People vs. Gabiosa, G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020 [Case Digest]

 

People vs. Gabiosa,

G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020

First Division [Caguioa, J]

 

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Facts:

            Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner before the Executive Judge Balagot.  In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero attached the Affidavit of his witness, PO1 Geverola. On the basis of the Affidavit, Judge Balagot conducted a preliminary examination to PO1 Geverola.

            Judge Balagot, then, issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 after finding a probable cause for such issuance. Thereafter, the aforementioned search warrant was served against petitioner.

            Petitioner, however, questioned the validity of the search warrant issued against him. Thus, on March 13, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence claiming that the issuance of the search warrant is grossly violative of his fundamental constitutional and human right.

            RTC denied the Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence (Motion to Quash) filed by Gabiosa. The RTC ruled against Gabiosa's contention that the search warrant was invalid as the judge did not examine the complainant but only his witness. The RTC explained that the judge was not mandatorily required to examine both the complainant and his witness.

            CA granted Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari and set aside the decision of RTC. CA held that the Search Warrant No. 149-2017 is null and void, and the search conducted on its authority is also rendered void. Consequent thereto, any evidence gathered by virtue of the aforementioned search warrant are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

 

Issue:

            Whether the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa.

 

Held:

            Yes. The Petition is granted. The Court rules that the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari, considering that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the validity of the search warrant.

            Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — one of two provisions in the Bill of Rights preserving the citizens' right to privacy  — protects every citizen's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It preserves, in essence, the right of the people "to be let alone" vis-à-vis the far-reaching and encompassing powers of the State, with respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects. It thus ensures protection of the individual from arbitrary searches and arrests initiated and perpetrated by the State. The rationale for the right, particularly of the right to be secure in one's home, was explained in the early case of US. v. Arceo, where the Court elucidated: The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.

            In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause;" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

                The CA's construction of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was inaccurate.  Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the CA, in invalidating the search warrant subject of this case, focused on a word used by the Constitution — "and" — and then ruled that it was the intent of the Constitution that both the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined by the judge before any warrant may be issued.  As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither supported by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the right.

                As early as 1937, in the case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the Court explained that ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause.

                The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary.

                If, despite the use of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as probable cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse — the judge examined the witness only and not the applicant — would not be valid as well. Again, the purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant only, or the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual's privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing undue importance on the Constitution's use of the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or."

In addition, it would be a fruitless exercise to insist that the judge should have examined the complainant as well when, as here, he admittedly did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that constitute the probable cause. Based on the affidavit submitted, it was Police Officer 1 Rodolfo M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola) and his "Action Agent" who had personal knowledge of the circumstances as they were the ones who conducted the surveillance and test buy. Even if, for instance, Judge Balagot examined the complainant, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero (P/Supt Ajero), he would have obtained nothing from the latter because of his lack of personal knowledge. P/Supt Ajero was the complainant only because he was the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City Police Station, but it was never alleged that he participated in any of the prior surveillance conducted.