Tuesday, August 31, 2021

Introduction to the Social Dimension of Education

 

Introduction to the Social Dimension of Education

By: G-one T. Paisones

1. How are the structural functionalism and symbolic interactionism related to education?

Structural functionalism stretched that the society is composed of various institutions that are dependents with each other.

Structural functionalism is dealing with the cultural, social, personality and actions system of every society. [PARSON]

Cultural system of a society provides pattern maintenance or harmony within the community. Social system of every society refers to the interaction, cooperation, social gathering of information towards the completion or attainment of goals. Personality and the action system are the behavioral and the fortitude organism that performs the actions of every society in a community.

The basic unit of the society is the FAMILY where love, cooperation, integrity, faith and knowledge begin. The society cannot exist without a family; hence family is the heart of society.

The second most important part of society is the SCHOOL. School performs an important function in building the society and the nation as a whole. School serves as an institution which provides intellect, knowledge and competitive education and skills of human resources as the product of the school-institution.

Therefore structural functionalism is related to education.

Symbolic interaction sees our selves as an engrave elements in social forces and social structures. Thus, the social self is an active part of society as a whole.

Therefore symbolic interactionism deals with socialization and interaction of everyone which is the main core of social dynamic fundamentals.

Symbolic interactionism states that human beings are endowed with a capacity for thinking and is shaped by social interaction that can be able to learn the meanings and the symbols that allow them to comprehend and interpret their actions and interactions. These tangled patterns of actions and interactions make up groups and society.

Indeed, symbolic interactionism is related to the process of education because every one of us had been engrave and part of the formed society of intellect-the school.

2. How would you distinguish consensus and conflict?

Consensus and conflict theories are can easily be distinguish through the table below:

Table 1 Consensus versus conflict


Consensus Conflict
Society General agreement among members. Clash between ideas, principle and people.
Parameter Social order, stability and social regulation. Resistance of social classes to maintain dominance and power.
Social Structure Maintenance or continuation of social order in society. Inequality in the distribution of resources.
Social Behavior Shared norms and values as fundamental to society Best understood in terms of tensions between the competing groups.
State of Society Equilibrium Heterogeneous
Social Change Occurring in a slow and orderly fashion Occurring rapidly and in a disorderly fashion
School Serves as an institution which provides intellect, knowledgeable and competitive education and skills of human resources as the product of the school-institution. School can contribute to the unequal distribution of people into jobs in society so that more powerful members of society maintain the best position and the less powerful groups allocated to lower ranks in society.
Religion Religion as an institution of believers which promotes unity and peace. Religion is the opium of the people. [Karl Marx]

What are the influences on the conflict and consensus theories in the work as a teacher?

The influences on the consensus theory in the work as a teacher are the following:

  • Ø order, stability and teaching regulation within the class premise.
  • Ø agreement among students, parents and other faculties in the school.
  • Ø Maintenance and continuation of strategically, technically and high-quality teaching.
  • Ø Shared norms and values as fundamental to school practices.

While the influences on the conflict theory in the work as a teacher, are the following:

  • Ø Clashing of ideas in other faculty and students.
  • Ø Different principles compared in other faculty and students.
  • Ø Resistance of students.
  • Ø Personal interest.
  • Ø Pressure between the competing groups of students.
  • Ø discrimination in the teaching of the subject (or teaching-terrorism).
  • Ø Inequality of giving fair grades (or favoritism).

According to Dahrendorf that “a society can not exist without both conflict and consensus, which are prerequisites for each other;” indeed, our-self as part of the society, also have conflict and consensus persuade within the dimensions of our ego.

 

Dr. Victoria L. Batiquin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118231 [Case digest]

 

Dr. Victoria L. Batiquin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 118231, July 5, 1996

Facts:

            Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to September 1989. Between 1987 and September, 1989 she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital.

            In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at the same Hospital, C.I. and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child, Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital until September 27, 1988 during which period of confinement she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988 Mrs. Villegas checked out of the Hospital.

            Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs. Villegas no end despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains became unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989.

            When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2 inches by 3/4 inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove". . . and which is [sic] also "rubber-drain like". . . . It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on September 21, 1988.

            Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated. CA reversed the decision of RTC and held that Dr. Batiquin is acted at fault or negligence on the said operation.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is acted at fault or negligence on the caesarean operation.

 

Held:

            YES. Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villega's abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.

            As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine:

This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen in those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuctable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer. . . . Under [this] doctrine

. . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

            The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

            In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

 

 

Noel Casumpang, et al vs. Nelson Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127 [Case Digest]

 

Noel Casumpang, et al vs. Nelson Cortejo,

G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015

Facts:

            Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever. r. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer. Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body temperature, and blood pressure.6 Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia.7 " Edmer’s blood was also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.

            At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia.

            At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor’s diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough10 but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son’s "blood pressure is just being active,"11 and remarked that "that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."12 Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day.13 Still suspicious about his son’s illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang’s attention and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer’s sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s illness is bronchopneumonia.

            In the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak"15 prompting the respondent (Edmer’s father) to request for a doctor at the nurses’ station.16 Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Miranda-Sanga (Dr. Sanga), one of the resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for examination.

            Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer’s head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever.17 Her medical findings state:

the patient’s rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient’s nose is flaring which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the abdomen has negative finding; the patient has low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient’s skin were not

"Herman’s Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.

            Dr. Sanga then examined Edmer’s "sputum with blood" and noted that he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication.

            Dr. Sanga advised Edmer’s parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer’s room and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.

After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer’s condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be found.

            At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient’s clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.

Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the RTC of Makati City.

RTC held that the doctors were negligent. CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.

 

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient.

 

Held:

            YES. Dr. Casumpang is Liable. àAttending physician

            Dr. Sanga is Not Liable for Negligence because the latter is only a resident doctor

The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.

            Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct.35 It requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability.

            A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a physician,36 and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.37 The establishment of this relationship is consensual,38 and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees.

            Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.

            Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each individual case. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.

            To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.44 The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it appears, based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the physician’s negligence.

            First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor’s diagnosis, or the accuracy of the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to decide – based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented– whether a breach of duty took place.

Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.65 Physicians are generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of judgment. Nonetheless, when the physician’s erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the appropriate tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.

Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science;66 and doctors, or even specialists, are not expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their clinic for consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment is called for in considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the results of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor must have acted according to acceptable medical practice standards.

In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.

Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake the proper medical management needed for this disease.

 

As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited the classic symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of analgesic, and infusion of fluids or dextrose;67 and once the patient had twice vomited fresh blood, the doctor should have ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing. Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to these standards.

            Also in Evans v. Ohanesian, the court set a guideline in qualifying an expert witness:

To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the witness (1) has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required of a physician under similar circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.