Gana-Carait vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 257453. August 09, 2022 [Case Digest]

 

Gana-Carait vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 257453. August 09, 2022

En Banc, ROSARIO, J.

Facts:

            On 17 October 2018, petitioner filed her CoC as Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna, for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections (NLE).

            On 22 October 2018, respondent Lim filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner before the COMELEC. Respondent Lim claimed that petitioner acquired United States (US) citizenship and sought election to public office without making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Respondent Lim likewise alleged that petitioner's application for and use of a US passport negated her claim that she was a Filipino citizen at the time she filed her CoC.

            Petitioner filed her answers to the foregoing petitions, claiming that: (1) she did not commit any material representation in her CoC since there was no deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible; (2) she is a dual citizen and she is not precluded from seeking an elective position; (3) dual allegiance is unlike dual citizenship, and it is the former that is proscribed by law; (4) since there is no voluntary or positive act on her part in acquiring her US citizenship, she being born in the US, the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225), is not applicable to her; (5) possession of an American passport of a dual citizen is not a basis for disqualification; and (6) the COMELEC cannot, as yet, decide on her qualifications since it is an issue that is undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.

            COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification, but granted the petition to deny due course to or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy. COMELEC First Division found that, from the time her US passport was issued in 2010 up to 2018, petitioner used her US passport to travel to and from the US and the Philippines, and vice versa.

            COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the COMELEC First Division. According to the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run for elective office and, thus, she committed material misrepresentations in her CoC when she stated therein that she was eligible to run for election.

 

Issue:

            Whether the petitioner committed material misrepresentations in her CoC.

 

Held:

            No; R.A. 9225 is applicable only to dual citizens by naturalization and not to dual citizens by birth. As was made clear in De Guzman v. COMELEC, R.A. 9225 covers two categories of individuals, thus: R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country: and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

                R.A. 9225 particularly applies to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Filipino citizenship through the process of naturalization. Essentially, both classes of individuals mentioned in R.A. 9225 refer to those who have undergone the process of naturalization.

                Thus, the coverage of R.A. 9225 includes only those natural-born Filipinos who acquired foreign citizenship through the process of naturalization. Similarly, the provisions of R.A. 9225 on the required oath of allegiance under Section 3, and the personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship under its Section 5(2) apply only to dual citizens by naturalization and not to dual citizens by birth. This is confirmed by the case of Maquiling v. COMELEC (Maquiling), which states: Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

                Records show that petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her CoC for the May 2019 NLE, being both a US citizen and a natural born Filipino. The pivotal issue however is whether petitioner acquired her US citizenship—and therefore her status as a dual citizen—by birth or through naturalization. If by birth, petitioner need not renounce her US citizenship or pledge allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to qualify as a candidate for public office as required by Sections 3 and 5(2) of R.A. 9225. Otherwise, if her dual citizenship proceeded from naturalization, petitioner must perform the twin requirement or renunciation and the taking of an oath under R.A. 9225.

                Petitioner is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization. First. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws, and these must be proven as fact under the rules on evidence. Having cited Act 322 of the United States INA in its argument that petitioner is not a dual citizen at birth but a dual citizen by naturalization, respondents Lim and Nuñez should have proven such foreign law pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court. The COMELEC First Division should not have taken judicial notice of this law, much less made an attempt to analyze and apply the same.

                Second. As furthermore pointed out by Justice Caguioa, the cited portions of the INA, which refers to automatic citizenship of a child upon the application of his or her American citizen parent, even supports the conclusion that, if, indeed, some positive acts were performed in the acquisition of petitioner's US citizenship, the same could not have been performed by her but rather, by her American parent. Notably, the records are bereft of any evidence which would indicate to the slightest degree that petitioner petitioned to acquire her US citizenship or that she went through the pertinent naturalization process. Again, respondents Lim and Nuñez had the burden of proving such allegations before the COMELEC.

                As explained by Justices Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, the very language of the CRBA shows that petitioner's US citizenship was acquired at birth, as it literally states: "acquired United States Citizenship at birth," and that documentary evidence was presented merely to establish such fact. Being a citizen of the US at birth, it would be absurd to construe petitioner's submission of documents to the Consular Service of the US to be akin to one's availment of the naturalization process for the purpose of becoming an American citizen, when she, herself has already been one since her birth.