citizen if he is guilty of a crime, regardless of whether proof of his guilt has been obtained illegally. The means used in the procurement of the document does not alter its probative value. So on Stevenson vs. Stevenson. Earnest, 80, I'll. 513, it was contemplated, and such ought ever to be the fact, that the records of courts remain permanently in the places assigned by the law for their custody. It does not logically follow, however, that the records, being obtained, cannot be used as instruments of evidence; for the mere fact of (illegally) obtaining them does not change that which is written in them ... . Suppose the presence of a witness to have been procured by fraud or violence, while the party thus procuring the attendance of the witness would be liable to severe punishment, surely that could not be urged againsturged the competency of the witness. If he could not, why shall a record, although illegally taken from its proper place of custody and brought before the Court, but otherwise free from suspicion, be hold incompetent?
"At Com. Vs. Dana, 2 Metc., 329. e; Court said: "Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence. If the search warrant where illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done. But this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized, as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were. When papers are offered in evidence the Court can take no notice how they were obtained, — whether lawfully or unlawfully, — nor would they form a collateral issue to determine that question."
The appellant cites the case of Bureau vs. Bureau. McDowell in the following terms:
Certain books, papers, memoranda, etc., of McDowell's private property were stolen by certain people who were interested in the investigation that the Grand Jury against Mcdowell would do for certain offenses that had been committed, relating to the fraudulent use of mail. These documents and lobros were then delivered to Burdeau by the people who had rabaod them. Burdeau was the special assistant to the Attorney-General of the United States, who was to have the direction and control of the American prolose, who was to have the direction and control of the prosecution before the Grand Jury. McDowell tried to prevent Burdeau from using those books and documents through a motion he had submitted to that effect. Burdeau opposed the motion, claiming that he had the right to use those papers. The U.S. Supreme Court upstood Bordeaux's contention, saying:
"We know of no constitutional principal which requires the government to surrender the papers under such circumstances.
"The papers having come into possession of the government without a violation of petitioner's rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why the fact that individuals unconnected with the government may have wrongfully taken them, should prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of incriminatory character." (Burdeau vs. McDowell.)
"Will our Supreme Court adopt the doctrine announced in this decision? We submit that this is a bad rule of law, and in our humble opinion, it should not be adopted by our Court."
The appellant then cites decisions of some Supreme State Courts that have not adopted this doctrine of the Federal Supreme Court. It's not Strange. Each court takes its own discretion. But of the 45 states of the American Union — according to Judge Cardozo in his decision in 1926, in People vs. People. Defore, 150 N.E., 585 — fourteen adopted the heterodox doctrine of Weeks and 31 rejected it, and according to Wigmore, in 1940, fourteen years later, six more states, 37 in total, including Hawaii and Puerto Rico rejected it, maintaining Orthodox doctrine. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., pages 5-11.) And after considering the various decisions of the two schools, Cardozo made these right observations about the doctrine of Weeks:
We are confirmed in this conclusion when we reflect how far-reaching in its effect upon society the new consequences would be. The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through over-zeal or indiscretions, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murder goes free. Another search, once more against the law, discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery. The absence of a warrant means the freedom of the forger. Like instances can be multiplied.
Let's get to the present case. If the documents whose unveiling the appellant asks for prove their guilt of the crime of treason, why does the state have to return them and rid him of the accusation? Isn't this condoning and convalidating crime? Does it not constitute a judicial approval of the commission of the offences, that of violation of the defendant's domicile committed by the members of the CIC and that of treason committed by the appellant? Such a practice would encourage crime rather than impede its commission. In addition, obtaining the documents does not alter their probative value. If a warrant had been mediated, the documents would be admissible evidence. There is no constitutional or legal provisions that release the accused from criminal responsibility because there was no injunction for registration. The public wine bar requires that criminal law violators be punished. To release the culpabale for the simple fact that the evidence against him has not been obtained legally is to judicially punish the crime.
Consider a case: John who witnesses a murder, gets the murderer's outburr the dagger, and with whom he orders him to be arrested and leads him to the presidency of the people. Along the way he meets Peter interceding for the killer; John, out of poorly understood sentimentality, returns the dagger and helps the defendant to make disappear all vestiges of the crime so as not to be discovered. John and Peter not only commit unworthy acts ofbuena citizenship, but must be punished by cover-ups (art. 19, cod. Pen. Rev.) The public will never understand why these two individuals should be punished and, instead, a court, under the doctrine of Weeks, may order the return of the stolen document proving the guilt of a defendant and set free the accused and the one who stole the document.
Another case. As a suspect, a jose is arrested by two policemen as he joins the rostrum where senior officials of the executive, legislative and judicial branch are gathered together with the diplomatic representatives of the partner nations to witness the anniversary of independence stop; in his pocket they find a bomb that is able to blow up the entire grandstand. Two other police officers, after learning of the arrest, requisition Jose's home and find documents revealing that he has received orders from a foreign organization to polverize all senior government personnel at the first opportunity. The cops have no warrant, no warrant. Is it fair that at Jose's motion in the criminal case against him, the court is ordered to return the documents proveing his crime? Wouldn't anarchism be encouraged by such a practice? The court would play the sad role of helping those who wish to undermine the foundations of our governesses. In the U.S. vs. U.S. Snyder, 278 Fed., 650, the Court said: "To hold that non-criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, most the expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." And in People vs. People. Mayen, 205 Pac., 435, said: "Upon what theory can it be held that such proceeding (for the return of the articles) is an incident of the trial, in such a sense that the rulingon goes up on appeal as part of the record and subject to review by the appellate court? It seems to us rather an independent proceeding to enforce a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. The right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. The right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence, but to recover the possession of articles which were wrongfully taken from him. That right exists entirely apart from any proposed use of the property by the State or whereas it was the invasion of his premises and the taking of his goods that constituted the irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of its; and the law having declared that the articles taken are competent and admissible evidence, notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure, how can the circumstance that the court erred in an independent proceeding for the return of the property on defendant's demand add anything to or detract from the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in the unlawful search and seizure?
The Constitutional and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid persons charged with crime in their efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of their iniquity. (8 Wig., 37.)
The theory of Weeks vs. U.S. subverting the rules of proof not acceptable in this jurisdiction: it is contrary to the sense of justice and to the order and sound administration of justice. Orthodox doctrine is imposed by its proven consistency over many years. It should not be abandoned if constitutional rights are to be respected and not desecrated. The culprits must receive their convicted punishment, even if the evidence against them has been obtained illegally. 2 And they that with an infraction of the law and the Constitution unduly seize such purebas must also be punished. This is how the law prevails, majestic and incolume.
The application is denied with costs.
Moran,
Pres., Feria, y Padilla, MM., estan conformes.
Tuason, J., concurs in the result.